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The system of military justice by which the Armed Forces of
the United States are governed provides the individual, accused
of having committed an offense, greater protection than any other
system of criminal jurisprudence. Only those aspects of this
system which certain to the review of court-martial records, in-
cluding appellate review, will be examined in detail. Other
aspects of the system will be given cursory consideration as they
bear upon the evolution of the system itself. The automatic re-
views, and those which are nearly automatic or appellate by nature,
contribute in no small measure to the fairness of the system as a
whole. Too frequently the rights and privileges of the individual
are believed to be in opposition to, or in conflict with, those
of the Government. The interests of the Government will, there-
fore, be considered. The concept of military justice, to be used
throughout, purports to treat the interests of the individual and
of the Government as being of equal importance and probably
interchangeable
.
Throughout the history of this nation, the Armed Forces which
have been brought to being in times of crises have been composed
largely of civilians as distinguished from the professional or
career militarist. Approximately 11,1*5^,000 of the 12,12^,Ul8
persons serving in the Armed Forces at the personnel peak of
Uorld War II, for example, entered the military service directly
from civilian life. These figures differ from past wars only in
total numbers. The lives of these civilians were governed by
military justice during the -period of their service. In turn,
the lives and well being of thousands of their dependents at
home were affected thereby. Many of these civilian soldiers and
sailors became active leaders in the civic and political affairs
of the communities to which they returned. Many such leaders will
be found today actively participating in various organizations,
veterans groups, state legislative bodies, and in the halls of
Congress. It is little wonder, therefore, that a very pronounced
civilian influence has always exerted itself upon the military
affairs of this country and specifically upon military justice.
It is upon this premise that considerable effort has been
devoted herein in tracing the origin and over-all development of
the military system as it exists today. An understanding of the
basic concepts upon which this system of military justice is
founded will better enable the civilian lawyer to represent his
clients with a fuller appreciation of the privileges extended to
military personnel. Such an understanding will aid the student
of the law in his exploration of a field of law long ignored or
paid little mind by legal scholars, yet vital to the military and
large segments of the population. It should guide the military
lawyer toward a recognition and preservation of the heritages of
2
antiquity tn r which discipline, so essential to the maintenance
of an armed force, is exercised with justice for all who conroose
that force.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice for the government of
the Armed Forces of the United States unified, consolidated,
revised, and codified the Articles of War, the Articles for the
Government of the Navy, and the disciplinary laws of the Coast
Guard, thereby placing' all of the military services under one
law. This Act was approved by the Congress on 5 May 1950 and
became effective 31 May 1951- By Executive Order 102lU, executed
by President Earry S. Truman on 8 February 1951? the Manual for
Courts -Martial, United States, 1951, came into full force and
effect on 31 May 1951- Under the provisions of the Act, the
Armed Forces were deemed to include the Army, the Navy, the Air
Force, and, except when operating as a part of the Navy, the
Coast Guard. The Marine Corps was included within the Navy, as
was the Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy. Per-
sonnel of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, Public Health Service,
and other organizations, when assigned to and serving with the
Armed Forces of the United States , and others were included within
the Act. This inquiry will, therefore, look primarily to the pro-
visions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and to the pro-
visions of Manual for Courts -Martial, United States, 1951, as
primary sources of the existing system of military justice. As
to the interpretations which have been given to these provisions,
reference will only be made tc the decisions of the United States
Court of Military Appeals.
The present inquiry will be confined to the authorized scope
of review of court-martial trial records by the convening auth-
ority, boards of review, and the United States Court of Military
Appeals, together with the limitations thereon. Jurisdictional
matters in general, pretrial and trial procedures, collateral
attack by the judiciary, and other remedial procedures are not
encompassed within this inquiry. The substantive law, upon which
specific or prejudicial error is predicated and subtle distinctions
between matters of fact and matters of law will be avoided so
far as possible.. No effort will be made to compare specific de-
tails of the. military system with those which exist in civilian
criminal practice. Particular attention will be directed to
limitations upon the scope of review and to matters, if any,
which may be considered if arising from sources outside the record.
Finally, consideration will be given to the .use to which judicial
knowledge may be put by reviewing. authorities.
CHAPTER II.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND- --MILITARY JUSTICE
POST WORLD WAR II -DEVELOPMENTS.
U. S. Army,
During World War I
;
k. 355 -000 men were called into the Armed
Forces of the United States. The expansion of the military in
World War II reached far greater proportions, and 12,300,000 men
were brought under arms. More than 11,000 lawyers served in the
Navy during World War II; the proportion would have been similar
in the other services. The outbreak of the Korean Conflict saw
1
our forces brought up to about 5 > 720, GOO men. Educational prog-
rams available to veterans greatly expanded the law school popu-
lations. The natural outgrowth of so many people's lives being
directly affected by the military, so many of whom were lawyers
,
has been a vastly expanded interest in the field of military
justice. The continued maintenance of our largest peacetime
Military Establishment has perpetuated this interest.
Plans for a permanent Military Establishment were being
formulated at about the time that a demobilization of World War
II forces reached completion. Secretary of War, Patterson, met
with Mr. Willis Smith, President of the American Bar Association,
and requested that members of the Association be selected to serve
on the War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice. The
1957 World Almanac; and Blanstein- -Porter, The American Lawyer
,
P- 117-
Committee was created on 25 March 19*+6 with Mr. Arthur T.
Vanderbilt as chairman. Other recognized leaders of the legal
profession who served with him were: Judge Alexander Holtzoff
,
Walter P. Armstrong, Joseph W. Henderson, William T. Joyner,
Honorable Frederick E. Crane, Jacob M. Lashly, Judge Morris A.
2
Soper, and Floyd E. Thompson.
The report of this Committee was submitted on 13 December
19^6 after months of study and research. It was thereafter sub-
jected to thorough study and consideration within the War Depart-
ment by the Office of the Chief of Staff and others. The
Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives,
79th Congress, also made a report on the judicial system of the
Army at about the same tirne.^ Honorable Kenneth C. Royall, then
the Under Secretary of War, was charged with the general super-
it
vision of military justice and clemency, the actual administration
being the responsibility of The Judge Advocate General. In
accordance with these studies and the resultant suggestions based
upon them, the Under Secretary determined which changes the War
Department thought necessary or advisable, and this determination
was approved by the Secretary of War.
2




3 H. R. Rep. No. 2722, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (19^6).
4
5 U.S.C. lSla (19^0). "The Undersecretary of War shall per-
form such duties as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War or
required by law. ..."




Two identical bills were separately introduced into the
United States Senate and the House of Representatives for the
purpose of accomplishing the legislative action necessary to
7bring about the desired changes. The House of Representatives,
after lengthy hearings, passed H. R. 2575, revising the Army
c -curt-martial system, but no hearings were held on the companion
bill in the Senate. Toward the end of the 80th Congress, the
bill revising the Army system, as passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives, and known as the Elston Act, was included as an
amendment to the Selective Service Act of 19*+3 during Senate
8
debate and subsequently became Public Lav; 759, oOth Congress.
The Navy Department had submitted proposed legislation early in
the 80th Congress, but in view of the controversial issues in-
volved and besetting Congress regarding the proposed changes in
the two existing systems of military justice, no action was taken
on the Wavy proposals.
It was during this same session of Congress that the National
9
Security Act of 19^7 was enacted, unifying the armed services
and creating a separate Department of the Air Force effective
18 September I9V7. Since there were such wide differences between
the proposed Army and Navy systems and in order to avoid the
7
S. 903, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (19^7) and H. R. 2575, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (19V7).
8 62 Stat. 627, Act of June 2k, 19U8. 62 Stat, at Large, Ch.
625, Sect. 201, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (18U8), 10 U.S.C. 1^72 et
seq.; U. S. Cong. Ser., 8lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) Leg. Hist.
2225-
9 Act of 26 July I9J+7 (c. 3^3, 61 Stat. U95).
establishment of a third distinct system, Secretary of Defense
James Forrestal in July 19^8 appointed a special committee to draft
a Uniform Code of Military Justice which would be equally applicable
to all of the Armed Forces. Professor Edmund Morgan, Jr., of the
Harvard Law School, was designated chairman, the other members of
the committee being: Assistant Secretary of the Army, Gordon Gray,
Under Secretarj/ of the Navy, John Kenney, and Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force, Eugene Zukert. Supplementing the efforts of the
main committee was a working group of approximately fifteen per-
sons, including officer representatives of each of the services
and five civilian lawyers under the chairmanship of Mr. Felix
Larkin, Assistant General Counsel in the Office of the Secretary
of Eefense. After some seven months of study, the combined ef-
forts were S. 857, presented to the Senate, and a companion bill,
H. R. J+OQO, This Act has become known as the "Uniform Code of
„11
Military Justice.
U. S. Navy .
A very similar development had been taking place in the Navy.
At the request of the Secretary of the Navy, a committee, headed
•J-
U. S. Cong. Ser., 8lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1950 ) Leg. Hist. 2225-11 UCMJ, Act of May 5, 1950, 6U Stat. 106 (50 U.S.C. 551-736).
Codified and enacted into law as Title 10 of the United States Code,
entitled "Armed Forces," Act of August 10, 1956 (Pub. Law 1028, c.
10U1, 8hth Cong., 70A Stat. 36). NOTE: Corresponding sections of
Title 10 may be found by adding 300 to the specific Article of the
Uniform Code of Military Justi ce. By way of example, Art. 1, UCMJ,
has been codified as 10 U.S.c7~"H01. (Hereafter referred to as the
"Code" and in subsequent footnotes as UCMJ.
)
8
by Mr. Arthur A. Ballantine, New York attorney and former Under
Secretary of the Treasury, submitted its first report in 19^-3
,
, 12followed by a second report in 19.to . Other members of the
Ballantine Committee were: Professor Noel T. Dowling, Columbia
Law School; Honorable Matthew F. McGuire; Major General Thomas
E. Watson, -USMC; Rear Admiral George L. Russell, USN (Assistant
Judge Advocate General of the Navy); Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich,
USN; Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, USN; Captain Leon H. Movine,
USCG; Lieutenant Commander Richard L. Tedrow, USNR; and Lieutenant
John J. Finn, USNR. A complete revision of the Articles for the
Government of the Navy was recommended by another committee, re-
porting in 19^5* This committee was headed by the Honorable
Matthew F. McGuire, U. S. District Judge, D. C; other members
being the Honorable Alexander Holtzoff, U. S. District Judge, D. C;
13
and Colonel James M. Sneieker, USMC. Father Robert J. White,
Dean of Catholic University Law School, Rear Admiral, USNR (Ret. ),
made recommendations for changes in the Navy court-martial system
Ik
as a result of several studies undertaken by him. Another com-
prehensive report recommending numerous changes in the naval
system was submitted by the General Court-Martial Sentence Review
15
Board, headed by Professor Arthur-John Keeffe, Cornell Law School.
Report of Ballantine Comm. to the Sec' y of the Navy (Sep
19^3j J
"
Report "Ballantine Comm. to the Sec'y of the Navy T-Apr 19U6 )
.
Report of the McGuire Comm. to the Sec'y of the Navy (Nov
1^ White, A Study of 500 Naval Prisoners and Naval Justice (Jan
19U7).
' Report of the General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board to
the Sec'y of the Navy ( Jan I9U7).
9
Other members serving on this board were: Felix E. Larkin, Vice-
President; Admiral C. P. Snyder, USN; Captain Hunter Wood, Jr.,
USN; Captain John A. Glynn, USCG; Captain Clifford B. Hines, USN;
Lieutenant Colonel E. N. Murray, USMC; and Commander A. W. Dickinson,
USNR. Eased upon the foregoing reports and independent studies
within the Navy Department, a proposed bill for the amendment and
revision of the Articles for the Government of the Navy was ihtro-
16
duced in' Congress. Action upon this proposed legislation was
held in abeyance, as mentioned above, pending results of the
committee appointed by the Secretary of Defense.
MILITARY LAW .
Origin- -In U. S. Navy .
In attempting to make an analysis of the scope of reviews
authorized by the Code, it may prove profitable that some attention
be given to the historical background out of which the present
system has evolved. The interest and activity, attendant upon the
enactment of the Code, evoked considerable controversy and com-
mensurate publicity. There has, therefore, been some tendency
toward a popular notion that military justice is something of very
recent origin. Such is not the truth. Turning back the pages of
history, the source and common ancestor of military and naval codes
17
will probably be found in The Ordinance of Richard I, dated 1190,
16 S. 1333 (starred version), H. R. 3687, both 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. (19U7).




which applied to soldiers as well as to sailors. The Black Book
of the Admiralty may be considered to be the first code speci-
19fically applicable to the British Navy. It appears that the
Ordinance and Articles of Martial law for the Government of the
Navy, 16*1-5, was the first statutory authority for naval courts-
20 ,.
martial. Cromwell's Articles, first enacted in 164-9 and
amended in 1652, became the original statutory provisions for
the general government of the Navy. Thgr contained what had been
the naval law in practice and were to remain the basic naval
law until 17^+9 when a new code was enacted. The Articles of 17^9
differed very little from Cromwell's Articles and were in force
21
at the time of the American Revolution.
John Adams compiled the first articles for use in the
American Navy by selecting suitable provisions from the British
Articles of 17^9* His work was approved on 28 November 1775 by
the Continental Congress and became the Rules for the Regulation
of the Navy of the United Colonies. The wisdom and good judgment
of such men as John Adams is aptly demonstrated by the fact that
these Rules provided regulation for the U. S. Navy with minor
modification until 1862 when the Articles for the Government of
22
the United States Navy were enacted by Congress. Forty-five
Edited by Sir Travers Twiss, Republished in 1871 with histori-
cal introduction.
19 Holdsworth, History of English law, 125 et seq (3d ed., 1922).
20 Lovette, Naval Customs, Traditions and Usages
,
p. 66 (3d ed.,
1939).
~~
2 Pasley and Larkin, The Navy Court-Martial: Proposals for
Its geform
, 33 Cornell L.Q. 195, 197.'£Z Rev. Stat. Sec. l62k (1875), 3^ U.S.C.A. 591 (1928).
11
articles were added between 1862 and the repeal of the articles
by the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which be-
came effective on 31 May 1951* It may be stated in all fairness
that Cromwell's Articles of 16^9 served a useful purpose for more
than three hundred years.
Origin—in U. S. Army—To World War I .
Lieutenant Colonel Waldemar A. Solf , USA, the author of
Chapter XX, Legal and Legislative Basis, MCM, 1951 j P» 1^6, points
out that a Committee of the Continental Congress composed of John
Adams, Thomas Jefferson, John Rutledge, James Wilson, and R. R.
Livingston patterned a set of Articles of War, in 1776, upon the
23
British Articles. He quotes from the autobiography of John Adams
in part as follows:
"This report was made by me and Mr, Jefferson, in conse-
quence of a letter from General Washington, sent by Colonel
Tudor, Judge Advocate General, representing the insufficiency
of the Articles of War, and requesting a revision of them.
Mr. John Adams and Mr. Jefferson were appointed a committee
to hear Tudor, and revise the Articles. It was a very diffi-
cult and unpopular subject, and I observed to Jefferson, that
whatever alteration we should report x?ith the least energy in
it, or the least tendency to a necessary discipline of the
Army, would be opposed with as much veheuence, as if it were
the most perfect; we might as well, therefore, report a com-
plete system at once, and let it meet its fate. Something
perhaps might be gained. There was extant one system of
articles of war which had carried two empires to the head of
mankind, the Roman and the British; for the British Articles
of War were only a literal translation of the Roman. It
would be vain for us to seek in our own inventions, or the
records of warlike nations, for a more complete system of
military discipline. It was an observation founded in the
23 Works of John Adams, Vol. Ill, pp. 68-69, Autobiography,
Monday, iteguct 1% 1776.
12
undoubted facts, that the prosperity of nationshad been in
proportion to the discipline of their forces by sea and
land; I was, therefore, for reportin' the British Articles
of War, tatidem verbis
. Jefferson, in those days, never
failed to a,< ree with me, in everything of a political nature,
and he very courteously concurred in this. The British
Articles of War were, accordingly, reported, and defended
in Congress by me assisted by some others, and finally
carried. That laid the foundation of a discipline which,
in time, brought our troops to a capacity of contending
with British veterans, and a rivalry with the best troops
of France."
It is of considerable interest that prior to the adoption of
the British Articles, the second Continental Congress, on 30 June
1775, had adopted a set of articles prepared by a committee, con-
sisting of George Washington, Philip Schuyler, Silas Deane, Thomas
Cushing, and Joseph Hewes. Some of their articles were taken from
the British Code, but others were taken from the Massachusetts
Articles of 5 April 1775 which probably constituted the first
American written code of military laws. The Code of 177°
assembled the articles into the form and arrangement of the British
Articles. The background of the British Articles, though not of
course identical, did very closely follow the general pattern and
25
trends from common ancestral -Ordinance of Richard I of 1190. It
is of passing interest at this point to note that at the time of
the American Revolution in 1776, the Armies and Navies of both
sides were conducting warfare under the same articles. It is of
greater import that notice be given to the fact that those who
were later to take an active part in drafting the Constitution of
the United States were well aware of the systems of military law
2^ Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents
, pp. 21-22 (1895 ed.,
1920 reprint).
25 ikifl j 903.
under which the Army and the Navy were functioning at the time
of its adoption. Based upon this historical background, Colonel
Winthrop in considering the powers of Congress under the Consti-
26
tution of the United States and those of the President as the
Executive power very neatly and concisely stated:2"
"The provisions of the Constitution which may be regarded
as the source or sanction of, or authority for, our existing
military law and jurisdiction—the discipline of armies as
well as the war power—are ..."
He then pointed to the provisions of Article I, Section 8, and
Article II, Sections 1, 2, and 3» Constitutional recognition of
then existing military law, together with authorizations noted,
has led to the rationale that courts-martial are not a part of the
judiciary of the United States but a part of the Executive Branch
of the Government. From this foundation is also derived the propo-
sition that the proceedings, findings, and sentences of courts-
29
martial are not subject to judicial revision or appeal. It is
recognized that there have been many cases involving certiorari,
30
writs of error, prohibition, mandamus, and habeas corpus. Many
of those cases are, to be sure,' within highly controversial areas
but of a nature beyond the present scope of inquiry and not directly
related to it.
26
U. S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8.
I U. S. Const., Art. II, Sees. 1, 2, and 3«2b Vinthrop, Military Law and Precedents
,
p. 16 (1895 ed., 1920
reprint). It is significant that the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution was not considered as a source of power at this time.
tg E. g., Dynes v. Hoover , 20 How. 65 (1858).
3 Winthrop, Military law and Precedents
,
pp. 50-51 (l895 ed.
1920 reprint). Also Snedeker, Habeas Corpus and Court-Martial
Prisoners
, 6 Vanderbilt L. Rev, 288 (195317
11+
Returning to the pre-World War evolution of military law in
the Army, the 1776 Articles were amended in May of 1786. The
Constitution was adopted on 17 September 1787* Requiring rati-
fication by nine states, the Constitution became effective on
k March 1789 with a ratification by eleven states. The First
Congress, by an act of 29 September 1789* adopted the Articles of
1786 for the existing army. These articles remained substantially
as they were until the enactment of a new code on 10 April 1806,
which contained one hundred and one articles with an additional
provision for the punishment of spys. With but minor amendments,
this code remained in effect until the Enactment of 22 June 187^
(Rev. Sts. Sec. 13*+2 and 13^-3 )• Further amendments were made in
189b by the creation of the summary court^ in l892 :> and 1895. 3
Little change took place thereafter until World War I.
Ansell Influence .
In 1918, General Samuel T. Ansell expressed legal views which
came into such sharp conflict with War Department interpretations
and those of the Chief of Staff as to require submission of the
matter to then Secretary of War, Baker. General Ansell 1 s position
in the field of law bears a striking resemblance to that of the
famous Billy Mitchell in the field of aviation. General Ansell
sunk no battleships, found little popular support, and today his
J" Act of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 6kQ.32 Act of July 27, 1892, 27 Stat. 277, 28l.
°3 Rev. Stats. Sees. 1202 et seq (1895).
15
name is hardly associated with the changes in military law which
have come about since World War II. In 1919> a bill was prepared
by General Ansell which was introduced in the Senate and in the
House of Representatives. This bill was designed to revolution-
ize the Army court-martial system. Briefly, the proposed legis-
lation provided that: every charge would be supported by the oath
of a person' subject to military law upon personal knowledge or
upon personal investigation; no charge should be referred to, or
•
i. tried by, a general court-martial unless an officer of the Judge
Advocate General's Department indorsed, as his opinion, that a
• charge was legally sufficient and that there was prima facie proof
of guilt; that charges be served and trial be. had within specified
periods or. the accused released without opportunity for retrial;
that penalties be imposed for failures to comply with provisions
imposing procedural duties upon officers; enlisted personnel could
serve on general or special courts; that the accused have the
right of peremptory and for cause challenges against members; the
right to file an affidavit of bias or prejudice against the con-
vening authority; a trial judge, called the court judge advocate,
be appointed for each general or special court with, power to
approve a finding of guilty or reduce to a lesser included offense
and to suspend, in whole or in part, any sentence not extending to
death or dismissal; the accused have military or civilian counsel;
neither the appointing authority nor any other military authority
S. 6h and E. R. 367, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919)-
16
review or control the finding of a court, excepting a sentence of
death which was to be confirmed and ordered executed by the
President, with power in the appointing authority to mitigate,
remit, or suspend certain sentences; a court of military appeals
be created, consisting of three judges appointed by the President,
to review the record of proceedings of every general court or
military commission which carried a sentence involving death,
dismissal, or dishonorable discharge or confinement of more than
six months, for the correction of errors of law. Other changes
were provided. The obvious intent of the bill was to create a
tribunal which would be a court, the proceedings of which from
35beginning to end would be wholly judicial as distinguished from
36
quasi-judicial or executive, functions. The prevailing military
view had been aptly summarized by Winthrop when he wrote:
"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the Government,
it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive
department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of
the executive power, provided by Congress for the President
as Commander-in-Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the
army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized
under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives . 37
BOARDS OF REVIEW—U. S. A3MY--1918-1920 .
At about the time of the Ansell revolt, an incident of riot
and mutiny focused public attention upon the review procedures
then in being. A report of this event recites:
35 Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 5^3, 558.
3^ Morgan, The Existing Court-Martial System and the Ansell
Army Articles , 29 Yale L. J. 52 (1919). ' The author of this article
is the same Edmund M. Morgan who served as Chairman of the Forrestal
Committee in 19*+8, for drafting UCMJ.
.'.' 37 winthrop, op. cit., fn. 30, h$.
17
"Early in that war /World War if some troops stationed near
Houston, Texas, engaged in a riot and a mutiny. Some of the
offenders were promptly brought to trial by the court-martial
for mutiny. The trial lasted several days and was carefully,
fairly, and scrupulously conducted. Each night the steno-
graphic transcription of the day's proceedings was brought to
the Department judge advocate, who wrote his review as the
trial progressed. On the last day several of the mutineers
were found guilty and some were sentenced to death. That
night the review was completed. The sentences were approved
and confirmed by the Department commander pursuant to his
authority under Article hS of the 1916 code to confirm death
sentences. in time of war, and the next morning the sentences
were carried into execution. "3°
Very promptly thereafter, Office Memo, JAG 321.^, of 6 August 1918,
was promulgated thereby creating, within the Office of The Judge
39
Advocate General of the Army, a Board of Beview. The War De-
partment then established a pattern of appellate review by the
promulgation of General Order No. 7, 19l8> requiring the review
of court-martial records in the Office of The Judge Advocate General
UO
or in a branch office before execution of any serious sentence.
The salient provisions of this order received statutory recognition
and authority under the Act of h June 1920, by the enactment of
Article of War 50|-. In part this Act provides:
"Art. 502* Review; Rehearing—The Judge Advocate General shall
constitute, in his office, a board of review consisting of
not less than three officers of the Judge Advocate General's
Department.
'
"Before any record of trial in which there has been ad-
judged a sentence requiring approval or confirmation by the
President under the provisions of Article k6, Article b8, or
Article 51 is submitted to the President, such record shall
be examined by the board of review. The board shall submit
its opinion, in writing, to The Judge Advocate General, who
;• ' 35 Legal and Legislative Basis, MCM, 1951 , p. l*+7
.
•
^ Forward 1 BR by Myron C. Cramer, Major General, The Judge
Advocate General of the Army.
40 Mott, Hartnett and Morton, A Survey
,
of : the Literature of
Military Law—A Selective Bibliography , 6 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 333*
note ±9, p. 31+7.
'
41 Ul Stat. 797.
shall, except as herein otherwise provided, transmit the
record and the board's opinion, with his recommendations
directly to the Secretary of War for the action of the
President.
"Except as herein provided, no authority shall order the
execution of any other sentence of a general court-martial in-
volving the penalty of death dismissal not suspended,, dis-
honorable discharge not suspended, or confinement in a
penitentiary . unless and until the board of review shall,
with the approval of The Judge Advocate General, have he3.d
the record of trial upon which such sentence is based legally
sufficienx to support the sentence; .... In the event that
The Judge Advocate General shall not concur in the holding
of the boa^d of review, The Judge Advocate General shal.1 for-
ward ail the pepers in the case, including the opinion of the
board of review and his own dissent therefrom, directly to
the Secretary of War for the action of the President, who
may confirm the action of the reviewing authority or con-
firming authority below
;
in whole or in part, with or with-
out remission, mitigation, or commutation, or may disapprove,
in whole or in part, any finding of guilt, and may disapprove
or vacate the sentence in whole or in part."
Branch Offices .
This act gave The Judge Advocate General the power to establish
two or more boards of review within his office and to establish
branch offices with any distant command. This power was exercised
by the Army shortly after the outbreak of World War II. A Branch
Office of The Judge Advocate General with the United States Army
Forces in the British Isles was established on 22 May 19^L2, and on
9 November 19^2 this office became the Branch Office of The Judge
Advocate General with the European Tneatre of Operations. On
27 October 19^+2, a branch was established for the China-Burma
-
India Theatre of Operations which on 2k October 19^+ became the
Branch Office of The Judge Advocate General with the United States
Forces in the India-Burma Tneatre. On 25 September 19^, a branch
19
\;as established for the Pacific Ccean Areas. The Branch Office
of The Judge Advocate General with the United States Army Forces
in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations \/as so named on
1 November 19^, having been initially established on 8 March 19^3*
The Branch Office of The Judge Advocate General with the United
States Amy Forces in the Pacific vac first established for the
South West Pacific Area on 11 July 19^2, also serving the South
Pacific Area until September 19*+*+; the office was redesignated on
30 June 19^5* The Army discontinued the use of branch offices
after the end of World War II. Statutory authority for branch
offices has. been carried over into the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, In December of 1955* The Judge Advocate General of the
Navy established a branch office at San Francisco,, California,
with two boards of review which are currently functioning there.
Neither the Air Force nor Coast Guard have branch offices at the
present time.
It will be noted that the board of review constituted under
Article pO§> supra, was strictly an advisory body with the duty to
examine records and submit opinions. Examinations as to the
legality of sentences and for legal sufficiency were limited to
certain types of cases. The Judge Advocate General might approve
or disapprove the holding of the board of review in forwarding
a case to the Secretary of War for the action of the President.
J
1
^ Mott, op. cit., fn. Uo, 3^8.43 Art. 5b, UCMJ.
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The concept that courts-martial were executive instrumentalities
to aid the President was clearly recognized by the Congressional
enactment of Article 50§.
First Board—Navy--19^5 •
In order to preserve some continuity in the chronology of
events, attention again focuses upon the Navy. By simple precept,
The Judge Advocat2 General of the Navy first appointed a board of
review in his office on 10 March 19^5^ "for the purpose of reviewing
and examining such records of trial by courts-martial as may be
referred to it by The Judge Advocate General or The Assistant Judge
Advocate General. ^ Others followed. The opinions of these boards
were advisory only. There were no written rules of procedure; no
briefs were filed; nor were oral arguments presented. In addition
to courts-martial review, these boards were called upon to con-
sider war crimes trial records, prepared changes to the Articles
for the Government of the Navy, and other legal problems of im-
portance. Boards of review, created in the same manner as had
been the Army boards in 19l3> continued to function in the Navy
until the effective date of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
31 May 1951.
THE JUDICIAL CCUKCIL--THE ELSTON ACT
.
The next matter of moment was the enactment of the Elston
Act as an amendment to the Selective Service Act of 19k8, supra .
j
Winthrop, op_. cit ., fn. 57'
2 Navy Department, Office of The Judge Advocate General Letter
JAG,:;: HAS: la of March 10, 19^5 (T.L. Gatch, Judge Advocate General).
40 m 8kL£. f&fc
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Article of War 50§ was rescinded and replaced by Article 50 of the
amendment. This Article, in part, provides:
"Art. 50—Appellate Review
—
"a. Board of review; judicial council.
—
"The Judge Advocate General shall constitute, in his
office, a Board of Review composed of not less than three
officers of. the Judge Advocate General's Department. He shall
also constitute, in his office, a Judicial Council composed of
three general officers of the Judge Advocate General's De-
partment ... .
"
"g. Weighing evidence. --In the appellate review of records
of trial by courts-martial as provided in these articles the
Judge Advocate General and all appellate agencies in his office
". snail have authority to weigh evidence; Judge the credibility
of witne s
s
es, and~determine controverted que
s




• :'.. Under Secretary of War, Kenneth C. Royall, in discussing the
amendments which were being presented to Congress, made the follow-
ing comment:
"The appellate process created by Article of War 50|- re-
ceived a severe test during World War II, but so satisfactory
have been the results that the War Department believes that
the fundamental mechanism prescribed by Article of War 50§-
should not only be perpetuated but should also be strengthened.
Consequently, the Article has been rewritten and additional
safeguards have been introduced.
"Of first importance' is the grant of authority tc The Judge
Advocate General and the appellate agencies to weigh evidence
and reconcile conflicts therein and to determine the credibility
of the witnesses. Heretofore the power to weigh evidence has
been confined to cases requiring confirmation by the President,
but by this proposed amendment it will be extended to all
classes of cases. Under this new grant of power, The Judge
Advocate General and Boards of Review will possess the same
power with respect to findings of facts as have generally
been exercised by civil appellate courts in equity cases.
*? 62 Stat. 635; Articles of War as amended June 2k, 191*8, 80th
Cong*, 2d Sess., Public Lav 759.
^° Royall, op. cit., fn, 2, 28l.
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"Of equal importance is the introduction into the appel-
late procedure of a new reviewing tribunal to be known and
designated as the Judicial Council. It will consist of three
members who will be of general officer grade if they are
available. ... The Judicial Council will not supplant the
Boards of Review, but will form an additional appellate review
tribunal for the most serious (but not capital) cases, prin-
cipally those now requiring confirmation of the President
acting through the Under Secretary of War."
It may well be said that the above changes were not by any
means the only changes wrought by the 19^8 amendments «, That work
established a code which was to become an integral part of the
Uniform Code. The influences of General Ansell were strongly
asserted- On one hand, strong forces have been exerting an ever-
increasing pressure to reduce and diminish the attributes of mili-
tary command in so far as they manifest themselves in the exercise
of military discipline. On the other hand, those dedicated to the
military concept have fought valiantly to preserve a heritage of more
than three hundred years. The ancient customs and usages of the
sea have blended with chivalrous deeds of heraldry to make the pro-
fession of arms on land or at sea a noble and an honorable pro-
fession. The military concept was not conceived as the arbitrary
whim of the martinet motivated by revenge and brimming with resent-
ment over the slightest encroachment upon his prerogatives of command
but stems from a system older than the Constitution itself. Prior
to the Constitution, the executive power of government vested in the
Congress which on occasion exercised the power of finally acting
kg
upon the proceedings of general courts-martial. * From the
adoption of the Constitution of the United States to the inception
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, all procedures in review
^9
"tfihthrop, Military Law and Precedents, p. kkT, note k (1895
ed., 1920 reprintX
of coact-martial records were conducted within the executive
branch of the government with the ultimate power of remedial action
reposing in the President himself.
THB UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ,
The United States Air Force became a separate armed force
effective 18 September 19^7 > as previously noted, upon passage of
the National Security Act of 19^7. In order to establish a
system of military law within the Air Force, Congress provided
that "the Articles of War and all other laws now in effect re-
lating to the Judge Advocate General's Department, The Judge
Advocate General of the Army and the administration of military
justice within the United States Army" would be applicable to the
Air Force from June 25, 19^8. The day before, June 2k, l^kQ,
the Elston Act had been approved, to be effective February 1, 19^9*
Part of the Elston Act amended the Articles of War but a separate
part of the same Act, which later became Sections 2k6, 2k"J, and
2^9 of the Selective Service Act of 19^8, established within the
Army a Judge Advocate General's Corps. The Air Force took the
position that only the new Articles of War were intended to apply
to them. The general position was substantiated hy court decision
52m the case of Stock v. Department of the Air Force, but the
court did not distinguish which part, either, or bcth of the acts




Act of July 2b, d$kj*
i± 62 Stat, 101*4 (.1948 ).
^ 186 F'.aa 968 (1950).
2k
doubt in this area by enactment of the Air Force Organization Act
of 195-* The provisions of the Elston Act did form the foundation
upon which the Air Force system has been developed.
TBS UNITED STA.TF.S COAST GUARD.
Before, the effect?.ve date of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, the Coast Guard had its own disciplinary laws for maintain-
ing discipline cf Coast Guard personnel when not serving with the
u"3
Navy.^ The Coast Guard has become subject to the Uniform Code of
Military «TustIc3 whether ser/ing with the Navy or not.
53 Articles fcr the Discipline of the United States Coast Guard, 63




SGOFjil OF KFIYIEW -
In approaching the problem of delineating the scope of review
by a convening author-icy, it may not be amiss to consider briefly
the identity of a convening authority and what it is that he is
going to review. At the outuet, it ma?/ be kept in mind that three
types of courts-mar Isial have teen provided by the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, to wit: General courts-martial, which shall con-
sist of a law officer and any number of members not less than five;
Speci al courts -martial, which shall consist of any number of mem-
bers not less than three; and Summary courts-martial, which shall
consist of one officer. For the present purpose, a general court-
martial has jurisdiction to try persons subject to the Code for any
OifidaSBai .iiade punishable by the Code and may, under such limitations
as the President may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not for-
bidden by the Code, including the penalty of death when specifically
55
authorized by the Code. The special court-martial has juris-
diction to try persons subject to the Code for any noncapital
oifense and for capital offenses under Presidential regulation.
A special court-martial may, under such limitations as the President
may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not forbidden by the Code
except death, dishonorable discharge, dismissal, confinement in
51* UCMJ, Art. lb.
55 Ibid ., Art. 18.
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excess of six months, bard labor without confinement in excess of
three months,, forfeiture of pay exceeding two-thirds pay per month,
or forfeiture of pay for a period exceeding six months." The
summary court-martial may try persons subject to the Code except
officers, warrant officers, cadets, aviation cadets, and midship-
men for any noncapital offense made punishable by the Code and
may, under such limitations as the President may prescribe, ad-
judge any punishment not forbidden by the Code except death,
dismissal, dishonorable or bad conduct discharge, confinement in
excess of one month, hard labor without confinement in excess of
forty-fivs days, restriction to certain specified 2imits in excess
of two months, or forfeiture of pay in excess of two -thirds of one
month's pay. Personnel of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard
may object to trial by summary court-martial in which event such
person shall be- tried by special or general court-martial. Army
and Air Force personnel may likewise object to trial by summary
court-martial, but only when such person has not demanded trial
57by court-martial in lieu of nonjudicial punishment. The Navy
had made use of the bad conduct discharge for many years, but its
use within the Army and the Air Force began with the advent of the
Uniform Code.
For the purposes of this discussion, the Convening Authority
is the officer who convened the court-martial, whatever type, a
cv 3M& * > A^t. 19-
Ibid., Art. 20; (pars. 132 and 133, MCM, 195l).
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successor in command, or any officer exercising general court-
martial jurisdiction. ^ The Uniform Code contains express pro-
59
vision as to convening the particular types of courts-martial.
After every trial by court-martial, including rehearings and new
trials, the record must "be forwarded to the convening authority
for initial review and action. This record varies with the type
of court involved and with the sentence adjudged. Each general
court-martial is required to keep a separate verbatim transcript
61
of all proceedings had before it. A bad conduct discharge can-
not be adjudged by a special court-martial unless a complete
record of the proceedings and testimony before the court has been
62
made. When a bad conduct discharge is not adjudged, a record
of trial by special court-martial need contain only a summarized
63
report of the testimony, objections, and other proceedings. In
order to prevent the use of a special court-martial as a vehicle
for the issuance. of a bad conduct discharge, the Army has pro-
hibited the appointment of reporters for special courts-martial
6k
without the prior approval of the Secretary of the Army. The
result of this action has been the elimination of trials before
Army special courts-martial of offenses for which a punitive dis-
charge would be appropriate upon conviction. Within the Army,
cq Ibid., Art. 60; (par. 84, MCM, 1951).
S 32M**' Arts ' 22 > 23> aDd 2^'
°° Ibid., Art. 60; (par. 84, MCM, 1951 )•
3* "(par. 82, MCM, 1951).
£
2 UCMJ, Art. 19.
°3 (pars. 15b and 83b (2), MCM, 1951 )•
54 SR 22-145-1, as changed by CI, 6 Mar 1952.
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the summarized report is most extensively utilized in cases which
are tried by special courts-martial. The other services tend to
utilize the verbatim transcript whether the sentence contains a
bad conduct discharge or not. Unless otherwise prescribed by the
convening or higher authority, the evidence considered by the
summary court-martial is not required to be summarized or attached
to the record of trial. The Secretary of the Navy, as such
higher authority, has provided for the use of a summarization of
the evidence which relates to any specification of which an accused
has been found guilty after a plea of not guilty before a summary
66
court-martial.
It was previously noted that the record of every trial by
court-martial is forwarded to the convening authority for initial
review and action. Having considered who are convening authorities,
the types of courts-martial which they are empowered to convene,
and the kind of records which are prepared by those courts, under
varying conditions, the next inquiry will be directed toward the
scope of review by the convening authority and the powers vested
in him in connection with this review.
Provision for the initial review of court-martial records
and the action to be taken thereon are generally contained in
Chapter XVTI cf the Manual for Courts -Martial, United States, 1951,
which contains paragraphs 8U through 91 • Of these provisions,
§ (par. 79e, MCM, 1951).
16.66 1955 ws, MCM, 1951, 011
Paragraph 86b (l) contains the requirement that the convening
authority before approving a finding of guilty or the sentence
adjudged therefor, must determine: (a) that the court was legally
constituted throughout the trial and had jurisdiction over the
offense and the person tried; (b) that the accused had the requi-
site mental capacity at the time of trial and the requisite mental
responsibility at the time of the commission of the offense; (c) that
the competent evidence of record establishes each element of the
offense of which the accused was found guilty; (d) that the sentence
was within the power of the court to adjudge and within the pre-
scribed limitations on punishments; and (e) that there ware no
errors which materially prejudiced the substantial rights of the
accused.
The above is in implementation of Article 6k of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, which provides:
"In acting on the findings and sentence of a court-martial,
the convening authority shall approve only such findings of
guilty and the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence,
as he finds correct in law and fact and as he, in his discretion
,
determines should be approved. ..." (Emphasis added.
)
In discussing this provision of the Code, the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals looked to the legislative history of the Code in a
67
recent case, United State s v. Massey , ' for the meaning of "in
his discretion." The Court determined that Congress intended to
grant the convening authority an exceedingly broad power to
°7 United States v. Massey (No. 5581), 5 USCM1 5lk, 18 CMR 138.
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disapprove a finding or a sentence. Judge Brosman, writing for a
6Q
unanimous Court, then went on to say:
"Originally these words were absent from the Code's draft.
However, from the first the official commentary on the pro-
posed Article 6k of the Code stated that the convening
authority 'may disapprove a finding or a sentence for any
reason.' (Emphasis supplied.) Hearings before the House
Committee on Armed Services, 8ist Congress, 1st Session, on
H. R. 2U98, pages II82-II83. Mr. Larkin, one of the Code's
principal draftsmen, explained that Article 6k 'was intended
to give him /the convening authority/ a free hand in doing
anything he wants for any reason in cutting down the sentence
or in disapproving. ' However, certain members of Congress
feared that the phrasing of the Article--as it then stood
—
was insufficient to make it fully comprehensible. Certain
of the colloquy concerning the draftsmen's intention is highly
pertinent to the present case:
"'Mr. Brooks c He /the convening authority/ doesn't have
to read the record or anything else/sic/. He can just say
disapproved and it is through.
"'Mr. Larkin. That is right. In the normal course of the
review of the case he looks to its legality and the establish-
ment of the facts and the appropriateness of the sentence and
he shouldn't approve anything that is wrong or illegal, but
he can disapprove it if it is illegal, if it is wrong, and
for any other reason.
"'Mr. Brooks. Or for no reason at all?
"'Mr. Larkin. Or for no reason at all.
"'Mr. Rivers. That is right.
"'Mr. Larkin. The classic case that I think General
Eisenhower stated in his testimony before your sub-committee
last year was that even though you might have a case where
a man is convicted and it is a legal conviction and it is
sustainable, that man may have such a unique value and may
be of such importance in a certain circumstance in a war
area that the commanding officer may say 'Well, he did it
all right and they proved it all right, but I need him and I
want him and I am just going to bust this case because I want





"'With the preceding discussion in mind the words 'in his
discretion' were inserted. House Hearings, supra, page
1266. No sort of similar phrase appears in Articles 66 or
67, which provide for review by a board of review and by
this court. '"
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In a rather recent case, United States v. Wise , the Court
determined the enumeration contained in paragraph 86b of the
Manual, supra , was not intended to be all-inclusive and that any
attempt to otherwise interpret it would be in conflict with
Article 6k of the Code, set out above. Referring to Article 6k,
Judge Latimer, speaking for a unanimous Court, says: (p. kTj)
"That language in essence states that he must determine
whether or not the sentence as imposed is appropriate factually
and.it should be apparent that appropriateness includes some -
thing more than legality . Of course, an appropriate sentence
must be legal, but the reverse is not necessarily true. The
_
maximum ; legal punishment is seldom imposed except in aggravated
cases. (Emphasis added.)
From the foregoing, it appears to be beyond controversy that
the convening authority has. the absolute power to disapprove any
finding of a court-martial reviewed by him. Research has failed
to disclose any qualification to thi6 proposition. The same general
principle applies to any sentence, except a mandatory death sen-
70
tence, which he cannot even suspend. Power to reduce a death
sentence upon reduction of a finding will be discussed later.
LIMITATIONS ON SCOPE OF REVIEW .
No Power to Disapprove Finding of Not Guilty .
Consideration has thus far gone to the scope of review and
the power of disapproval which, of course, is the converse of
69 United States v. Wise (No. 6937), 6 USCMA kJ2, 20 CMR 188.
7° (par. G8e, MCM, 19§T).
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approval. Attention will, therefore, be directed into the channel
of "approval" and what, if any, limitations have been placed upon
the power of "approval" as granted by Article 6k of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, supra.
Probably the most extreme situation which can be envisioned
would be presented by the record of a court-martial trial which
had terminated with a finding of not guilty. Does the convening
authority have any power which would enable him to disagree with
the court-martial or to compel such a court-martial to change,
alter, or reconsider its findings?
Historical .




is presented. In the Tapalina case, the accused, a military
policeman, was found not guilty of a burglary charge by a general
court-martial. The convening authority returned the case to the
court with an endorsement amounting to an argument that the accused
was guilty and that the finding of the court was wrong. On re-
vision by the court-martial, the accused was thereupon found guilty.
The Judge Advocate General of the Army expressed the advisory
opinion that the accused was innocent. The convening authority,
however, approved the conviction, and the sentence was ordered
executed.
Manual and Code Provisions .
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the convening
authority may not return the record of any case for reconsideration
71 Morgan, Background of the Code (l953)> 6 Vanderbilt L.Pev.
169, 171-
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"by the court-martial of any finding of not guilty of any specifi-
72
cation or of a ruling which amounts to a finding of not guilty.
'
The Manual provides:''
"... Neither a finding of not guilty nor a ruling of a
court which amounts to a finding of not guilty requires any
action by the convening authority thereon. The latter should
neither, approve nor disapprove the action of the court in
such a case. Disapproval cannot in any event affect the
finality of a legal acquittal or a_ruling of the court that
amounts to a legal acquittal . . . /and/ ... No action can be
taken by the convening authority that would amount to cen-
sure of the court or the members thereof. See Article 37 ••••"
Article 37, Uniform Code of Military Justice, to which the
Manual makes reference, was designed to insure compliance with the
above provisions and to eliminate the possibilities of other
Tapalina cases. It provides in part:
"No authority convening a general, special, or summary
. court-martial, nor any other commanding officer, shall cen-
sure, reprimand, or admonish such court or any member, law
officer, or counsel thereof, with respect to the findings
or sentence adjudged by the court ...."
See also (par. 85b, MCM, 1951).
The first and probably most important limitation upon the
power of the convening authority is, therefore, more accurately
designed as a removal of not guilty findings from his purview.
Two possible exceptions to the proposition that the convening
authority lacks the power to review findings of not guilty will
be treated later herein, i.e., insanity and jurisdiction, which
deserve separate consideration. In reality, these considerations





go to a determination of whether or not there was a trial rather
than to a review of the not guilty finding. When so considered,
neither is in fact an exception to the general proposition but
something quite apart from it. Mention as possible exceptions at
this juncture is merely to forestall premature questions in the
reader's mind.
Referral to Legal Officer or Staff Judge Advocate .
Requirements .
The next limitation upon the power of the convening auth-
ority may or may not be an actual limitation, depending upon the
Ik
situation presented. Under the Code,
"The convening authority shall refer the record of every
general court-martial to his staff judge advocate or legal
officer, who shall submit his written opinion thereon to
the convening authority . . . .
"
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In conjunction with this provision is Article 65, which is as
follows:
"(a) When the convening authority has taken final action in
a general court-martial case, he shall forward the entire
record, including his action thereon and the opinion or opinions
of the staff judge advocate or legal officer, to the appropriate
Judge Advocate General.
"(b) Where the sentence of a special court-martial as ap-
proved by the convening authority includes a bad conduct
discharge, whether or not suspended, the record shall be
forwarded to the officer exercising general court-martial
jurisdiction over the command to be reviewed in the same
manner as a record of trial by general court-martial or
directly to the appropriate Judge Advocate General to be re-
viewed by a board of review. If the sentence as approved by
an officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction in-
cludes a bad conduct discharge, whether or not suspended,
7Z UCMJ, Art. 61.
75 UCMJ, Art. 65.
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the record shall be forwarded to the appropriate Judge Ad-
vocate General to be reviewed by a board of review.
"(c) All other special and summary court-martial records
shall be reviewed by a judge advocate of the Army or Air
Force, a law specialist of the Navy., or a law specialist
or lawyer of the Coast Guard or Treasury Department and shall
be transmitted and disposed of as the Secretary of the De-
partment may prescribe by regulations."
A note of explanation may prove helpful in this connection.
A "law specialist" is construed to refer to an officer of the Navy
or Coast Guard designated for special duty ^law), whereas a
"legal officer" refers to any officer in the Navy or Coast Guard
77designated to perform legal duties for a command. Ey law he
need not be a lawyer. Judge advocates are lawyers commissioned
as -.officers in the Army and the Air Force.
.
j-r-- Supplementing the above provisions of /the Code, the Manual
78
'
provides further: • ' • "••'" --'. .-'.-•
"a. General '- --Before acting upon a record- of trial by
general court-martial, or a record of trial by special court-
martial which involves a sentence of bad conduct discharge,
a convening authority who exercises general court-martial
jurisdiction will refer ; it tc his. staff--judge advocate or
,.-
, legal officer for review and advice. : See -Articles 6l and 65b.
"No person Who has aeted as member, law officer, trial
counsel, assistant trial counsel, defense counsel, assistant
defense counsel, or investigating officer in any case shall
subsequently act as a staff judge advocate or legal officer
to any reviewing (convening) authority upon-.the same case.
(Art. 6c) •'• ......
,
-,-
"'if a convening authority has- no staff judge advocate or
legal officer, or if the person' serving: in, that- capacity is
ineligible, to act as staff judge advocate or legal officer
for any reason (e.g., Art. 6c)/'he may request the assignment
^sratT, A.rc 2(13),(( UCMJ, Art 2(?0.
78 (par. 35, MCM, 1951).
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of a staff judge advocate or legal officer to review the
record, he may forward the record to the appropriate Judge
Advocate General for review and advice before acting thereon,
or he may forward the record for action to an officer exer-
cising general court-martial jurisdiction as provided in
81k:.
"b. Form and content of review. --The staff judge advocate
or legal officer to whom a record of trial is referred for
review and advice wi3.1 submit a written review thereof to
the convening auchoc:; ty« The review will include a summary
of the evidence in the case, his opinion as to the adequacy
and weight of the evidence and the effect of any error or
irregularity respecting the proceedings, end a specific
recommendation as to tne action to be taken. Reasons for
both the opinion and the recommendation will be stated. The
convening authority may direct his staff judge advocate or
legal officer to make a more comprehensive written review or
supplementary oral or written reviews or reports.
. "c Disagreement between convening authority and staff judge
advocate or legal officer. -•Ordinarily, the convening auth-
ority should accept the opinion of his staff judge advocate
or lsgal officer as to the effect of any srror or irregularity
respecting the proceedings,, as to the adequacy of the evidence,
and as to what sentence can legally be approved - However,
it is^ within the particular province _of the convening auth-
ority to weigh evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses
,
. determine controverted questions of fact that may have been
raised in the record, and to determine what legal sentence
should- be approved . In those unusual cases in which a con-
vening authority is in disagreement with his staff judge
advocate or legal officer as to the effect of any error or
irregularity respecting the proceedings, as to the adequacy
of the evidence, or as to what sentence can legally be ap-
proved, the convening authority may transmit the record of
trial, with an expression of his own views and the opinion
of his staff judge advocate or legal officer, to the Judge
Advocate General of the armed force concerned for advice.
In any case which is forwarded to the Judge Advocate General,
if the convening authority takes an action different from
that recommended by his staff judge advocate or legal officer,
he should state the reasons for his action in a letter trans-
mitting the record to the Judge Advocate General (91a)...."
(Emphasis supplied.
)
Have these requirements that the records of trial be referred
to the staff judge advocate or legal officer for review and advice
37
had the effect of "tying a mill- stone about the neck" of the
convening authority? If so, what restrictions or limitations have
"bean placed upon him? The legal officer or staff judge advocate
is first required to include in his review a summary of the evidence
79
in the case with his opinion as to its adequacy and weight.'^ It
has been shown, however, that it is within the particular province
of the convening authority to weigh evidence, judge the credibility
of witnesses, and to determine controverted questions of fact that
may have been raised in the xecord. It would appear, therefore,
that the opinion of the legal officer or staff judge advocate in
this area is advisory only. Using the same process of deduction,
it will be noted that secondly the written review will contain the
opinion of the legal officer or staff judge advocate as to the
81
effect of any error or irregularity respecting the proceedings.
This area, which may be differentiated as pertaining to matters
of law, was not designated specifically as within the particular
82
province of the convening authority. It would appear that the
drafters of the Manual, by omission, attempted to distinguish
between questions of fact and questions of law. The third re-
quirement of the review is, by inference, that it contain the
opinion of the legal officer or staff judge advocate as to what
sentence can legally be approved. Here the Manual
79 (par. 85b, MCM, 1951).
°° (par. 85c, MCM, 1951).
JJ
1 (par. 85b, MCM, 1951).
g? (par. 85c, MCM, 1951).05 id.
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placed the determination of what legal sentence should he approved
Qk
within the particular province of the convening authority. From
this wording, it would appear that the legality of the sentence
would be within the province of the legal officer or staff judge
advocate with the convening authority relegated to a decision as
to what portion of that part of the sentence, determined to he
legal, he might desire to approve. A fourth requirement is that
the review contain a specific recommendation as to the action to
85be . taken by the convening authority
.
The Manual quite clearly assumes that the convening authority
will, for the most part, accept the advice and opinions of his
legal officer or staff judge advocate. Further consideration must,
however, be given to the Manual provision as to disposition of
those unusual cases in which a convening authority is in disagree-
ment with his legal officer or staff judge advocate as to any
86
matters within any of the four areas set out above . It appears
that in such event he is obliged to forward the record, the opinion
of his legal officer or staff judge advocate, and his own views
87
to his Judge Advocate General "for advice." The Judge Advocate
General may approve the findings and sentence, but, should he
determine that any part of the findings or sentence is unsupported
in law or If he so directs, the record shall be reviewed by a board
8k id.
II Tpar. 85b, MCM, 1951).
^ (par. 85c, MCM, 1951).
7 id.
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of review. It should be borne in mind that the Code does not
require that the convening authority of a special court-martial
or a summary court-martial submit a record of trial to a staff
judge advocate or legal officer. He may act with, or without,
the benefit of such legal advice. If the sentence of a special
court-martial, as approved by the convening authority, includes
a bad conduct discharge, whether or not suspended, the record is
forwarded through an officer exercising general court-martial
jurisdiction for review in the same manner as a general court-
martial record. The officer exercising general court-martial
jurisdiction refers other cases to his staff legal officer or
89
judge advocate whereupon his action as supervisory authority
becomes final.
In view of the foregoing, it may be concluded that a strict
and literal analysis of the Code and Manual provisions, taken
separately, may lead to misleading deductions, though not wholly
erroneous. Taken as a whole and keeping in mind that the con-
vening authority may disapprove such findings of guilty as he
desires and that findings of not guilty are beyond his purview,
the Code and the Manual 1 do place limitations and restrictions
upon him as to the approval of findings of guilty and sentences
based thereon. His opinions in support of such findings and
sentences are subject to the concurrence of his legal officer or
^
8 UCMJ, Art. 69.
9 9£' United States v. Coulter (No. 2786), 3 USCMA. 657, 664,
1*J- CMR 75-
1*0
staff judge advocate* If he fails to obtain such concurrence,
he must then obtain it from The Judge Advocate General or from
a board of review before the sentence can be executed. Further
shoving of the restrictions upon the convening authority by virtue
of the imposition of a legal officer or staff judge advocate upon
him will be found in the decisions,
PIS QUAIJF.i.CA.T10?C _GF CQWVBRIflG AUTHORITY
.
Stafi_Judge_ Advo cate 's Prior Service as Trial Counsel,
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The case of United
__
States v. Coulter involved an accused who
was tried and convicted by special court-martial. He was sentenced
to a bad conduct discharge and confinement at. herd labor for six
months. An officer designated as the "Acting Assistant Staff
Judge Advocate" submitted a detailed post trial report, concluding
"with a recojanendat i on that the bad conduct discharge be suspended.
The staff judge advocate who had served as trial counsel at the
trial of the accused did not concur. He prepared a report in
which he characterized the accused as a "worthless individual"
and a ''liability to the Air Force." The findings and sentence
were approved by the convening authority.
Chief Judge Guinn expressed the views of the majority in
holding that Article 6(c) of the Uniform Code, providing that no
person who had acted as trial counsel shall act as a staff judge
advocate to any reviewing authority in the same case, was man-
datory and failure to comply therewith evoked the principle of
general prejudice, whereby the case was remanded for rehearing.
90 Uai'ted States v. Coulter (No. 2786), 3 USCMA 657, 1^ CI© 75-
kl
Judge Latimer, by his dissent, denies the applicability of
the doctrine of general prejudice, pointing out that the accused
was, in his opinion, entitled to no more than a reconsideration
of the sentence. It was his view that Article 6(c), supra, was
not violated, as the convening authority was not required to sub-
mit the record to a staff judge advocate. He then posed the
query as tc what result the majority would reach in the event
that a staff judge advocate, similarly, disqualified to act, should
recommend leniency.
Tne above case is but one of some thirty cases heard before
the Court of Military Appeals in which the Chief Judge and Judge
Latimer have expressed divergent views regarding the application
of the doctrine of general prejudice. Stripped of the "window
dressings," it appears that the majority are correct in refusing
to permit the trial counsel any active participation in the re-
view process. In this case, no issue was raised in review regarding
the guilt or innocence of the accused. There seems to be little
reason, therefore, to subject the accused to another trial. It
is possible that the doctrine of general prejudice might be so
modified that its effect may be effectively cured by referral back
to the level of the proceeding at which it occurred. It would
have sufficed in this particular case. It is suggested that the
only answer to Judge Latimer's query is that in all probability
such matters will be resoD.ved in favor of the accused. Unless he
suffers some possible detriment, the question is not apt to be
heard before the Court.
k2
Trial Counsel's Preparation of Post Trial Review .
Chief Judge Ouinn delivered the majority opinion in United
91States v. Clisson. The accused was tried by a general court-
martial, convened by the Commander, Flying Training Air Force.
The appointed trial counsel was Major D, who, after the conviction
of the accused, prepared a "Post Trial Interview" which ha signed
as "Staff Judge Advocate." It appears that he was actually the
VJing Staf:? Judge Advocate of the Air Force Base, where the trial
took place. His report included interviews with the accused, his
squadron commander, the confinement office;!*, and the prison
chaplain. He incorporated his conclusions with a recommendation
that the sentence be approved. The Assistant Staff Judge Advocate
prepared a review in accordance with the requirements of the Code,
which was concurred in by the Staff Judge Advocate. The majority
of the Court found that the report emanated frcm the Staff Judge
Advocate of the command at which the court sat and that the re-
viewing authority's Staff Judge Advocate's report was so tainted
by the impropriety of Major D's report as to fall short of that
degree of impartiality contemplated by Article 6 of the Uniform
Coae. The decision of the board of review was reversed, and the
case was returned to the convening authority to be reviewed by a
qualified sisaff judge advocate.
Judge Brosman, in a concurring opinion, expressed the belief
that the Court should not permit the post trial interview to be
91 United State s v. Clisson (No. U635), 5 USCMA 277, 17 CMR 277-
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made by the very officer who prosecuted the accused, and who may
suffer from a certain natural, understandable, and quite unconscious
bias. The accused might be incapable of complete communication
to his erstwhile prosecutor, the Judge thought.
Judge Latimer, dissenting, pointed out that the trial counsel
did not act as a staff judge advocate or legal officer to any re-
viewing authority in violation of the terms of the Code but had
made a report well within the letter and spirit of the Code which
would better enable the staff judge advocate and the convening
authority to perform the duties devolved upon them.
Curiosity prompts a query as to what result the Court might
have reached had the report not been signed as "Staff Judge
Advocate." It is obvious that Major D did not act in that capacity
to the convening authority. There were certainly too many lawyers
performing duties which were not essentially legal. The reader is
requested to notice the expenditure of talent and effort involved
in the automatic review shown by this example. The case shows
the Court of a mind to zealously protect the interests of the
accused but taking a more practical approach to remedial action
than resulted in the Coulter case, supra .
Related Situations .
The Court unanimously held that participation by the law
officer in the preparation of the review of the staff judge advocate
92
was prejudicial error necessitating a rehearing. Serving as
92 United States v. Crunk (No. 3653), U USCMA 290, 15 CMR 290.
trial counsel in a closely related matter disqualified the Assistant
93
Staff Judge Advocate from conducting the post trial review.
On the other hand, the Court determined that the pretrial advice
and recommendation of the staff judge advocate to the convening
authority did not preclude his later participation in the review
of the record of trial; and in another case it was held that
giving legal advice to the investigating officers did not evoke
95
a die qualification of the staff .judge advocate * Numerous hoard
of review decisions deal with variations of the factual situations
considered by the Court. One further example will suffice to
round out the considerations presented in this area.
ERRONEOUS AlWHB BI.\pIIIG_UPONJJOMVEKINC AUTHORITY
.
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In the recent case of United States v. Massey, the Court
of Military Appeals ordered a reconsideration by a convening
authority because of erroneous advice given to him by his staff
judge advocace. In an even later case, erroneous advice was given
to the convening authority by the staff judge advocate. The
Court affirmed the order of a board of review remanding the case
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to a different convening authority for further review.
l^%&LR?\W&m 0? CONVENING- AUTHORITY
.
Becoming A causer .
Having considered examples wherein the disqualification of
the convening authority arose through his statutory assistant, the
93 United States v. Eightower (No. ^879), 5 USCMA. 385, 18 CMR 9-
9 United" States v. Haimson™v>o, ^9), 5 USCMA 208, 17 CMR 208.
9£ United States v. DeAngelio (No. 999), 3 USCMA 298, 12 CMR 5^.
q£ United States v. Massey (No. 558l). 5 USCMA 51^, 18 CMP 138,
Waited States v. Papciak (No. 8176), 7 USCMA klZ, 22 CMR 202.
^5
legal officer or staff judge advocate, it may be well to next
consider the position of the convening authority himself. Examples
will again serve to point up limitations and restrictions arising
08
from his position. The Uniform Code defines the term "accuser"
and also provides that courts -martial shall be convened by
superior competent authority when officers otherwise designated
99
as convening authorities are accusers
r
IOC
In the Gordon case, the accused was initially charged with
having burglarized the dwelling of Ceneral E and with having at-
tempted to burglarize the dwelling of General L. Prior to referral
for trial, the staff judge advocate recommended to General L that
the attempted burglary charge should be dismissed for the reason
that the pretrial statement of the accused, which confessed the
.
attempt to burglarise General L' s home
;
was not corroborated by
other substantial evidence. This was done, and General L there-
after convened the general court-martial which tried and convicted
the accused, of an offense against the home of General E. Sub-
sequently
,
General L reviewed the record as convening authority.
The court-martial sentenced the accused to be dishonorably dis-
charged from the service, to forfeit all pay and allowances, and
to be confined at hard labor for a period of five years. The
convening authority approved only so much of the sentence as pro-
vided for dishonorable discharge, confinement at hard labor for
two years, with forfeiture of all pay and allowances.
9$ UCMJ, Art. 1(11), also (par. 5a(*0, MCM, 1951).
£i UCM-J> -^"t, 22(b) and Art. 23(b), also (par. 5a(3), MCM, 1951)-
United States v. Gordon (No. 2p8), 1 USCMA 255, 2 CMR l6l.
Judge Latimer, in rendering the opinion of the Court, points
out that the concept of the accuser being unable to appoint the
court is not of recent origin. The first prohibition passed by
Congress in 1830 applied to the prosecution of officers and re-
mained unchanged until 1913 • The Judge Advocate General of the
Army as early as 1871 had extended the Act of 1830 to include the
trial of enlisted men. The opinion, after searching the older
authorities, states:
"
. . .we do not believe the true test is the animus of the con-
vening authority. This undoubtedly was the early rule, but
as we view it, the test should, be whether the appointing
authority was so closely connected to the offense that a
reasonable person would conclude that he had a personal in-
terest in the matter." 10^-
Judge Latimer then went on to state:
"In a general court-martial the convening and reviewing
authorities are the same and if the officer is disqualified
from convening he should not be qualified to review. The
reviewing authority is vested with great power over the pro-
ceedings of a court-martial. He is at liberty to approve or
disapprove the finding of guilty or to approve, only so much
of a finding of guilty of a particular offense as involves a
finding of guilty of the lesser included offense, and he has
the power to approve or disapprove the whole or any part of
a sentence. Such power should not be vested in a person who
is interested in the litigation. "102
In the above case, the Court found the substantial rights of
the accused were materially prejudiced. The holding of the board
of review, which approved the conviction and sentence, as approved
by the convening authority, was reversed and remanded to The Judge
101
5sL*> p- 2bl.102 ]&•> PP- 261-262.
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Advocate General of the Air Force for action not inconsistent with
the opinion' of the Court. It will he noted in this case that the
error was dual in nature. That- portion of the error disqualifying
the convening authority from convening the court goes directly to
the finding of guilty whereas disqualification to review is in
effect a compounding of the original error. Put another way, the
first error may affect what is in the record with the second going
only to an evaluation of the record. It was this basic problem
which caused Judge Brosman to comment in a concurring opinion that
he preferred to bottom his concurrence on the concept of general
prejudice. The majority opinion did not distinguish between
specific prejudice and general prejudice in this case. No im-
pelling reason appears to require that the principles enunciated
have application only to general courts-martial. Although
Articles 22 and 23 of the Uniform Code, supra , deal respectively
with general and special courts-martial, the origin, background,
and development of the principles should, by reason and logic,
apply with equal force even to ' the appointment and review of a
summary court-martial. The Manual attempts to exempt the con-
103
vening authority of a summary court-martial, but reason
dictates that the accuser should forward to a superior authority.
It is clear that if the convening authority is an "accuser"
he is divested of authority to convene any court-martial and his
acts in convening a court-martial constitute prejudicial error
>
103 (par. 5c, MCM, 1951).
kQ
Divesting himself of authority to convene a court-martial has been
shora to also disqualify review of the record of trial of any
court-martial convened by him. Prejudicial error having been com-
mitted at the outset, considerations regarding the review are of
little consequence. From a practical standpoint, any issues re-
garding the review have been effectively mooted. The Court has





Events may well arise after the court-martial has been con-
vened wherein the reviewing authority may be disqualified. The
105
.
McClenny case is in point. In this case, the accused was
charged with an unauthorized absence. Extracts from the accused's
service record and from the Unit Diary were admitted in evidence.
The convening authority had authenticated the Unit Diary and ex-
tracts, thereby making himself a witness with respect to them.
The accused presented evidence to dispute the accuracy of the
service record entries and those in the Unit Diary, to the extent
that the prosecution's case obviously turned upon the reliability
of the entries. The Court found that alchough the convening
authority had not become an accuser so as to preclude his con-
vening the court-martial, he was placed in the position of
determining the weight to be given to his own testimony, as the
-"°^ Illustrative "accuser" cases are: United States v. Marsh
(No. 1526), 3 USCMA kQ, 11 CMR k8; United State s v. Keith (No. 3293),
3
USCMA 579, 13 CMR 135; United States v. Noonan~[No. 4191), h U3CMA
299, 15 CMR 299.
105 United States v. McClenny (No. 5^92), 5 USCMA 507, 18 CMR
131.
initial reviewing authority. The Court affirmed the test of ob-
jective reasonableness, set out in United States v. Gordon , supra,
as the standard by which to judge the disqualification of a con-
vening authority and were of the opinion that the test may be equally
applied to the reviewing authority who has appeared as a witness
against the accused.
Chief Judge Cuinn notes that no statute or regulation pro-
hibits a review by a reviewing authority who has been a witness
against the accused. In his opinion, p. 510; he states:
"The omission by Congress and the President of a specific
statement of condemnation does not mean that this court is
powerless to condemn conduct which destroys the integrity
of a trial. On the contrary, it is not only within our
power, but it is our dut3r to guard against any infringe-
ment of the fundamentals of a fair trial."
The Court determined that an error which prejudices a sub-
stantial right of the accused on the post trial review does not
require, as a matter of law, that the conviction be set aside
but that the error may be effectively cured at the level of the
proceeding at which it occurred.
The relationship between the convening authority and his
legal adviser appear to make them identical twins in many respects.
The relationship possibly bears more legal semblance to an agency
than a partnership. The acts of the principal are his own and
may be disqualifying; nevertheless, he may also be disqualified
because of the acts of his legal officer or staff judge advocate.
The similarity ceases at that point, however, as the convening
50
authority cannot delegate his duties or responsibilities and cannot,
therefore, act through agents or partners. Disagreements be-
tween them must be resolved by higher authority. There can be
little question but that all of the persons enumerated in Article
6(c) of the Uniform Code, to wit, member, law officer, trial-
counsel, assistant trial counsel, defense counsel, assistant de-
fense counsel, or investigating officer, will be considered under
the principles which have been discussed above. It appears that
the Court is tending to consider the cases in this area without
resort to the doctrines of general and specific prejudice and
are leaning more toward a view of seeking to cure error, if pos-
sible, at the level of the proceeding at which it occurred. If
applied to the examples discussed above, little difficulty would
be encountered in arriving at a completely satisfactory result.
MATTERS OUTSIDE TEE .RECORD
.
Error to. Consider for Purpose of Approval .
In general, it may be said that the matters which have been
thus far considered have been those matters which were contained
within the record of trial itself. It is now proposed to change
the direction of inquiry somewhat and toward a determination as to
whether or not the convening authority is bound by the confines
of the trial record. A helpful landmark in this direction is the
107
case of United States v. Duffy . There a general court-martial
convened in Korea, convicted the accused, Duffy, of t2ra- laKr'S3iiy
*£ (par. 5a(5), Sb(2), ?c, MCM,195l).
United States v. Duffy (No. 1^04), 3 USCMA 20, 11 CMR 20.
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of two truck tires. The findings and sentence were approved by
the convening authority over the contrary advice and recommendations
of the assistant staff judge advocate and his immediate superior,
the Corps judge advocate. In his letter of explanation to The
Judge Advocate General, United States Army, as required by para-
graph 85c of the Manual, the convening authority stated that the
accused had previously confessed to the commission of the crime
but, because of a technical failure to fully comply with the re-
quirements of Article 31 of the Code, the confession was not ad-
missible in evidence.
The Court, in setting aside the conviction for insufficiency
of the evidence, pointed out that a failure to warn the accused
of his rights, as required by the Code, was no mere "technicality."
The Court then said: (p. 23)
"By his utilization of 'evidence' outside the record in
affirming the conviction of the accused, the convening
authority unwarrantedly deprived the accused of the review
guaranteed him by the Code and Manual .... Without hesitation,
we say that the right of an accused to a review confined to
the record adduced at his trial is safely within the guarantee
of militar;/- due process of law .... We cannot conceive of a
concept more repugnant to elementary justice than one which
would permit appellate reviewing authorities to cast beyond
the limits of the record for 'evidence' with which to sustain
a conviction. It would not be tolerated in the civilian com-
munity for a single moment, and so long as this court sits,
it will not be tolerated in the military. While we are not
without understanding and sympathy for the vigorous reaction
of the convening authority as a man, it must not be forgotten
that he acted on the record of this trial as an official of
the United States. His conduct as such an official was not
only unlawful; it was lawless. It struck at the very heart
of the Uniform Code and the current dispensation of milit'ry
justice, and it cannot be condoned." (Emphasis added.)
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Error Not to Consider for Purpose of Disapproval .
A more recent decision of the Court of Military Appeals presents
a different facet of the problem. That case is United States v.
108
Massey, in which the Court rendered a unanimous decision. The
accused was tried and convicted by genera], court-martial. He was
sentenced to be dismissed from the service. The convening authority
and an Army board of review approved. At the trial, the defense
relied heavily upon character testimony. Two psychiatric witnesses
testified that they, together with other psychiatrists, had ex-
amined the accused and found no homosexual traits. The law officer
excluded tendered evidence as to the results of "lie detector"
examinations of the accused and of several key prosecution wit-
nesses which showed a lack of guilty reactions as to the accused
but a marked degree of attempted deception as to the aD.leged
victims. The accused testified at length, unequivocally denying
the accusations of misconduct. Following the trial, but before
the staff judge advocate had completed his review of the record,
the defense submitted the certificate of an armed forces neuro-
psychiatrist, who recited the results of an examination of the
accused under sodium pentothal or "truth serum." The certificate
expressed the opinion that the accused was not guilty of the offenses
for which he had been convicted and that he had a completely nor-
mal psycho-sexual life with none of the traits of homosexuality.
The staff judge advocate advised the convening authority that the
108 United States v. Massey (No. 558l), 5 USCMA 51U, l8 Cffi 138.
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product of the lie detector examination had been properly excluded
at the trial. He discussed in general terms whether the convening
authority should consider the "truth serum" interview, and apparently
his statements were also applicable to the "lie detector" tests-.
He indicated that the convening authority was without power to
consider evidence outside the record of trial. Judge Brosman then
discussed Article 6h of the Code and its legislative history,
quoted supra . His opinion continued:
"The staff judge advocate seems to have believed that
United States v. Duffy, 3 USCMA 20, 11 CMR 20, prevented con-
sideration by the convening authority of matters outside the
record of trial. See also United States v. Gordon, 2 USCMA
632, 10 CMR 130. The answer to this contention was furnished
bv an Army board of review in United States v. Pratts-Luciano
/CM 370895/, 15 CMR 481
:
"
'We distinguish this case from United States v.
Duffy .... which was vigorously urged by the defense as re-
quiring reversal. In the Duffy case it positively appeared
that evidence outside the record was utilized to affirm the
conviction, whereas in this case it positively appears that
evidence outside the record was considered only as a pos-
sible basis for disapproval and the conviction was approved
solely on the evidence of record. In the Duffy case the ac-
cused was deprived of the review guaranteed him by the Code
and Manual . In this case he was accorded that review in full.
He should not complain that his case was given more consideration
than the Code and Manual guarantee.'
"The board of review further noted appropriately:
"
' In acting on the findings and sentence of a court-
martial, the convening authority shall approve only such
findings of guilty, and the sentence or such part or amount
of the sentence, as he finds correct in lax^r and fact and as he
in his discretion determines should be approved. 1 (UCMJ, Art.
6k) ^Italics supplied^/ That is to say, we believe, that
the authority of a convening authority to approve findings and
sentence is conditioned by the evidence of record and the j.a~j
of the case, whereas his authority to disapprove is conditioned
5*
only by his discretion, Where, as in this case, there is
brought to the attention of a staff judge advocate a matter
extraneous to the record that indicates disapproval may be
warranted in the interests of justice, it is the staff judge
advocate's duty to cause the matter to be investigated and
reported to the convening authority with appropriate advice.
The fact that his advice with respect to the extraneous
matter may be adverse to the accused does not impeach his
recommendation and the pursuant action of the convening
authority on the record of the trial proper. To hold other-
wise would be to circumscribe the convening authority in the
exercise of his discretion under Article 6h of the Code and
would induce, rather than prevent miscarriages of justice."'
The Court made reference to another case decided by it,
109
United States v. Walters, which involved an interpretation as
to whether certain items were parts of the record of trial. The
Court found that they were, and as such were to be weighed by the
convening authority and the board of review. By dicta, -Judge
Brosman then commented that he was not saying that if the Court
had found the items to fall outside the record, they could not have
been considered by the convening authority. The items were certi-
ficates regarding unauthorized conferences by court personnel,
during the trial, not revealed in the record of trial.
The author Judge then continued into what appears to be a
very fine line of distinction. For accuracy, his language will
again be quoted.
"Government appellate counsel have argued that, when
construed as a whole, the staff judge advocate's advice did,
in fact, allow the convening authority to consider the re-
sults of the out-of-court investigations, but permissibly
informed him that the weight to be accorded them was not such
as to justify overturning the findings of guilt returned by
the court. We do not at all deny that a staff judge advo'-at^--
109
United States v. Walters (No. 373^), k USCMA. 6lJ, 16 CMR 191.
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in the course of his review of a case—may express his
own conclusions with respect to the weight of evidence sub-
mitted at the trial, together with the import of matters
learned from sources outside the record. Nor may the ac-
cused justly complain if that evaluation of evidence or in-
formation is adverse to him. United States v. Pratts-Luciano,
supra. Moreover, a staff judge advocate may al?.owably go
further—indeed to the point of informing a convening auth-
ority that he believes it would constitute an abuse of dis-
cretion to grant substantial weight to evidence secured and
presented ex± .v&judicially. The line of legality is distinctly
passed, however, when the staff judge advocate's review creates
in the mind of the convening authority the impression that he
would err in law if he were to go outside the formal record
of trial for the purpose of determining his action on findings
and sentence."
The case was remanded to an officer other than the one who
convened the court-martial which tried the case. The Judge pointed
out one further item of interest in that the convening authority
did not have authority to change a dismissal to an administrative
discharge. Therefore, in this case, the extrajudicial tests were
relevant only to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Clemency
was not in issue. From the above, it appears to be crystal clear
that had the tests pointed toward the guilt of the accused rather
than toward his innocence, the decision would have clearly fallen
within the purview of the Duffy case, supra . Rather, the cases
are but demonstrative of the munj^cesa^'wJdfc^iaccompanies an accused
even at the initial review of his case. Angels may dance upon the
head of a pin, but staff judge advocates, legal officers, and con-
vening authorities had best seek firmer footing. The only logical
deduction which can reasonably be drawn from the cases is that
matter outside the record of trial may be considered by the con-
vening authority as a basis for disapproval of a finding of guilty
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or a sentence, but he may not consider such matter as a basis for
the approval of a finding of guilt. From the background material,
which has been developed thus far, the convening authority has far
broader powers than have been given to boards of review or to the
Court of Military Appeals. It may be stated categorically that the
convening authority has all tlie power which is possessed by either
a board of review or the court but is not subject to all of the
limitations which are placed upon them. Subsequent inquiry will
seek a delineation of their powers. It is for this reason that
only cursory consideration will be given to three remaining spheres
for inquiry, i.e., insanity, jurisdiction, and policies.
May Consider When Relating to Insanity .
110
The Manual provides that when it appears from the record
or from any other source that the accused may have been insane at
the time of the commission of the offense or at the time cf trial,
regardless of whether such question was raised at the trial or how
it was determined, the convening or higher authority should disap-
prove any findings of guilty affected by a reasonable doubt as to
the sanity of the accused. Before action is taken on the record,
the convening or higher authority may refer the matter to a board
of one or more medical officers for their observation and report
with respect to the sanity of the accused. Suffice it to say, at
this point, that there are no restrictions upon the convening auth-
ority restricting such inquiry into the mentality of the accused as
may be warranted in the interest of justice.
110 (par. 12U and 86e, MCM, 1951 )•
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'• May Consider When Relating to Jurisdiction .
Only a passing reference will "be made to this very broad field
of inquiry. The Manual provides:
"If the court lacks jurisdiction or if the charges fail
to allege any offense under the Code the proceedings are a
nullity. These objections cannot be waived and may be as-
serted at any time."
Error to Consider Policy Instruction as Mandatory .
A broader consideration will be given to this matter in con-
sidering policy matters in general. In the first place, it must
be assumed that commanding officers, who are also convening auth-
orities, know all policies promulgated within their own commands.
They ere also charged with knowledge of policy directives from
higher authority. It may, therefore, be assumed that they do have
knowledge of such policy directives as may be pertinent to each and
every case initially reviewed. No difficulty is encountered in
this area unless there is some indication that a policy directive
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may have been misunderstood. The case of United States v. Doherty
will serve to illustrate the difficulty encountered in this field.
SECNAV INSTRUCTIONS 1620.1, dated June 5, 1953, was an instruction
issued by the Secretary of the Navy and distributed to all ships and
stations of the United States Navy. The instruction designated pro-
cedure for the disposition of cases of homosexuality involving naval
personnel and expressed the policy that known homosexual individuals
™ (par. 68b, MCM, 1951).
United States v. Doherty (No. 488*0, 5 USCMA 287, 17 &$'&£7 •
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are military liabilities and must be eliminated from the service.
The accused was convicted before a general court-martial and sen-
tenced to a punitive discharge. The Oourt unanimously recommended
that the bad conduct discharge be remitted. The District Legal
Officer recommended that the sentence not be remitted or suspended
because of the Nay/ Department policy. The convening authority took
no action because of the SECNAV INSTRUCTION, so stating on the
record but further recommended that the recommendation of the Court
be further considered upon the clemency review within the Office of
The Judge Advocate General of the Nay.
Judge Latimer, writing for the majority of the Court, said,
referring to the instruction:
".c.if the language is construed as an inviolable command to
those in the military judicial system, such as courts -martial,
the convening authorities, or boards of review, then the in-
structions conflict with the Code and must yield. We do not
interpret them to go that far, but we are convinced the con-
vening authority did, If so, he failed to make that independent
evaluation of the appropriateness of the sentence approved by
him which Congress decreed he make."
The case was thereupon returned to the convening authority for
reconsideration to remove any and all doubt as to whether he approved
the bad conduct discharge solely because he misunderstood the scope
and legal effect of the policy instructions.
Error Not co Consider for Adequacy
.
1 TO
In another illustrative case, United States v. Wise , "** it
appears that the convening authority had announced a policy advising
his command that he would not consider the intention in the military
service of any individual who had been sentenced to a punitive discharge
113 Uaited states v. Wise (No. 6937), 6 USCMA 472, 20 CMR 188.
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The Court, speaking through Judge Latimer, said:
"It would appear that if it is a valuable right to have
sentence passed upon by a convening authority who is free from
any connection with the controversy, it is equally important
to have one's sentence considered by a convening authority who
does not arbitrarily refuse in advance to mitigate an important
part of the sentence, no matter what factors might be brought
to his attention ... if the accused was seeking to raise error
because the convening authority had not seen fit to suspend the
execution of the sentence, W3 would not have entertained his
petition for review. But in actuality he requests something
entirely different, as he asks that the convening authority be
required to consider with an open mind those matters which
accused seeks to offer for clemency purposes .... We have con-
sistently held that a convening authority is unfettered in his
liberty of deciding on the appropriateness of a sentence and
unlimited as to the sources from which he gathers the information
which serves as the foundation for his action ... he may rule
on the sentence as he chooses, but he cannot, without abusing
the power vested in him by the Code, refuse to listen."
These examples will serve further to substantiate the showing
heretofore made concerning the over-all restrictions and limitations
placed upon the convening authority. More of this type of restraint
exhibits itsslf as command influence directed toward the courts or
members of them. There have been many cases in this very closely
Ilk
related field, but those cases deal primarily with pretrial pro-
cedure which is net directly within the present inquiry.
Before passing on into an examination of the scope of review
btfore boatds of review, a word or two may be in order regarding
supervisory authorities. Obviously the largest number of cases in-
volving offenses committed by military personnel are of a relatively
minor nature. Just as within the civilian community, there are far
11
^EJ g. > United States v. Fowle (No. 8339), 7 USCMA 3^9, 22 CMR
139; United States v. Costner'TNoT 3102), 3 USCMA k66, 13 CMR 22;
United States v. Littrice~~(No. 2809), 3 USCMA U87, 13 CMR U3; United
States v. Isbell "(No. 3319), 3 USCMA 782, Ik CMR 200; and United
States v. Ferguson (No. 3289), 5 USCMA 68, 17 CMR 68.
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more traffic violations than murders. Most of the records of
trial by summary courts -martial and a sizeable proportion of special
courts-martial deal with these offenses. Without considering minor
exceptions, those cases wherein the sentences adjudged do not ex-
tend to a punitive discharge, whether or not suspended, are for-
warded to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction
over the command, as supervisory authority. For all practical
purposes, his review of these cases is final. All cases must be
reviewed by qualified service lawyers whose reviews are similar
to those of the legal officers and staff judge advocates of the
convening authority. In general, it may be said that powers,
duties, responsibilities, restrictions, and limitations of the
convening authority are applicable to the supervisory authority.
The functions of the supervisory authority are of the greatest im-
portance in the administration of military justice. This phase of
the appellate review system is not being by-passed as inconse-
quential but only because of its marked similarity to the all
important functions of the convening authority.
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CHAPTER IV.
THE COURT 0? MILITARY APPEALS AND BOARDS OF REVIEW
GENERAL BACKGROUND.
In Chapter II, an effort was made to show the historical back-
ground and development of the board of review. It was shown that
boards of review came into being in the Army by Department Order
in 1918 as advisory boards. In 1920, they were given statutory
recognition. The Navy first established an advisory board of re-
view in 19^5* Shortly thereafter, the Elston Act was enacted into
law. This 19^8 enactment empowered the Army boards of review to
weigh evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and to determine
controverted questions- of fact. The Army continued to function
under the legislation until the enactment of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice which became effective on May 31* 1951. From
the creation of the Air Force as a separate branch of service, the
19^8 legislation served as their law until the effective date of
the Code. During the period from 19^5 to 1951> the Navy continued
to utilize their boards of review, created internally within the
Office of The Judge Advocate General of the Navy. Uniform Rules
of Procedure for Proceedings in and before the boards of review
were promulgated jointly by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the
Treasury Department on June 8, 1951. The Elston Act, to a
very broad degree, was an attempt to provide legislation which
115 DA Bull. 9, NAV EXOS P-932 and AF Bull. 2k.
62
was remedial as to most of the complaints lodged against military
justice following World War II. It incorporated much of the
thinking which found expression in the various committee reports
of those committees which had made intensive studies of the problems
involved. It is little wonder, therefore, that the Uniform Code
of Military Justice should bear a striking resemblance to its
immediate predecessor, the Elston Act. The Army and the Air Force
found very little substantial change brought about by the advent
of the Code. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard faced a
different situation. New concepts and nomenclature were presented.
Their deck court became a summary court. Their summary court
became "a special court. Their advisory board of review became a
statutory board functioning within a new system of appellate re-
view. The judicial council of the Elston Act was abolished, and
the Court of Military Appeals substituted in its place. The Court
was new to all of the services. The law officer, as a functionary
of the general court-martial, was new to the Navy. No further
effort will be made toward pointing out deviations between the new
and the old, excepting as it may bear upon the functions of the
boards of review and the Court of Military Appeals.
During the period between l^kd and 1951; Army and Air Force
boards of rtview and the judicial councils were presented with
many novel problems. The recorded decisions of these bodies
proved most helpful to the military lawyer in orienting his problems
to the Code. Subsequent to adoption of the Code, the recorded
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decisions of the "boards of review of all of the services have pro-
vided a rich source for legal research. The boards of review have
looked to the decisions of other boards for guidance. These cases
have been of inestimable value to the Court of Military Appeals.
The Court on frequent occasion has made reference' to the board
decisions and not infrequently has adopted the reasoning of a
board decision in formulating its own opinions. The boards of
review of one service are not bound by the board decisions of any
other service nor for that matter by the decisions of other
boards within the same service. The Court of Military Appeals,
on the other hand, is the Supreme Court of military justice and
their decisions do establish precedents which are binding upon
the service. The Court has now been in being for more than five
years and has considered several thousands of cases. Seven volumes
of their decisions have been published, which provide a broad and
comprehensive source of legal precedent. Because the opinions of
the Court are authoritative and binding uniformly throughout the
services, the discussion which follows will not make reference to
board decisions but will only consider decisions of the Court of
Military Appeals. The foregoing comment is not intended in any
way to belittle or minimize the outstanding work which has been
accomplished by the boards of review and the very substantial con-
tributions which they have made to legal thinking in the field of
military law. Practical expedience also dictates some delineation
as to the breadth of exploration.
6k
SCOPE OF REVIEW ,
Boards of Review -Authority Under the Code ,
The Uniform Code of Military Justice is the legislative foundation
upon which the system of military justice is founded. As was noted
in the previous chapter, the Manual for Courts -Martial, United
States, 1951* implements the Code and is supplementary thereto.
In passing now to a consideration of the boards of review and the
Court of Military Appeals, their respective scopes of review, and
such limitations as may have been placed .thereon, attention will
again be directed to the provisions of the Code and the Manual.
It is believed that the boards and the Court can best be con-
sidered together, comparing and distinguishing their functions
where possible.
Of primary concern and the only article dealing exclusively
ll6
with boards of review is Article 66 which provides as follows:
"(a) The Judge Advocate General of each of the armed forces
shall constitute in his office one or more boards of review,
each composed of not less than three officers or civilians,
each of whom shall be a member of the bar of a Federal court
or of the highest court of a State of the United States.
"(b) The Judge Advocate General shall refer to a board of
review the record in every case of trial by court-martial in
which the sentence, as approved, affects a general or flag
officer or extends to death, dismissal of an officer, cadet,
or midshipman, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or con-
finement for one year or more.
" (c ) In a case referred to it, the board of review shall act
only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by
the convening authority. It shall affirm only such findings
of guilty, and the sentence or such part or amount of the
116 UCMJ, Art. 66.
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sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and determines,
on the basis of the entire record, should be approved. In
considering the record it shall have authority to weigh the
evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine
controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the trial
court saw and heard the witnesses.
"(d) If the board of review sets aside the findings and sen-
tence, it may, except where the setting aside is based on
lack of sufficient evidence in the record to support the find-
ings, order a rehearing. If it sets aside the finding and
sentence and does not order a rehearing, it shall order that
the charges be dismissed.
"(e) The Judge Advocate General shall, unless there is to
be further action by the President or the Secretary of the
Department or the Court of Military Appeals, instruct the con-
vening authority to take action in accordance with the de-
cision of the board of review. If the board of review has
ordered a rehearing but the convening authority finds a
rehearing impracticable, he may dismiss the charges.
"(f) The Judge Advocates General of the armed forces shall
prescribe uniform rules of procedure for proceedings in and
before boards of review and shall meet periodically to for-
mulate policies and procedure in regard to review of court-
martial cases in the offices of The Judge Advocates General and
by the boards of review."
Another provision of the Code which is pertinent is that part
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of Article 71: ' which provides:
"No sentence which includes, unsuspended, a dishonorable
or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one year or more
shall be executed until affirmed by a board of review and, in
cases reviewed by it, the Court of Military Appeals.' 1 (Em-
phasis added.)-
n8 '
The Manual provides that a court shall not adjudge a sen-
tence of confinement at hard labor, for a period greater than six
months unless the sentence includes a dishonorable or bad conduct
discharge. The result of this provision is that almost all cases
117trX UCMJ, Art. 71(c).
110 (par. 127b, MCM, 1951).
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involving a sentence to confinement in excess of six months will be
reviewed by a board of review rather than those involving a sen-
tence to confinement in excess of one year in accordance with Article
7l(c), supra .
Another source of reviewable cases will be found in Article
, 11969 -wherein the following appears:
"Every record of trial by general court-martial, in which
there has been a finding of guilty and a sentence, the appellate
review of which is not otherwise provided for by Article 66,
shall be examined in the Office of The Judge Advocate General.
If any part of the finding or sentence is found unsupported in
law, or if The Judge Advocate General so directs, the record
shall be reviewed by a board of review in accordance with
Article 66, but in such event there will be no further review
by the Court of Military Appeals except pursuant to the pro-
visions of Article 67(b)(2)." /This reference provides that
.. The Judge Advocate General may order cases reviewed, by a
board of review, forwarded to the Court of Military Appeals for
review^/
120
By the express provisions of Article 70 '" The Judge Advocates
General are required to appoint qualified legal counsel to serve
as appellate government counsel and as appellate defense counsel.
These counsel represent the Government and the accused respectively
: before the boards of review and the Court of Military Appeals. In
addition, the accused has a right to be represented before the
. boards of review and the Court by civilian counsel if provided by
; him. The accused may be represented by military counsel at every
.
stage of the proceedings against him up to and including the appellate
court without expense to him. If he chooses to be represented by
^j-
19 UCMJ, Art. 69.
120 UCMJ, Art. 70.
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civilian counsel, be must do so at his own expense. Under the pro-
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visions of Article 68 boards of review may be established in
branch offices of a Judge Advocate General whenever the President
deems such action necessary. It was mentioned in Chapter II, hereof,
that the Navy has such a branch office in San Francisco. The other
services do not have such branches at the present writing.
The system, which the above Code provisions established, pro-
vides an intermediate appellate body which is quite comparable to
122
the Court of Appeals in the Federal judiciary system. The boards
of review do have broader powers, however. Most appellate courts
act only upon questions of law, whereas boards of review weigh the
evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, determine controverted
123
questions of fact, and may reduce any sentence deemed inappropriate.
The United States Court of Military Appeals --Authority Under
'The Code.
As was also noted, above, the United States Court of Military
Appeals came into being upon the adoption of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. It was new to the military services and without
precedent. The judicial councils within the Army and the Air Force
which had functioned from 19^8 to 1951 were abolished and the Court
was established in their stead. It is interesting to note that this
Court very closely approximates that recommended by General Ansell
jjjl UCMJ, Art. 68.
Latimer, A Comparative Analysis of Federal and Military Crimi -





at the close of World War I. The historical development shown in
Chapter II pointed in the direction that the court-martial system
has always been a part of the Executive Branch of the Government
12^
as distinguished from the judicial branch. This position was
125
somewhat challenged by a later case holding.
The precise status of the court-martial system and the appli-
cability of certain provisions of the Constitution of the United
States thereto is current^ the subject of a considerable amount
of legal research. This problem is much too broad to be undertaken
in the present inquiry. For present purposes the viewpoint will be
adopted that
' the court-martial system within the Armed Forces of
the United States is constitutionally a part of the Executive Branch
of the Government, including the appellate tribunals which are an
integral part of the system. For all practical purposes, however,
the functions performed throughout the system are of a judicial
• • 126 127
nature. The Constitution provides that the judicial power
of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts,
shall hold their offices during good behavior and shall, at stated
times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not
'be diminished during their continuance in office. By establishing
a tenure of office for the judges of the Court of Military Appeals
1
-Dynes v. Hoover , 20 How. 65 (1858,).
•^•HunkTe v. United States , 122. U;S. $%&, ' .". '.
;,;.'.'
*2^ United States v. Whitman (No. 2168), 3 USCMA 179., U CMR
179J United States v. Lanford (No. 65U0), 6 USCMA. 371, 20 CMR 87.
12 i (U. S. Const
.





of something less than good behavior, the Congress distinguished
these judges from those of the inferior courts. Members of the
boards of review may be officers or civilians appointed by the
128
respective Judge Advocates General.
It has been said that for all practical purposes the Code
sets up three judicial or quasi-judicial bodies: The court-martial
(trial court), the board of review (appellate forum), and the Court
of Military Appeals (appellate court). These bodies are the
creatures of statute, and their powers are limited to those which
130
Congress has expressly granted or implied.
..Having already set forth the Code provisions specifically
granting authority to the boards of review, it will now be well to
look to the Code provisions upon which the Court is dependent for
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its power. Article 67 comes into focus with the following
provisions:
"(a)(l) There is hereby established a Court of Military
Appeals, which shall be located for administrative purposes
in the Department of Defense. The Court of Military Appeals
shall consist of three judges appointed from civilian life
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, for a term of fifteen years .... The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals shall have power to prescribe its own rules of
procedure and to determine the number of judges required to
constitute a quorum. A vacancy in the court shall not impair
the right of the remaining judges to exercise all the powers
of the court ....
"(b) The Court of Military Appeals shall review the record
in the following cases:
128
12q UCMJ, Art. 66(a), supra .
ion Upited States v. Reeves (No. U53), 1 USCMA 388, 3 CMR 122.ljU United States r. Lanford (No. 65^0), 6 USCMA 371, 20 CMR 87;
United States v. Brasher (No. 499 ), 2 USCMA $0, 6 CMR 50; United
States v. Whitman (No. 2168), 3 USCMA 179, 11 CMR 179; United States
v
- PaPCiak (No. 8176), 7 USCMA. lU2, 22 CMR 202.
*35 UCMJ. Art. fir., 67
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"(l) All cases in which the sentence, as affirmed
by a board cf review, affects a general or flag officer or
extends to death;
"(2) All cases reviewed by a board of review which
The Judge Advocate General orders forwarded to the Court of
Military Appeals for review; and
"(3) All cases reviewed by a board of review in
which, upo?a petition of the accused and on good cause shown,
the Court of MJ litary Appeals has granted a review ....
"(d) In any case reviewed by it, the Court of Military
Appeals shall act only with respect to the findings and sentence
as approved by the convening authority and as affirmed or set
aside as incorrect in law by the board of review. "In a case
which The Judge Advocate General orders forwarded to the Court
of Military Appeals, such action need be taken only with respect
to the issues raised by him. In a case reviewed upon petition
of the accused, such action need be taken only with respect to
issues specified in the grant of review. The Court of Military
Appeals shall take action only with respect to matters of law«
"(e) If the Court of Military Appeals sets aside the
findings and sentence, it may, except where the setting aside
is based on ltv.-k of suffi cient evidence in the record to support
the findings, order a rehearing. If it sets aside the findings
and sentence and does not order a rehearing it shall order that
the charges be dismissed.
"(f) After it has acted on a case, the Court of Military
Appeals may direct 'The Judge Advocate General to return the
record to the board of review for further review in accordance
with the decision of the court. Otherwise, unless there is to
be further action by the President, or the Secretary of the De-
partment, The Judge Advocate General shall instruct the con-
vening authority to take action in accordance with that decision.
If the court has ordered a rehearing., but the convening authority





The provisions of the Manual in general add very little to
the Code provisions as set forth above. Specific reference will be
made to Manual provisions as may become necessary to the discussion.
132 (Chap. XX, Pars. 98 to 108, MCM, 1951).
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Before proceeding to an examination of the cases themselves, two
other possible sources of guidance will be consulted. The first
of these will be the Rules of Practice and Procedure before the
United States Court of Mtlitsry Appeals. Pertinent extracts
provide as follows:
"Rule 3» Jurisdiction.
"The court will review the record in the following cases:
"(a) General or flag officers; death sentences. All
cases in which the sentence, as affirmed by a board of review,
affects a general or flag officer, or extends to death;
"
(
b ) Certified by Tha Judge Advocate General. All
cases reviewed by a board of review which The Judge Advocate
General forwards by Certificate for Review to the Court; and
...'..:
"(c) Petitions by_the accused . All cases reviewed
by a board of review in which, upon petition of the accused
and on good cause shown, the Court has granted a review, ex-
cept thoye reviewed under Article 69»
"Rule k. Scope of Review.;
"The court will act only with respect to the findings and
sentence as approved by the convening or reviewing authority,
and as affirmed or as set aside as incorrect in lav/ by a board
of review. In those cases which The Judge Advocate General
forwards to the Cou£t by Certificate for Review, action need
be taken only with respect to the issues raised by him. In
a case reviewed upon petition of the accused, action need be
taken only with respect to issues specified by the court in
the grant of review. The court may, in any case, however,
review other matters of law which materially affect the rights
of the parties- The points raised in the Court will involve
only errors in law."
Board Rules
„
The second source is fourd within the Uniform Rules cf Pro-
134
cedure for Proceedings in and Before Boards of Review, wherein
Rule IXF contains the following:
133 1 USCMA xxfcti.
Op, cit., fuo 115, supra, also reproduced as Appendix IV,
1955 Naval Supplement to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
1951.
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"F. Matters outside record .—Matters outside the record
of trial will not be presented to or argued before a board of
review except with respect to:
"1. A petition for a new trial referred to a board under
Article 73.
"2. A question of jurisdiction.
"3« Matters affecting the sanity of an accused tending to
show that further inquiry as to his mental condition is war-
ranted in the interest of justice.
"k. Matters as to which judicial notice may be taken in
military law.
- "When requested by The Judge Advocate General, a board of re-
view may hear and report to him on any matter outside the rec-
ord in mitigation of the sentence or otherwise in the interest
of justice."
LIMITATIONS ON SCOPE OF REVIEW .
:. At this juncture, it will be noted that the boards have ap-
parently been given dual functions under Article 66(c), supra .
The first deals with a review of findings of guilty as approved
.by the convening authority. The second is concerned with the sen-
tence 'as approved by the convening authority. In examining the
cases, therefore, the possibility of severability of functions will
be kept in mind. It is also possible that some distinction may
exist in the functions of the Court, although the Court takes action
only with respect to matters of law.
Limited to Record as to Findings ,
1^5
The Whitman case Jy was considered in the previous chapter.
It was the case in which the accused stood convicted by special
135 United States v. Whitman (No. 2168), 3 USCMA 179, H CMR 179*
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court-martial for the possession and sale of heroin. One R had
"been convicted of similar charges arising out of the same trans-
action by a different special court-martial. R's conviction was
set aside by the convening authority on the ground of entrapment.
A Navy board of review reversed the conviction of W, as approved
by the convening authority and the supervisory authority, and dis-
missed the charges, concluding that it would "create an injustice"
to the accused, W, to permit his conviction to stand in the face of
the dismissal as to R» Judge Brosman, writing for a unanimous
Court, and after quoting Article 66(c), fn. 116, supra , as follows:
"It is quite apparent that boards of review, like other
appellate bodies exercising judicial or quasi -judicial functions,
are limited to the record presented to them. Although the
matter dehors the record resorted to in this case operated
in favor of the accused, this does not change the essentially
erroneous character of the board's action, nor serve to supply
authority where none exists. If the board's present action
were to be approved, it would be illogical to deny to any re-
viewing authority the power to examine matter aliunde the
record which would operate against the interest of the accused
person. That is to say, such an authority might be permitted
to look outside the record for evidence of guilt. This we
have already branded as reversible error at the hands of a
convening authority. United States v. Duffy (No. 1^04), 3
USCMA 20, 11 CMR 20, decided July 3, 1953, Therefore, the
historic limitation mentioned earlier must, of necessity,
apply to boards of review."
Matters of Law or Fact.
Within that area delineated as review of the findings, it is
quite clear that Article 66(c) of the Code, supra, granted to boards
of review the authority to weigh evidence, judge the credibility of
witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing
that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses.. It is equally
7^
clear that the Court was granted authority by Article 67(d) of
the Code, supra , to take action with respect to matters of law.
A determination as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence
to sustain a conviction is without question a matter of law. It
will be readily perceived that there are all manner of gradations
between matters of fact and matters of law, not clearly rssogni-
zable as either. This conflict was recently before the Court in
136
the case of United States v. Hendon wherein the accused entered
a plea of not guilty to a charge of desertion. He was convicted by
general court-martial. The convening authority approved but the
board of review reduced the finding to the lesser included offense
of absence without leave, although it affirmed the sentence. The
board, in expressing its finding, stated:
''We do not think the mere proof of the inception of an
unauthorized absence and the termination of the absence by
apprehension is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the requisite intent to desert. In this case the court had
before it only evidence of an unauthorized absence for about
one hundred and twelve days. No evidence was before the court
indicating the condition of the absence. Mere length of ab-
sence will not justify the court to draw an inference of
intent."
This language was in the face of language of the Manual, also quoted
by the board, to the effect that if the condition of the absence
without proper authority is much prolonged and there is no satis-
factory explanation of it, the court-martial will be justified in
inferring from that alone an intent to remain absent permanently.
Judge Latimer, in writing for a unanimous Court, characterized
the board's decision as follows:
United States v. Hendon (No. 8679), 7 USCMA k2Q f 22 CMR 219-
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"This verbiage, as we understand it, is no more than a
holding that, as a matter of lav/, an intent to remain away
permanently may not he inferred by a reasonable court mem-
ber from an absence of one hundred and twelve days terminated
by apprehension .... This, of course, amounts to saying that
the court-martial erred in returning a finding of guilty of
. desertion on the evidence presented to it .... Phrased dif-
ferently, the board was expressing the view that no reasonable
man could believe that "this accused intended to remain away
permanently when the evidence showed that he had been absent
without leave for over three months and then was apprehended
rather than returning voluntarily .... Here the board was
arguing that the court-martial had an insufficient base to
support &n inference of the requisite intent, which is a
legal question. Its members did not assert that they. per-
sonally were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused intended to remain away permanently, a factual
matter which would have been within their domain. ..."
In determining whether the board of review had exceeded its fact-
finding authority, the opinion goes on to state:
"We have ever been loath to interfere with the exercise by a
board of review of its fact finding powers. Heretofore, in
doubtful cases we have demanded that boards clearly indicate
whether they are making factual or legal determination. If
the forcer, we may with propriety only insist that the finding
be one which a reasonable man could reach. Applied to this
case, we are unwilling to say that no reasonable man could
believe that this accused did not intend to desert. In other
words, we do not believe that all reasonable men would agree
that Hendon intended to remain away permanently. Some rea-
sonable men could so believe, most reasonable men would, but
we cannot say that all would be impelled to do so ti
In discussing the contention that the case presented only a
factual determination which involved the exercise of a power re-
served exclusively to the board of review and beyond the power of
the Court, the opinion further states:
"In United States v. Moreno, 6 USCMA. 388, 20 CMR lOh, we
recognised that boards of review have been given plenary fact-
finding powers by Article 66(c) of the Code ... subject only
to the limitations that they bear in mind that the trial forum
saw and heard the witnesses and that their action must not be
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arbitrary, capricious, or one which no reasonable person
would take. A necessary coxo'luary to the Moreno holding may
be found in United States v. Bunting, 6 USCMA. 170, 19 CMR
296, where we held that if a board of review clearly exer-
cised only its power to make factual determinations in a
situation where reasonable men might differ as to whether
the Government had carried its burden of proving guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, we had no authority to review its decision.
Of course, a board of review may not defeat review in this
court by labeling as questions of fact those matters which
are questions of lav; or mixed holdings of law and fact. United
States v. Benson, 3 USCMA 351, 12 CMR 107."
In this case, the Court has added requirements to the fact-
finding powers granted to boards of review by Article 66(c), supra .
The action of the board of review (l) must not be arbitrary, (2)
capricious, or (3) one which no reasonable person would take.
The introduction of that fictitious character in the law,
long known as the reasonable man, may cause difficulty. He has
been used in a wide variety of situations as a standard. What
would he do under Like or similar circumstances? This has been a
yardstick by which to measure other men. By pluralizing the rea-
sonable man into reasonable men, as was done in the Hendon case,
then saying that some reasonable men would do one thing, whereas
others would not, any semblance of a standard has been destroyed.
Mention is made of this point and, for that matter, the case itself,
as merely illustrative of the type of difficulty which arises
within the review of findings area. Subtle distinctions between
matters of fact and matters of law have long perplexed the bar and
bench. This perplexity may arise in most any case. With the
appellate court limited to the review of matters of law, it must
of necessity determine which powers of review were used by the
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intermediate appellate body, the board of review. The boards
being vested with the power to determine both matters of fact and
matters of law. it becomes incumbent upon the Court to ascertain
which process the board used. The Hendon case, supra , is but il-
lustrative of the problem.
Before the Hendon case, supra , the Court had before it the case
of United States v. Bunting. ^' In that case, the accused without
provocation suddenly struck a Japanese policeman several times,
overpowered him, and appropriated his revolver and ammunition.
Proceeding down the street, he broke the headlights out of on-
coming bicycles, struck one person with the revolver, shot and
seriously wounded two others, and terminated his activities by
killing a second policeman by shooting him in the face at close
range. The accused did not hide or escape and offered no resistance
when apprehended. The facts of record were uncontroverted . The
accused testified that he remembered nothing save for one brief
fleeting incident. Several medical experts testified as to the
mental responsibility of the accused. The two leading experts
agreed on many points including a genuine amnesia during the
period of the accused's beserk behavior. Doctor L was of the
opinion that dissssociative reaction had reached psychotic pro-
portions at the time of the acts and that the accused was insane.
Doctor P did not believe that the condition had progressed so far
as to become a state of psychosis and that the accused was, therefore;
137 United States v. Bunting (No. 3387), 6 USCMA. 179, 19 CMR 296.
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responsible for his acts. The trial court found the accused guilty
of unpremeditated murder and three offenses of aggravated assault,
sentencing him to life imprisonment. The convening authority ap-
proved, but a majority of the Navy board of review concluded as a
matter of fact, after considering all of the evidence of record,
that they had a reasonable doubt as to the sanity of the accused
at the time of the commission of the offenses. They set aside the
findings and sentence and dismissed the charges. On certification
by The Judge Advocate General of the Navy, the Court of Military
Appeals considered whether the board of review committed error,
as a matter of law, in its analysis of the testimony, thereby abusing
its discretion. In summarizing previous decisions, the Court said:
"We have previously considered the power granted to us
by the Uniform Code of Military Justice to interfere with a
decision of a board of review, and we have suggested certain
limits beyond which our authority does not run. In United
States v. Zimmerman, 2 USCMA 12, 6 CMR 12, we recognized our
power to review questions of law resolved by a board of re-
view by saying:
"'... Article 67(d), supra /of the Code/, explicitly gives
to the Court power to act with respect to findings and sen-
tence which have been 'set aside as incorrect in law' by a
board of review. A board of review decision clearly based
on matter of law, therefore, does not possess such finality
that it may be assimilated to court-martial findings of not
guilty.
'
"It is implicit in the grant of authority found in Article
67 of the Code that a board of review may not permissibly
defeat review in this court by labeling a matter of law, or
a mixed holding of law and fact, as a question of fact. To
avoid that impasse, we look to the substance of the holding,
and its rationale, not to the charactization by the board of
review. United States v. Benson, 3 USCMA 351, 12 CMR 107.
Furthermore, we have consistently held that where a board of
review makes a truly factual determination based upon the
79
evidence of record, we may not overturn it. United States v.
Thompson, 2 USCMA U6o, h62, 9 CMR 90. When faced with such
a determination, we are free only to insist that the holding,
if it affirms a finding, be based upon substantial evidence,
United States v. Hernandez, h USCMA. ^65, 16 CMR 39, and that
the board of review express clearly the exercise of its fact
finding powers. United States v. Sell, 3 USCMA 202, 11 CMR
202; United States v. Moreno, 5 USCMA 500, 18 CMR 12k,"
The Court then turned to the facts presented by the facts of
the Bunting case which will be rather fully extracted for the preser-
vation of context. The Court said:
"Here the board of review found that the evidence in the
record was insufficient to establish the sanity of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt. The nature of this finding does
not permit us to say accurately that the evidence is sufficient
to support the finding, for to do so would suggest that we are
placing a burden on the accused to establish his insanity. The
test we view as more appropriate in this instance may be found
in thi6 reasoning: On the one hand, if all reasonable men
would conclude that the Government had established sanity be-
yond a reasonable doubt, then as a matter of law the board of
review erred. On the other hand, if all reasonable men would
conclude that the accused was insane, a holding to that effect
' by a board of review would be untouchable. Between the two
extremes there exists an area where reasonable minds would
differ as to whether the Government had established its burden
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the facts place the issue in
that area, then the board of review may resolve the conflict
either way—in the exercise of its fact-finding powers—with-
out abusing its discretion. ... Had it expressly found the
accused sane, the record would sustain the finding. On the
contrary, had it found the accused insane, the same situation
would exist. The majority made a conscious and informed
choice in that area, and surely if the evidence would sustain
a finding of insanity, a fortiori, it supports a holding that
the Government had not established sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt."
In the Hendon case, supra, in determining whether the board
of review exceeded its fact-finding authority, what would the re-
sult have been had the Court used the test of the Bunting case,
supra ? By substituting "intended to remain away permanently" for
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"insane" into the Bunting test, it would appear to read: On the
one hand, if all reasonable men would conclude that the Government
had established that H intended to remain away permanently, beyond
a reasonable doubt , then as a matter of law the board of review
erred. On the other hand, if ail reasonable men would conclude that
H did not intend to remain away permanently, a holding to that
effect by a board of review would be untouchable. Between the two
extremes, there exists an area where reasonable minds would differ
as to whether^ the Government had established its burden beyond a
reasonable doubt . The Court in Hendon said: "... we do not be-
lieve that all reasonable men would agree that Henuon intended to
remain away permanently. Some reasonable men could so believe,
most reasonable men would, but we cannot say that all would be
impelled to do so." The Court was then consistent in placing Hendon
between the two extremes and within the untouchable area. But the
Court did touch. It had just concluded as a matcer of law, that
the board erred in holding the court-martial to have erred in re-
turning a finding of guilty of desertion which the Court says was
tantamount to holding that as a matter of law the evidence was in-
sufficient to sustain the finding. If it was error to hold as a
matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
finding then it follows as day does the night that the evidence
was sufficient to sustain the finding of guilt. The Court so held
as a matter of law. How then can findings of fact based upon one
identical set of facts be found by reasonable men or otherwise to
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be diametrically the opposite? If sufficient as a matter of law,
upon what theory or reason can the same facts be found to be
insufficient? It is submitted again that this result could not
arise under a reasonable man test.
By its holding in Hendon , the Court is saying in effect that
a single set of facts are sufficient in law to sustain a conviction
of desertion providing the board of review wear judicial robes
while making the determination and that the board would err to
find otherwise. If the board shed their judicial robes, however,
the opposite result may be reached.
If an unauthorized and unexplained absence of one hundred and
twelve days, terminated by apprehension, is desertion, as a matter
of law, how can it be anything else? Why should one reasonable man
be permitted to find otherwise? If one such man was not able to do
otherwise, then no multiple of one would be able to do so.
If the same reasoning be applied to the Banting case, or any
other case, the evidence in the particular case is either legally
sufficient cr it is not.
The writer offers apology for the use of the Hendon case at
this time as author of the Government's brief in that case. The
foregoing is not intended in any way to present more than an academic
discourse on the difficulties encountered within this area. The
particular case brought the Court to dealing with the dual functions
of the boards of review in a sharply focused situation. It is
respectfully submitted that a "maybe yes," "maybe no," solution is
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far from satisfactory. Attempting to ascertain which function a
board of review performed at a given time is even less satisfactory.
The boards are clothed with authority to perform dual functions
and there is no reason why they cannot be performed simultaneously.
The Court of Military Appeals has but a single function to perform
in this area, i.e., to determine whether the evidence is or is not
legally sufficient to sustain a conviction. It is most sincerely
contended that this determination must always be a matter of law.
In the 3unting case, supra
,
Judge Brosman, in a separate con-
curring opinion, stated that if the danger arising from the nonre-
viewability of captious acquittals by the trial court did not dis-
turb the Congress he could hardly be expected to feel upset about
the infinitely more remote risk that boards of review—composed of
experienced lawyers—would make wholly unsupported findings of
fact in favor of accused persons. Re expressed the belief that
the Court should refrain from entering into matters which have to
do with no more than the weight of the evidence and the credibility
of witnesses. The imagination does not need to wander far to
envisage more complex problems. Ignorance or mistake of fact may
be exculpatory under certain circumstances, whereas it is axiomatic
1^8
that ignorance of law is no excuse. "* Imagine the case in which
ignorance or mistake of fact is interposed as a defense but wixhin
controversial territory as to whether mistake of fact or law. The
""3° Oliver, Ignorance or Mistake of Fact as a Defense in Military
Law
, JAG Jour., Jan 1957*
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board of review must then determine the matters of fact and of
law as presented. The Court is then called upon to unravel com-
plexities of the perplexity. It was pointed out in Chapter I that
it was not the purpose of the present inquiry to enter into this
very complicated field to seek solutions. It is not amiss, how-
ever, that the reader's attention be invited to the field.
Again considering the scope of review, within the record,
139
the case of United States v. Thompson * offers further enlighten-
ment. This case involved an accused who had positive knowledge
on June J, 1952, that his ship was scheduled to depart on July 7,
195.2. On. June 17> 1952, the accused commenced an unauthorized ab-
sence extending to July 27, 1952. The board of review held there
was no proof of a causal connection between the neglect and the
.missing of the scheduled movement. On certification, the Court
held that, the board committed error as a matter of law regarding
the proof which they required the Government to make. The Court
said that if they were reviewing the case de novo, they would say,
as a matter of law, that there was sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case. In remanding the case for reconsideration by
the board of review, the Court pointed out that if, aside from the
element of causal connection, the board determined there was in-
sufficient evidence to support the finding, it was not the Court's
intention to reverse that determination.
"^ United State s v. Thompson (llo. 1637), 2 USCMA. U60, 9 CMR 90.
8h
The opinion uses the following language:
"Further, as we read the opinion of the board of review, it
amounts to a factual determination that there is insufficient
evidence to support the findings. If this determination is
based solely on an appraisal of the evidence we shall not
overturn it. See United States v. Zimmerman (No. 26l), 6 CMR
12, decided October 6, 1952. Our jurisdiction is limited to
questions of law. and we shall, therefore, review the decision
of the board of review only insofar as it purports to delineate
the legal elements of the offense under consideration."
Court Cannot Render Advisory Opinions .
This case also stands for one further proposition regarding
the scope of review. The Court held that it did not have .power
to answer hypothetical or in vacuo problems and that they were re-
luctant to arrogate to themselves the power to render advisory
opinions.
Certificate by Judge Advocate General Does Not Cause Double
Jeopardy
1^0
In a fairly early case, United States v. Zimmerman , the
Court held in considering Article 67 of the Code, supra , that
sections (b), (d), and (f) are authority for The Judge Advocate
General of a service to certify any case to the Court of Military
Appeals with no restrictions whatever as to whether the board of
review decision was in favor of or contrary to the interests of an
accused. The Court held that Article 67(d), supra , explicitly
gives the Court the power to act with respect to findings and sen-
tence which have been "set aside as incorrect in law" by a board
of review. They reasoned that a board of review decision clearly
United States v. Zimmerman (No. 26l), 2 USCMA 12, 6 CMR 12.
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based upon matter of law does not possess such finality that it
may be assimilated to court-martial findings of not guilty. The
Court reserved consideration of the question of whether board of
review disapproval for lack of sufficiency of the evidence as a
matter of law possessed that finality.
.•..*.-'' iia
This same case was previously before the Court. Initially,
the accused, upon trial by special court-martial, pleaded guilty
to, and was found guilty of, unauthorized absence for a period of
ten days and missing a movement of his ship. He was sentenced to
a bad conduct discharge and confinement at. hard labor for three
months. The convening and supervisory authorities approved. A
Navy board of review disapproved the findings and sentence. Upon
certification of The Judge Advocate General, the Court decided
that the procedural errors asserted by the board of review were
not prejudicial to the accused. Tne Court did find an improper
presentation of prior convictions in the record which could have
influenced the trial court in arriving at a sentence. The Court
thereupon remanded the case to The, Judge Advocate General "for
action not inconsistent with the views expressed" by the Court.
It would have been possible to refer the case to the board of
review for consideration of an appropriate sentence without the
improperly considered prior convictions. On motion of appellate
defense counsel, the board ruled that the principle forbidding
double jeopardy precluded the reinstatement of any part of the
United States v. Zimmerman (No. 2ol), 1 USCMA. l6o, 2 CMR 66.
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sentence and therefore its prior holding on dismissal would have
to stand* Again, the matter was certified to the Court. In
^addition to the proposition set out above, the case is authority
. for the proposition that action by a board of review reinstating
a conviction consistent with the decision and mandate of the
Court of Military Appeals and approving such part of the sentence
as was found correct does not violate Article kk, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, or the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States. The Court found that there was no trial and
.... hence no jeopardy, until the finding of guilty has been affirmed
by the last. appellate tribunal to consider it. The action of the
board of review directing dismissal on a point of law was inter-
locutory only until appeal or an expiration of the time for appeal.
The Court . then said
:
"Here the case has been twice before a board of review, will
return for further consideration, and will have been twice
passed .on by this court. However, no matter how lengthy the
process, and regardless of the number of times a case may
pass between a board of review and this court, the fact re-
mains that the sum constitutes one appellate review of one
-• '".':. case .... Different problems have been involved, it is true,
but one case has been the subject of one appellate review.
Until all possible and proper aspects have been considered,
the appellate review is incomplete and no jeopardy can pos-
•
-.••• siblyhave attached." -...-.,
. The Court thereupon turned its consideration to the possible
effects of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. First- the Court cites a number of Federal court decisions
showing that the courts have been divided on the question of
whether this amendment applies of its own force to personnel of the
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military establishment, noting that the Supreme Court of the
United States had in cited cases avoided the question. The
Court mentioned Wade v. Hunter wherein the Supreme Court ex-
pressed a "tacit understanding that the Fifth Amendment doas
apply to military persons." The Court did not determine. this
point but passed on to other considerations which narrowed to,
"assuming arguendo that this certification by The Judge Advocate
General amounts to an appeal by the prosecution . . . would such
appeal violate the accused's guaranty against double jeopardy?"
The Court thought not. The Court showed that, at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution and the original amendments; prose-
cution appeals in criminal cases were wholly unknown, and it was
of no matter that a trial court erred in questions of law as dis-
tinguished from questions of fact. The older cases based upon
different reasons held quite uniformly that there was no right
of appeal by the Government in criminal casus. Considerably later
and after a transition of statutory provisions, the Supreme Court
lUlheld in United States v. Gulf Refining Co^. ..that certiorari on
behalf of the United Status would lie to review a Court of Appeals
reversal of a criminal conviction. The Court cites numerous cases
picked at random wherein Court of Appeals reversals were in turn
reversed and the causes remanded for further proceedings in con-








lk3 United States v. Gulf Refining Co ., 268 U.S. 5 [!-2.
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accused persons was wholly unknown. ... For the present
purpose, therefore, we hold that automatic hoard of review
consideration on "behalf of a convicted military person is
tantamount to intermediate appellate review sought by the
accused himself—this for the reason that the dangers of
double jeopardy have been eliminated. A guaranty against
evil is not contravened by a procedure which precludes that
evil."
The Court and Matters of Fact .
ikk
The Gourt made- a 'comment in the Dickenson case, per Chief
Judge Quinn, which is worthy of note. - He said:
"While we can- disregard testimony which is inherently in-
credible or manifestly unbelievable, we have no power to
deci&e conflicts in the evidence , or to weigh the testimony
of one witness against that of another. We have authority
to review the" evidence only for the purpose of determining
the ultimate legal effect. The only question for our con-
sideration here is whether there is substantial evidence in
the entire record of trial to support the findings of guilty.
- United States v. Dodd, 2 USCMA 9^>- 6 CMR 9^ United States v.
Logas, 2 USCMA U&9, 9 CMR 119."
One other thought will be suggested in this area. The writer
once heard a Federal District Judge instruct the jury in a criminal
case: "Gentlemen of the jury: In. this case it is- within your
power as jurors to acquit the. defendant. As American citizens, you
do hot have the right to do so." .Without.. analogizing or condoning
- the instruction,' would not a power and right: concept be helpful to
the court?- There can be no question but that boards of review have
the power to approve, partially approve, or disapprove findings.
The- only restraint upon this power is that their actions must not
be- capricious,-' arbitrary, or one which no reasonable man could
reach. The Court has reversed board of review decisions, which
but for the appellate court review, would have effectively acquitted
lW* United States v. Dickenson (No. 6238), 6 USCMA. *+38, 1*62, 20
CMR 15^.
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to any possible conflict with the Fifth Amendment. The Court
points out that a waiver of guaranty may serve as a foundation
for these cases as only the defendant can appeal to the Court of
Appeals. He cannot complain of his own actions. The Court then
says:
"It follows that, if the Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the conviction, it may thereafter "be affirmed, without the
necessity for retrial and without contravening guarantees
against double jeopardy,"
Turning back to the military system, the Court of Military Appeals
notes the provision for automatic consideration by a board of re-
view and reasons that since there is no provision for appeal to
the intermediate tribunal by an accused., no notion of waiver is
available to sustain prosecution appeals.
.
The Court then con-
tinues to say:
"However, action by a board of review is always taken on
behalf of an accused and in his interest. Literally he
can never be prejudiced by this appellate review- -for on
retrial, if .any > he cannot be tried for an offense greater
than that charged at the first trial, nor can he receive a
sentence greater than that adjudged at the first trial. ...
Since prejudice is impossible under this procedure, the
evils contemplated by and even prompting the guaranty
against double jeopardy are entirely inoperative. The
provision for automatic review simply constitutes the de-
vice adopted by Congress for insuring that no man may
stand convicted on an inadequate record. To rule that
the consequences of its action contravene the Fifth Amend-
ment would be palpably absurd and would operate to penalise
the legislative interest in insuring justice to members of
the armed forces to the utmost extent possible. To put
the matter in another way, the Fifth Amendment was in-
tended to codify the common law principle against double
jeopardy. During the period this principle was being
formulated—and doubtless at the time of the Amendment
was adopted as well—automatic review on behalf of convicted
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the accused. Is this not saying in effect that the board, although
having the power to make such a determination was legally restrained
from doing so? Whether the terminology of rights, duties, privileges,
or powers he used, is the Court not saying there are additional
legal limitations by which the decisions of boards of review will
be governed? If sufficiency of the evidence is but clearly recog-
nized as a matter of law, then the Court need not attempt to draw
fine lines of distinction. The Court need only find that the
evidence is or is not sufficient to support the decision of the
board of review, as a matter of law. This does not imply that
rigid or fixed standards must be established by which all cases of
mental responsibility are to be measured. Each case should stand
on the content of its own record, The same would be true of the
desertion case. If any inference is legally justifiable from the
length of the absence, when unexplained, there would be little
damage in the Court finding that a given number of days would be
sufficient as a matter of law whereas less than that number would
be insufficient. The variables as to what explanation would refute
the inference would remain.
Clearly boards of review have the power to judge the credibility
of witnesses which the Court does not share. It is commendable
that the Court has scrupulously refrained from infringing upon
this power. The same problem confronts the Court in this area
as in the matter of weighing evidence. If no reasonable man could
give credence to the testimony of a particular witness, there can
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be little doubt but that the Court would find that a board of
review would err in extending credibility to the testimony of that
witness. In contrast, if all reasonable men would give credence to
a particular witness, a board would err not to so do. In between,
in that area where reasonable men might differ, the boards would
be at liberty to believe or disbelieve a given witness without
the slightest likelihood of reversal by the Court. The credibility
of most witnesses would fall within the wide space between the two
extremes. There is very little that can be added to the previous
discussion. The Code admonishes that boards of review should
recognize that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses. From
a practical standpoint, the credibility of a witness is inextricable
from the weight to be given to his testimony. A board of review
sitting in Washington, D. C, is rather handicapped in attempting
to evaluate the testimony given by witnesses at a trial conducted
in Japan, Germany, or even in an adjoining room. Appellate courts
in general, whether intermediate or of last resort, whether state
or Federal, review only as to errors in law. There seems to be
little justification for granting boards of review broader powers
than are entrusted to the Court of Military Appeals. The diffi-
culties which the Court has encountered in this area would be
effectively removed if Congress would merely limit the powers of
the boards to that granted to the Court.
MATTERS WHICH WOULD ORDINARILY APPEAR WITHIN THE RECORD .
A line of cases will be encountered which, at first blush,
give the impression of being departures from the general holdings
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which have thus far been discussed. These cases appear to look
outside the record of trial at both hoard of review and Court
levels. It is believed that three cases will serve to show that
such cases do not actually constitute exceptions to the general
proposition that review is limited to the record of trial as to
findings.
In United States v. Walters , the accused officer was charged,
among other charges, with having conspired to defraud the West
German Republic of certain tax receipts, unlawfully accepting gifts
and having made a false official statement. A general court-martial
returned findings of guilty which the convening authority approved.
An Army board of review approved part of the findings. The Court
of Military Appeals granted a petition for review to determine
whether the accused had been prejudiced by cumulative error, or
by unauthorized conferences between the law officer and certain
court members- -and whether an erroneous instruction concerning
maximum sentence had been given. The occurrence of the unauthorized
conferences was not revealed in the record originally prepared but
through certificates executed by various participants at the direction
of the convening authority following complaints by the civilian
counsel who represented the accused. These were attached to the
record and considered by the staff judge advocate and the con-
vening authority. Judge Brosman, writing for the majority of the
Court, points out that an omission from a trial record involving
11+5 United States v. Walters (No. 373^), & USCMA 6l?, 16 CMR 191.
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a deliberate suppression would be a fraud upon the court, and as
such, grounds for a new trial. In some instances, the failure of
a reporter would be obvious from the record itself but in other
areas, such as the one under consideration, there would be no clue
within the .record. As to possible remedial action, Judge Brosman
says of a petition for new trial:
"Yet it is hard to see how proof of lacunae in a record can
be said to fall within the category of newly-discovered evi-
dence under Article 73—or even in most cases within the
ambit of what is deemed a 'fraud on the court.' "lw
The Judge then discusses the use of a certificate of correction as
provided in the Manual. He expresses the view that liberality is
demanded regarding claims of omissions from the record to the end
that cases may be fully reviewed as directed by Congress and states:
"
. . .we have here no problem of a clash between a properly
.• authenticated certificate 03? correction relied on by the
Government, on the other hand, and affidavits submitted by
the defense on the other. Contrariwise, it seems conceded
that certain events occurred, and the only issue is whether
those events may properly be considered by this court.
"We doubt that we shall be met in the future with frequent
'battles of affidavits' by reason of this decision to con-
sider omissions from a record of trial, although raised in
a manner other than by certificate of correction ...."
The Court then determined that it would treat the matters related
in the personal certificates, although not in compliance with the
Manual, as if they had been reported in a formal certificate of
±k6
UCMJ, Art. 73, which provides: "At any time within one year
after approval by the convening authority . . . the accused may petitioi
The Judge Advocate General for a new trial on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence or fraud on the court. ..."
9*
correction. They then determined that the events related were a
part of the trial court 1 s proceedings open to review by the Court.
1^7
The Court distinguished the Harvey case, wherein they refused
to consider new evidence unearthed after the trial, but attached
to the record at the time of the staff
.
judge advocate's review, on
the basis that the evidence did not relate to proceedings of the
trial court and cou?_d not conceivably have been considered in
reaching the findings of guilt and imposing the sentence.
Judge Latimer, concurring in part and dissenting in part, found
that the certificates filed at the level of the convening authority
were properly a part of the record on appeal and properly before
the Court but that the affidavit filed after the record reached
the Court was not. Judge Brosman had not excepted this document,
saying that it merely corroborated the others. Judge Latimer re-
fused to adopt the certificate of correction approach, labeling
it as artificial and reached the same end result, saying:
"The criteria I would rely on to determine whether the
documents reflecting out-of-court irregularities are in the
record on appeal and can be considered by us are the time
and manner in which the issues were raised and by whom they
were decided. The Code recognizes that matters dehors the
record may be raised properly before a board of review, and
before this court, by a petition for a new trial, and these
petitions may be founded on circumstances and events which
occurred prior to findings. In petitions for new trials,
certificates of correction need not be used to frame the
issues; and I fail to see why written documents composed in
any legal and recognizable form, which are filed with the
convening authority and which seek to invoke his power to
correct injustices that brought about an unfair trial,
should not be considered as petitions for rehearing."
"^ United States v. Earvey (No. 1625), 2 USCMA 609, 10 CMR 107
.
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Judge Latimer then proceeds to point out a preferable practice which
would be the filing of a petition for rehearing fortified by affi-
davits in support of the grounds alleged. Service upon the Govern-
ment would afford opportunity to meet the issues. The action of
the convening authority, the pleadings and the evidence would
thereby become a part of the record on appeal. The basic dissent
went to the merits in this case with the dissenting Judge concluding
that the accused was entitled to all or nothing and that he would
affirm the findings and sentence whereas the majority found pre-
judicial error and ordered a rehearing.
Passing from the Walters case, supra , consideration will next
be given to the case of United States v. Ferguson et al . In
this case, the several accused were convicted of a mutiny occurring
at a post stockade. After conviction and sentence, the findings
and sentences, as mitigated, were approved by the convening authority
and forwarded to an Army board- of review. While the matter was
pending before the board of review, the staff judge advocate for-
warded to The Judge Advocate General of the Army a transcript of
statements made at a conference held the day before the trial com-
menced. Present at the conference, in addition to the staff judge
advocate, were the convening authority, the chief of staff, the
law officer, a recording officer, and members of the ccurt-martial.
The staff judge advocate described generally the duties of court-
martial members and included in his remarks a discussion of the
lL
'8 Uai^ed States v.. Ferguson (No. 3239), 5 USCMA 68, 17 CMR 68.
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offenses prevalent in the command. Reference was made to "dissident
elements" and "people who are not responsive to discipline" and
"trouble makers" within the stockade. The court-martial members
were told that "more cases like this are in the offing' 1 ; that it was
essential "that the case "be handled promptly, expeditiously"; that
they "act firmly" otherwise the situation in the stockade would be
aggravated leading to further outbreaks and disturbances which was
the sort of thing that adversely affects the command and leads to
poor publicity. Among other certified questions, the Court was
requested to determine whether the board of review, as a matter of
law, had the right to consider the transcript. The board had
. determined that it had such right as the matters presented per-
tained to jurisdiction and that the pretrial conference reflected
command control over the members rendering them incompetent to
hear the case, wherefore the proceedings were rendered null and void.
The board ordered that the convening authority might direct a new
trial before another court-martial.
All three members of the Court agreed that "command control"
was present but that th<=> error was not jurisdictional. The Court
returned the case to The Judge Advocate General ordering a rehearing,
although Judge Latimer concluded that he would reverse the decision
of the board of review and reinstate the findings as returned by
the court-martial and affirmed by the convening authority. His
reasoning was that -che board of review was without power to con-
sider the transcript except on the question of jurisdiction. The
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error not "being Jurisdictional, he would have returned the record
to the "board of review on the record without considering matter
contained in the transcript. Chief Judge Quinn, by separate opinion,
stated that the rule that an appellate tribunal will not consider
questions not raised in the trial forum is only a rule of expediency
and that one of the well-recognized exceptions to the general rule
is that "questions of a general public nature affecting the interest
of the state at large may be determined by the appellate court
without having been raised in the trial court." He considered a
question of command control to be a matter which gravely affects
the military community and further reasoned that there was no
contest as to the accuracy of the transcript in the case before
them. It would have netted the same result if it had been con-
sidered at the trial level and thereby been reviewable by the board.
He would have considered the transcript regardless of whether it
was a part of the record and apparently would not have limited its
consideration to jurisdiction. Judge Brosman, also by separate
opinion, was convinced that the board of review could have con-
sidered the transcript qiite apart from any question of juris-
diction and that once considered the command influence shown
constituted prejudicial error. He suggested that the conference
held but a day before was a part of the proceedings as held in
the Walters case, supra . Another suggestion was that the trans-
cript was forwarded to the board by The Judge Advocate General
under authority to hear and report to him as provided by Rule IXF, supra
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One other facet of this case may he of interest. Judge Latimer
reiterated his belief that the proper method of bringing matter
outside the record before the Court would be on motion for new
trial. He then went on to say:
"In this instance the method of raising the error is not
a matter of form, it is a matter of substance. If the ac-
cused were successful in raising the pretrial conference as
a matter of prejudicial error on direct appeal, they might
obtain a rehearing with a ceiling on the punishment, or a
reduction in sentence by the board of review. If they pro-
ceeded by a motion for a new trial, the sentence would be
undisturbed if the petition was denied. If it was granted
on Jurisdictional grounds and the accused were retried, they
would not have the protection given by the Code prohibiting
the increase of sentence. I can aptlj'- illustrate what would
happen in this instance were we to ho3d the claimed error
divested the court-martial of jurisdiction. Two of the de-
fendants who have served a goodly portion of their two-year
sentence could be retried and sentenced to the maximum term
of confinement. It would thus be trading a fixed and par-
tially served sentence for a possible death sentence; and
similar fate would face the other accused. From my review
of the facts, it is entirely probable that I would work a
grave injustice on all accused by holding that the pro-
ceedings were null and void."
Judge Latimer has thus sounded a warning which all defense counsel
might well heed in determining the method by which the Court is
approached if dealing in that delicate area involving jurisdictional
defects which will be considered later herein. It will have been
noted that Judge Latimer and Judge Brosman were not able to agree
wholly in their approaches to these cases. Chief Judge Quinn ex-
pressed an independent view which may be considered as a middle or
in-between view.
The next case to be considered is of particular interest be-
cause it is authored by Judge Homer Ferguson with Chief Judge Quinn
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and Judge Latimer concurring. The case actually turned upon juris-
dictional grounds but is worthy of consideration for the language
used by the author judge. The case is United States v. Roberts .
The accused was convicted by general court-martial of desertion
resulting from a prolonged absence of about eleven years. He was
sentenced to dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures, and con-
finement at hard labor for fifteen years. The convening authority
approved but reduced the confinement to ten years. An Army board
of review reduced the confinement to six years. After the board
of review had acted in the case, the convening authority forwarded
a" letter to the Chief, Defense Appellate Division, Office of The
Judge Advocate General of the Army, stating in substance that he
had personally delegated to his staff judge advocate authority to
refer the case for trial and that the staff officer and not the
commander made the decision. The same information was contained
in one of a number of affidavits attached to the pleadings in the
case. This the Court considered as going to jurisdiction and
reversed the decision of the board of review and returned the
record for a rehearing.
Judge Ferguson had this to say:
"In connection with appellate exhibits generally, we feel it
appropriate to point out that certain distinctions must be
drawn. Where such an exhibit contains new evidence or new
matter which was not before or was not considered by the
trial court or the reviewing agencies, this court follows the
almost uniform civil practice and generally will not consider
it. Ordinarily appellate courts review claimed errors only
11+9 United States v. Roberts (No. 7738), 7 USCMA 322, 22 CMR 112.
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on the basis of the error as presented to the lower courts.
. . . However, this court will review material outside the
record having to do with insanity, United States v. Bell,
6 USCMA 392, 20 CMR 108, and jurisdiction, United States v.
Dickenson, 6 USCMA ^38, 20 CMR 15U.
"The other category of appellate exhibits actually
amounts to what is usually referred to as a supplementary
or additional designation of record. That is, it involves
some procedure or occurrence which ordinarily would be in-
cluded in the record of trial and other proceedings that
come before this court for review but which is missing
therefrom by way of mistake, inadvertence, or otherwise.
In this latter category, the only question involved is
whether such occurrence in fact took place. If so, and if
pertinent, it is entitled to be made part of the record of
the proceedings before this court. There may of course be
circumstances where- -when such a correction is made for the
first time at this level- -we will return the entire record
for primary decision at the appropriate level. Neverthe-
less civil courts generally and the Federal courts in
particular provide the necessary measures to insure that a
complete and correct record is before the appellate court.
See Rule 75(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which also applies to the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure (Rule 39 )• This does not mean that we are not fully
aware of and in complete accord with the function provided
for by a Certificate of Correction (paragraph 86c, Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951 )• But the use of
such certificate appears to be permissive in nature, merely
one method of correcting a record, not the exclusive means.
United States v. Self, 3 USCMA 568, 13 CMR 12
W
From the foregoing cases, it is quite apparent that Chief Judge
Quinn will have no disposition to consider matters outside the record
which were not raised at the trial level unless the matter is of
a general public nature which gravely affects the military com-
munity. Judge Latimer has expressed an unwillingness to look out-
side the record when the matter would more appropriately be raised
by motion for new trial. He has not indicated a disposition to
require strict compliance with the procedures moving for new trial
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or for correcting records. The expressions of Judge Ferguson in-
dicate a basic and more fundamental unanimity among the three
members of the Court than has prevailed in this particular area.
It would be idle speculation to go further into prognosticating
the future,
SENTENCES .
At the commencement of this chapter, it was thought to be
preferable that consideration be given separately to "findings"
and to the "sentence." To this point in the discussion, attention
has, therefore, been directed toward. the findings. At this juncture,
the discussion will point toward the sentence.
Slgtoical .
The historical background of Article 66(c) and (d) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, supra, shows that boards of re-
view were not empowered to deal with sentences until the enactment
of the Code. The Congress contemplated that such power would work
to establish a uniformity of sentences throughout the Armed Forces.
The traditional powers which have always been possessed by convening
authorities were preserved unto them by the Code. Judge Brosraan
very aptly summarized the power of the convening authority in
pointing out that he is not limited in the sources from which he
may obtain information upon which to form an opinion as to the
appropriateness of a particular sentence but may, if he desires,
consult "a guy named Joe.' 5° The Code provides, however, that
150 United States v. Coulter (No. 2786), 3 USCMA. 657, 663, lk
CMR 75-
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boards of review will look only to the "entire record"^l -j_n ^s
determinations. It will be necessary, therefore, to make inquiry
into the meaning of the term "entire record" and to the extent to
which the boards have been empowered to deal with sentences.
Entire Record- -Broader Than Record of Guilt or Innocence .
In a recent case, United States v. Lanford, ->2 Chief Judge
Quinn considered the over-all problem presented. He there said:
"In the first instance the sentence is fixed by the court-
martial. The court, of course, will normally act on the
evidence presented to' it. The sentence imposed by the court
is not final. It cannot be increased, but it may be mitigated
by the reviewing authorities. The question then arises as to
whether the interests of justice require these reviewing
authorities to look ho further than the trial proceedings
for facts which would justify a reduction in the sentence.
It seems to us that ah accused would be the last person to
urge that rule. In any event, we think that the law is less
harsh- In our opinion, justice is fostered by giving the
reviewing authorities power to go outside the record of
trial for information as to the sentence. See Rule 32(c),
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Its purpose is to bene-
fit, not to hann, the accused. But what of a case like this
one in which some of the extra-trial facts militate against
a reduction in the sentence? Would not consideration of
these facts harm the accused by persuading the reviewing
authorities to affirm the sentence imposed by the court-
martial? The answer is necessarily 'yes.' But, it must be
remembered that appeal from the court-imposed sentence is a
matter of legislative grant not of inherent right. Con-
gress might have piovided that a legal sentence adjudged
by a court-martial cannot be altered in any way by a review-
ing authority. Instead, it chose to provide a procedure
under which the court's sentence can be materially reduced.
This procedure insures justice; it does not defeat it. We
conclude, therefore, that contrary to the accused's con-
tention, the words 'entire record' mean more than the evi-
dence presented at the trial. In fact, previous decisions
of the court clearly indicate that a board of review may
look beyond the trial record for mitigating evidence."
151 UCMJ, Art. 66(c).
152 United States v. Lanford (No. 65U0), 6 USCMA 371, 379, 20
CMR 87."
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The Lanford case from which the foregoing quotation was taken
was a Navy case tried "before a special court-martial wherein the
accused was charged with an unauthorized absence of approximately
eleven hours. The accused pleaded guilty and during the sentence
procedure, two previous convictions were introduced into evidence.
He was sentenced to a bad conduct discharge and to confinement at
hard labor for one month. The convening authority approved but
suspended the execution of the discharge for the period of confine-
ment and five months thereafter. In approving the sentence, the
convening authority in his action on the record, stated that he
had considered the entire service record of the accused, which,
with commendatory items, also included a list of nine nonjudicial
punishments. The defense moved to strike the references to the
nonjudicial punishments from the record. The board denied the
motion but held that it could not and would not consider the ad-
ditional information in its deliberation on the sentence. On the
basis of the offense charged, the eleven-hour unauthorized absence,
and the two prior convictions, the board decided that the sentence
was inappropriate and ai firmed only the period of confinement.
The action of the convening authority complied with a directive
of the Chief of Naval Personnel, BuPers Instruction 1626.13 of
October 7' t 195^, by including in his review a synopsis of the
conduct record of the accused. Army and Air Force requirements
for a post trial interview reach a similar design. The Judge
Advocate General of the Navy sought review by the Court of Military
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Appeals to determine whether the board of review was correct in
refusing to strike the nonjudicial punishments from the record;
whether the hoard should have considered all of the matter con-
tained in the synopsis in its determination of the appropriateness
of the sentence; whether the board was authorized to exercise
clemency and to what extent; and whether the board should consider
all of the matter contained in the synopsis in its decision as to
whether or not to exercise clemency. In dealing with the certified
questions, the Court has given a comprehensive coverage to the
matters presented which, in turn, is the subject of the present
inquiry.
In dealing with the questions submitted, the Court, although
indicating that reviewing authorities have the power to go outside
the record of trial for information as to the sentence, seems to
be "really saying that certain matters which become appended, attached
as allied papers, or are supplementary to the record of trial, be-
come a. part of the "entire record" for the purposes of review as
to the sentence. In support of this position, the decision points
out that neither the Code nor the Manual prohibit the convening
authority from detailing his reasons for approving a sentence.
In granting a review of his action as to the appropriateness of
the sentence, the Court reasons that reviewing authorities should
have the benefit of those factual matters which he considered but
which were not admissible into evidence as to the guilt or innocence
of the accused. As was previously determined, there is practically
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no limitation as to what the convening authority might take
into consideration. It follows that whatever he considered he
could recite in his action on the record and thereby incorporate
those matters into the "entire record." It might he less con-
fusing if the record of trial were to be designated as "the file"
of the case after the court-martial had arrived at a sentence.
Judge Latimer, in a separate concurring opinion, comments:
"It would be strange law indeed if a convening authority
could exercise his powers in silence without infringing on a
privilege of an accused, yet if he speaks out, an accused's
right has been violated. That such a ruling would be abused
can well be established. In the first instance, the accused
has no possibility of undermining the base supporting an
affirmance . In the latter instance, he has been furnished
an opportunity to rebut the truthfulness or accuracy of the
supporting evidence, even though the occasion may be late.
If an accused has reason to believe that information fur-
nished to the convening authority is not founded in fact he
can submit to that officer his rebuttal evidence. If he is
uninformed, he can prepare the way before action by explain-
ing any unfavorable entries appearing in his service record.
It may well be that he must take the initiative, but that
is a burden he must assume.
Judge Latimer further recognizes the possibility of the convening
authority going beyond the service record and obtaining information
from doubtful sources- -possibly consulting "Joe." To this he
rationalizes that the accused is requesting a favorable discretionary
ruling to which he has no right to an explanation of its denial;
he may submit his version of disputed matters for reconsideration;
but in any event legally trained board members should be able to
evaluate properly what is presented to them.
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The Chief Judge reviews previous cases ' considered by the
Court wherein distinctions were apparently drawn between the ap-
propriateness of a sentence and the exercise of clemency. He
concludes:
"The name by which the board's power is denominated is
really unimportant. What is important is that within the
limitations of its own authority, the board of review can,
in the interests of justice, substantially lessen the rigor
of a legal sentence. The board of review, therefore, can
be compassionate;; it can be lenient; it can be forbearing.
If one prefers to call the influence of those human qualities
in the mitigation of a sentence the exercise of the judicial
function of determining legal appropriateness the description
is proper. ... On the other hand, if one wishes to call it
clemency, that description also is proper."
In the light of this decision, the conclusion is reasonably drawn
that the Court has resigned themselves to less bickering about
terms with a recognition that boards of review may exercise clemency
in conjunction with a judicial determination as to the legal ap-
propriateness of a sentence. The Court remanded the principle
case to The Judge Advocate General of the Navy for submission to
the board of review for reconsideration of the sentence. The net
effect would be that the board of review would take into consideration
-*-" ]?or other cases in this area which the Court considered and
which are not discussed, infra : United States v. Jones (No. 79),
1 USCMA 302, 3 CMR 36; United States v. Reeves (No. 1*53), 1 USCMA
388, 3 CMR 122; United States v, Keith (No." 226), 1 USCMA kk2, k
CMR 3^; United States v. Brasher "(No. ^99), 2 USCMA 50, 6 CMR 50;
United States v. Duffy (No. 1^04), 3 USCMA 20, 11 CMR 20; United
States v. Wbiteman (No. 2168), 3 USCMA 179, 11 CMR 179; United
States v. Fleming "(No. 2727), 3 USCMA U6l, 13 CMR 17; United States
v. Cavailero (No. 277*0, 3 USCMA 653, Ik CMR 71; United State s v.
Coulter (Mo. 2736), 3 USCMA 657, l1* CMR 75; United States v. Walters
"[No. 373*0, k USCMA 617, 3.6 CMR 191; United States v. Clisson (No.
w35), 5 USCMA 277, 17 CMR 277; United States v. Long TNo. 5503),
5 USCMA 572, 18 CMR 196; United States v. Parker (No. 5759), 6 USCMA.
75, 19 CMR 201.
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the nine nonjudicial punishments of which it was previously cog-
nizant but refused to consider. It could then approve the punitive
discharge as suspended by the convening authority or, by the exer-
cise of clemency in its determination of legal appropriateness,
approve only the confinement as it did in the first instance.
The Court of Military Appeals lacks the power to determine
15^
the appropriateness of a. sentence. ' Its power, as has been
shown, stems from Article 67(d) of the Code, supra
,
providing that
the Court shall take, action only with respect to matters of law.
In the absence of a sentence exceeding maximum legal limits, the
Court is without authority to determine what portion of a sentence
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should be approved. This oft-repeated generalization will bear
further consideration.
Death Sentence Reduced .
156
In the case of United States v. Bigger, the accused was
found guilty of premeditated murder by the trial court and was
sentenced to be executed. The board of review affirmed only so
much of the finding as found the accused guilty of unpremeditated
murder and approved only so much of the sentence as provided for
a dishonorable discharge and confinement at hard labor for life.
The Judge Advocate General of the Army submitted the case to the
Court for a determination as to the legality of the action of the
board of review in changing the death sentence. The defense urged
that .the board's action was an illegal act since the boards of
j-^ United States v.- Cousae (No. 2780), 3 USCMA. 793,797, ~& CMR 211.
\ United States v. Keith (No. 226), 1 USCMA hh2, U51, k CMR 3U.
1^° United States v. Bigger (No. k$6), 2 USCMA. 297, 8 CMR 97.
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review had no authority to commute, as distinguished from deter-
mining appropriateness or granting clemency. It was contended that
such power had been delegated exclusively to the President and
Secretaries of the Departments by Article 7l(a) and (b) of the Code
and paragraph 105 of the Manual. The Court concluded that the
action of the board did amount to commutation. They found, however,
that premeditated murder and the sentence of death were so inextricably
intermixed that the death sentence could not stand when the finding
was reduced to a lesser offense. The Court concluded that Congress
intended to authorize boards of review to affirm findings of guilty
of lesser included offenses and that, if by so doing, it must have
intended to permit the board to substitute a lesser legal sentence.
It appears, therefore, that boards of review do possess the power of
commutation in at least this one situation.
The Bigger case, supra , suggests a question as to whether the
power of commutation might find application in a situation where a
death sentence was predicated upon more than one finding of guilt
although the board should reduce one of the findings. Such a
situation was presented tc the Court in the case of United States v.
Freeman . ^ ' In that case, two accused were tried jointly by general
court-martial in Germany. Each of two specifications under the
first charge alleged the joint rape of two separate women. The
single specification of Charge II alleged a joint assault with a
dangerous weapon upon the husband of one of the rape victims. Both
i57 United States v. Freeman (No. 3211 ), h USCMA 76, 15 CMR 76.
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accused were found guilty as charged and sentenced to death. The
convening authority approved the findings and the sentences. A
board of review in the Office of The Judge Advocate General of
the Army reduced the finding of guilty under one of the rape speci-
fications to joint assault with intent to commit rape. The deaoh
sentence was affirmed by the board but its members forwarded a
recommendation that the sentence as to each accused be commuted
to a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances,
and confinement at hard labor for life. The case was before the
Court on mandatory review of the death sentences. Judge Latimer,




j . "At best the board had three possible alternatives. First,
it could affirm the sentence as originally imposed; second, it
.: could affirm the sentence and recommend that clemency action
be exercised by those in whom such authority was vested; and
third, it could direct a rehearing, if sentence could not be
justified reasonably upon the affirmed findings. We think the
board was correct in its decision to reject the third alter-
native. The facts we have previously related show that the
offenses committed by the accused were of a violent and heinous
nature. The offenses were established beyond peradventure of
doubt, and there is not the slightest semblance of a defense
suggested. ..."
Dismissal—Powers Regarding.
The next question with which the Court was confronted in this
area was whether a board of review had the power to reduce a sen-
tence of dismissal to a loss of numbers. The issue arose out of
the case of United States v. Goodwin . 1^ The accused officer was
found guilty of one charge of assaulting a shore patrolman in the
15 United States v. Goodwin (No. 5868), 5 USCMA. 6kj, 18 CMR 271.
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execution of his office under Article 128 of the Code and of a
charge of being drunk and disorderly in station under Article 13^.
The court-martial sentenced him to be dismissed from the service.
The convening authority approved the sentence. A Navy board of
review affirmed the findings of guilty but concluded that the sen-
tence was inappropriate and commuted the sentence to the loss of
two hundred unrestricted numbers. The Judge Advocate General's
Certificate presented the issue as to the power of a board of
review. Pending appellate review, the Secretary of the Navy,
acting independently of the board of review, commuted the sentence
to a loss of two hundred numbers. The Court proceeded with its
. review. It recognized that the board of review had acted under a
misapprehension regarding the imposable punishments but then turned
its attention to the certified question. The Court noted that
Congress did not use either the term "commute" or "mitigate" when
it granted boards of review the power to consider the appropriate-
ness of sentences. It turned attention to the historical dis-
tinctions which had existed in the military services until the
enactment of the Code. After tracing the legal background through
various changes in the law, a majority of the Court noted that a
difference had been maintained by granting to officers inferior
to a Secretary of a Department only the power to reduce or miti-
gate sentences but at the same time gave to the President or to
theSecretary of the Havy-the authority to commute or change their
nature. In 19^9 > for the first time someone other than the Presi-
dent or a Secretary of the Department could commute a dismissal to
some other form of punishment. The Court said:
.Hi.
"For a short period of time the Judicial Council could
change the form of the sentence and the nature of the
punishment. However, when Congress eliminated the Judicial
Council, the board of review did not fall heir to its powers.
Only a specific delegation of authority by Congress would
vest the board with authority to substitute punishments."
The Court then turned its attention to the provisions of the Code
which they interpreted as permitting affirmation of a sentence or
such parts as should be approved but found that such grant does
not offer any power to resentence the accused to another form of
punishment. The Court concluded by saying:
"In hopes we will state the law as it is now provided
for in the Code, and restate what we believe the law always
has been in military services, we sum up our views. Speci-
fically, only the Chief Executive and the Secretaries of the
Departments or their Assistants,, if so designated, have the
power to change a dismissal from the service to any other
form of punishment. Only the President can change a sen-
tence of death to confinement for life or a term of years.
Generally, the President and the enumerated Secretaries
and their Assistants alone can commute a sentence, and we
use the word 'commute' in its. generally accepted sense,
that is, change in form. Mitigation we restrict to a re-
. duction in kind."
. Chief Judge Quinn strongly dissented, expressing the view that he
thought Congress intended to confer upon the board of review the
power to approve a sentence, which, while not necessarily a part of
the whole, is lesser in amount than that adjudged by the court and
approved by the convening authority. He points out that one of the
alternative courses previously suggested by the author Judge in the
Freeman case, supra
,
was to order a rehearing whereby the board of
review could accomplish indirectly what the majority hold could
not be accomplished directly. He states:
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"The board of review was constituted as the authority to
determine the appropriateness of any sentence, whatever its
nature, and to cut down that sentence in any amount, if it
determined that the adjudged sentence was too severe . ...
"The real issue in this case is not to distinguish be-
tween commutation and mitigation, but whether loss of numbers
is a punishment which is a lesser 'amount' than dismissal.
See United States v. Kelley, 5 USCMA 259, 17 CMR 259- Plainly,
it is. Eowever, even if the question is considered from the
standpoint of the difference between commutation and mitigation,
the action taken by the board of review is proper."
The Chief Judge then quotes from a unanimous opinion of the Supreme
159 '
Court of the United States in the Mullan case, y' where the Supreme
Court held that changing of a sentence of dismissal to a loss of
numbers was exercising the powers of mitigation. He concludes
that what was mitigation then is still mitigation. The majority
had distinguished the Mullan case on the basis that the law had
changed; that the Supreme Court conceded a difference between
mitigation and commutation; and that the President possessed both
powers in the Mullan case.
Prior to the above case, the Court of Military Appeals had
considered another case, wherein the sentence provided for dis-
missal. In United States v. Voorhees , the accused officer
stood convicted of five violations of the Uniform Code which grew
out of certain of his writings of experiences in Korea. A divided
board of review set aside all of the findings of guilty except
for one single offense. The board affirmed the sentence of
^ Mullan v. United States , 212 U.S. 5l6 (1909).
United States v. Voorhees (No. 3226), k USCMA 509, l6 CMR 83.
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'dismissal and total forfeitures as appropriate for the finding
affirmed. The dissenting member would have dismissed all of the
findings of guilty. In view of the dismissal of all of the major
charges and the failure of the hoard of review to order a rehearing
• before the trial court, the Court reversed the decision of the board
of review and ordered a rehearing en the one remaining charge.
Judge Brosman dissented and would have dismissed the remaining
charge. Judge Latimer wrote a separate opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part from the author Chief Judge. He expressed
the view that the board could not compensate by a reduction in
sentence for the findings which it reversed. He believed that a
rehearing by the court-martial was not only appropriate but was
mandatory under the circumstances. The board of review had no
power to change the type or nature of the sentence and was thereby
precluded from making the punishment fit the crime. The board
should not have passed upon the appropriateness of the sentence.
As to returning the case to the board, he reasoned that he would
be compelled to hold that the board erred if it were to again affirm
the sentence. The sentence should be considered by a judicial
body which did have free choice of an appropriate sentence.
The respective positions of the present membership of the
Court of Military Appeals is brought out in the case of United
States v. Stene . Judge Latimer has written the opinion of the
Court with the concurrence of Judge Ferguson. Chief Judge Quinn
161 United States v. Stene (No. 8325), 7 USCMA 277, 22 CMR 67.
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retained the position which he had taken in previous cases and
registered a strong dissent. In the Stene case, the accused officer
was charged with an unauthorized absence of twenty-six days' failure
to obey an order and dishonorably failing to keep a promise to his
commanding officer. He pleaded guilty to all of the specifications
and was sentenced to be dismissed from the service. The convening
authority affirmed the findings and sentence, but the board of re-
view dismissed the specification alleging the failure to keep a
promise as failing to state any offense. It affirmed the findings
as to the other two allegations and found the sentence of dis-
missal to be an appropriate punishment for the affirmed findings.
On rehearing, the board reaffirmed its prior conclusion as to the
appropriateness of the sentence. Judge Latimer uses this language:
"... A right to fit the punishment to the crime is thus vested
in that agency, but no such power has been conferred on us.
Here the board concluded that the sentence as imposed by the
court-martial was legal and appropriate in all respects for
the offenses which were affirmed. ..."
He then distinguishes the Voorhees case, supra, by saying:
"While the cases may only differ in degree, they are so far
apart factually that the dissimilarity calls for different
results."
It may be worthy of note that at this point the Court, although
saying that it does not have the power to fit the punishment to
the crime, is certainly in a position of deciding whether the
board has properly exercised the power vested in it. The only way
by which such a determination could be made is to apply the punish-
ment to the facts of the particular case, reach a conclusion as
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to appropriateness and on the basis of that determination measure
the results reached by the board. Actually, there is no objection
to such prdcsdure. It amounts to nothing more than a determination
that, as a matter of law, the sentence, as approved by the board
of review, is legal under the facts of the particular case* The
function of weighing facts for legal sufficiency has previously
been discussed. The same principles apply to a determination of
the legality of sentence. It is suggested that a clear-cut recog-
nition of these functions by the Court would greatly simplify
their exercise * •' -•
'Judge Latimer further said:
-'
'
-"Over the five year period of this court's existence, we have
repeatedly returned cases to boards of review for reassess-
ment of sentence when a specification has' been dismissed or
the findings set aside by us. In addition, those agencies
have long determined the appropriateness of sentences in the
light of altered arid modified findings. • The power of a board
to fix the quantum of punishment With or without affirming
all findings is no longer in doubt. The principles controlling
in that area have -become so well -fixed that little need be
said concerning their place in our practice and procedure."
At this juncture, there can be no question but that boards
of review do have the power to determine the appropriateness of
sentences and the power to fix the quantum of punishment. Query
is made, however, as to whether this is a power exclusively vested
in the boards of review. Should this power not be limited in its
practical application to sentences which remain after the findings
have been altered or modified by the boards of review? It is
without controversy that the sentence as approved by a board of
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review after the findings have been altered or modified and found
to he appropriate is still subject to review by the Court.
To carry through with the Court's reasoning, Judge Latimer
will be quoted further, as follows:
"..., at the risk of being redundant, we repeat that in mili-
tary law, a single inclusive sentence is imposed, and unless
a beard of review has the power to affirm a sentence in whole
or in part when findings are modified, the whole appellate
superstructure must be redesigned. One of the cardinal prin-
ciples set out in Article 66 of the Code is that a board of re«
view may affirm all or part of the findings and determine a
specially suited sentence from the entire record, That ob-
viously means the record as it stands or as it has been
changed by action on the findings. That must necessarily
follow, for in some instances, the punishment imposed by the
court-martial is assessed solely on the most serious aspect
of the criminal transaction even though it may have been
charged in several ways. In other situations, the total
sentence may be determined by totaling the punishment con-
sidered appropriate for each crime. The record does not dis-
close the method used, but to make a workable system, some
appellata agencies must have the power to adjust the sen-
tence if the findings are changed on appeal. Congress has
given boards of review the authority to determine the ap-
propriateness of sentence, and surely within that grant of
power would be the right to make the determination regard-
less of the action on the findings, in all cases where the
sentence is one which the board is authorized to change.
We believe the principle is expressed properly in United
States v. Keith, 1 USCMA. kk2, h CMR 3^. We there said:
"
' . . . We quite agree that if a military judicial agency
empowered to do so has determined that the original sentence
is appropriate for a single valid conviction in a case in-
volving several specifications^ we are powerless to disturb
that determination on review.'
-
"
The Court then proceeded in the principle case to hold that
the board of review had twice concluded as a matter of fact and
of law that the sentence of dismissal was appropriate for the two
remaining convictions. The crimes were serious, and the Court
held that it could not say that they were not a major part both
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quantitatively and qualitatively of the offenses considered by
the court-martial. Such "being the case, the board of review was
held, not to have abused its discretion in affirming the sentence*
It is perfectly clear that if the board had abused its discretion
in affirming the sentence, the Court would have had no qualms about
taking remedial action. Had the approved findings of guilty repre-
sented but a small portion of the original findings, the Court
would have returned the case to the court-martial for reassessment
under the Voorhees case, supra . Granted that these situations were
limited to cases wherein the only sentence was dismissal, did not
the Court as a matter of law determine that a sentence of dismissal
either was or was not appropriate under the facts of the particular
case? The Chief Judge registered a strong dissent in the Stene
case. He first dissented from the majority opinion's belief that
the Keith case, supra , held that the Court could not review a
lo2
sentence and quoted from United States v. Field, wherein Judge
Brosman noted that the Court had repeatedly emphasized that the
Court held no warrant to determine the appropriateness of a court-
martial' s sentence although the Court had not denied the possession
of power in a proper case to declare punitive action inappropriate
as a matter of law. Secondly, he disagreed with everything in the
principle opinion which either directly or by implication limited
the power of a board of review to reduce a sentence of dismissal
to a less severe form of punishment.
162 United States v. Field (No. 2210), 5 USCMA. 379, 382, 18 CMR 3-
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At this point, reference will be made to Article 66(c) of the
Cede, supra, which has consistently been the foundation for all
of the discussion regarding appropriateness. The Code provides
that the board:
"... shall affirm only such findings of guilty, and the sen-
tence or such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds
correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the
entire record, should be approved..."
There is nothing in that language which refers to appropriateness.
Do not all appellate courts have power to reduce a sentence which
is excessive as a matter of law? Is not a sentence which is ex-
cessive as a matter of fact also excessive as a matter of law?
The boards of review have the power to weigh facts' and in the
light of those facts to determine what portion of the sentence is
not, as a matter of law, excessive. Is not this exactly what
Congress intended to give the Court of Military Appeals? Under
Article 67 of the Code, the Court shall "take action only with
respect to matters of law." An excessive sentence, as a matter of
law, is illegal and requires remedial action. What prevents the
Court, from taking such action and itself approving only such find-
ings of guilty, and the sentence or such part or amount of the
sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and determines, on
the basis of the entire record, should be approved? The answer
is nothing. The difficulty seems to arise from Article 67(e) which
provides, as has been previously noted above:
"If the Court of Military Appeals sets aside the findings and
sentence, it may, except where the setting aside is based on
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lack of sufficient evidence in the record to support the
findings, order a rehearing. If it sets aside the findings
and sentence and does not order a rehearing it shall order
that the charges be dismissed."
There can he no question but what the charges must be dismissed in
the event that the Court weighs the evidence in the record but
finds it insufficient as a matter of law to support the findings.
If there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings,
there would be no reason to set aside the findings or the sentence
and approval would follow. In the event there are several findings
of guilty, the Court should set aside those which were not sup-
ported by sufficient evidence but would approve those which were
supported. If it then approved the sentence or such part or amount
as it found correct in law, there would be no need for a rehearing.
It is only when the findings and the sentence are both set aside
that a rehearing need be ordered or the charges be dismissed. If
the board of review or the Court finds that prejudicial error has
been committed by the trial court which is of such gravity, as a
matter of law, that the finding cannot be sustained then the find-
ing must be set aside. If the error goes to a substantial portion
of the conviction, a rehearing may be ordered. If the prejudice
was of a nature to blanket all of the guilty findings, a rehearing
would certainly be in order. Under such circumstances, all of the
findings of guilt would be set aside. It would follow that all of
the sentence would also be set aside. Congress undoubtedly intended
that such a case should be referred back to a trial court for
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another trial. Wherein does this construction do any violence
to the express provisions of the Code? It does not.
Bad Conduct Discharge .
Before leaving this area, one further situation will be pre-
l6^
sented. In United State s v. Atkins, the accused was convicted
by a special court-martial of a violation of Article 92 of the Code
and after considering three prior convictions the court sentenced
him to be discharged from the naval service with a bad conduct dis-
charge which both the convening and supervisory authorities approved.
The board of review approved the findings but set aside the sentence.
The Judge Advocate General of the Navy certified the following
question to the. Court:
"Did the Board of -Review err in that it affirmed the finding
of guilty and yet disapproved and set aside the. sentence in
its entirety without ordering a rehearing?"
It is the Government's position,, in line with previous cases dis-
cussed above, that such action goes beyond commutation and amounts
to the grant of a quasi-pardon. It is suggested, in view of previous
discussion, that the Court need only find that the board erred as a
matter of law and order a rehearing or set aside the action of the
board as to the sentence and approve that which the trial court
imposed and which the convening and supervisory authorities
approved. Again, why should the matter be referred back to the
board of review? To carry the matter one step further, why should
163 Uaited States v. Atkins , NCM 56-02638 decided 13 September




the Court, if it should determine a bad conduct discharge to be
excessive, be required to refer the case back? It is believed
that there is considerable merit to the position which Chief Judge
Quinn has consistently maintained in his dissenting opinions. To
follow the consistency of this reasoning, there must be punishment
less severe than death; so of dismissal or a punitive discharge.
If the board of review should find one of these sentences excessive,
why should it not have the power to approve any sentence of a less
severe nature which was not excessive? Its actions would be review-
able by the Court. If the Court determined that the board was in
error, it could then reinstate the original sentence. Cn the other
hand, if a board approved an excessive sentence, the Court could
approve only so much of that sentence or one less severe, as was
not excessive.
l6k
In United States v. Brasher , the Court held that the action
on a sentence as approved by a board of review was illegal. The
sentence as approved by the convening authority provided for a bad
conduct discharge, forfeiture of $35*00 per month for ten months,
and confinement at hard labor for ten months. The board of review
set aside the discharge but affirmed the remainder. The Manual
provides that a court shall not adjudge a sentence involving a
forfeiture greater than two-thirds pay for six months or confine-
ment for more than six months without including a dishonorable or
United States v. Brasher (No. U99), 2 USCMA 50, 6 CMR 50.
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bad conduct discharge. The majority of the Court held that the
sentence as approved by the board exceeded that which a court
could have imposed without punitive discharge and was therefore
illegal. Judge Latimer dissented on the basis that the original
sentence of the .court-martial was legal and that he believed that
Congress intended to confer upon boards of review the power to
affirm any part thereof. This appears to be the position which
the Chief Judge has taken by his dissents in more recent cases
as noted above. It is also worth noting that the board of review
in the Brasher case bad two choices under the court's referral
back for action, not inconsistent with the court's opinion. It
could reduce the periods of forfeiture and confinement to six
months, or it could determine that setting aside the punitive dis-
charge constituted the illegality and thereupon approve the sen-
tence as originally imposed. This is but another example of the
rather anomalous situation into which the Court has been placed
by its judicial interpretations limiting the powers granted by
Congress to the boards of review and to the Court itself.
Suspension .
Another restriction upon the power of boards of review and
upon the Court resulted also from judicial interpretation. In the
lo5
case of United States v. Simmons, x the Court held that the power
of suspension has been expressly granted to the President, the
Secretary of the Department, and to the convening authority.
1^5 United States v. Simmons (No. 9^0), 2 USCMA. 105, 6 CMR 105.
'
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Boards being purely creatures of statute, their powers and auth-
ority, like the court-martial itself, depend upon that granted "by
creating legislation. The Code did not grant express authority
to suspend and, therefore, the court-martial, the boards of review,
and the Court itself were without such power. The Court considered
the historical background of suspension within the military es-
tablishment, noting that the power of suspension had been, without
exception, vested solely in those reviewing authorities which had
the power to order execution of a sentence. Boards of review from
'• their statutory inception had never been granted this power. The
Court concluded that if Congress had intended to alter this prior
consistent policy it would have done so in express language. In-
stead, by Article 71 of the Uniform Code, it chose to place the
: power in the President, the Secretary of the Department, and the
convening authority. The Court considered authority which seemed
to support the proposition that there is an inherent power in
courts to suspend a sentence. Citing the United States Supreme
166Court case of Ex parte United States, the Court held that there
was no inherent power, but:
"Even if there existed this inherent power in courts of
general jurisdiction, it would still be difficult to say that
the same authority attached to a body such as a board of
review."
The Court acknowledged the anomaly presented by a board's
power to remit a punitive discharge yet be entirely powerless to
suspend it under probation or a conditional guarantee of continued
^ Ex parte United States , 2U2 U.S. 27.
22h
good behavior. As indicated above, the author is not willing to
concede that the Court of Military Appeals does not possess both
the inherent power and statutory authority to suspend any sentence
which a convening authority could suspend. The breadth of this
discussion does not permit full development of this proposition
at the present writing.
New Trial .
In giving consideration to what matters may be considered in
the appellate process which are not included within the record
of trial, the Petition for a New Trial must be noted. By express
167provision of the Code:




- vening authority of a court-martial sentence which extends
to death, dismissal, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge,
; 'or confinement for one year or more, the accused may petition
The Judge Advocate General for a new trial on grounds of
Dgffly.-jdiscovered evidence or fraud on the court . . 77* (Em-
phasis added.
)
The Manual makes provision for implementing the above enactment
of the Code. A mere glance at the emphasized wording of the Code
provision discloses that the grounds contemplated will, by their
very nature, be predicated to a large extent upon matter which is
foreign to the record of trial. It was for this reason that the
subject of new trials was deleted from detailed study. Furthermore,
this procedure lies beyond the scope of appellate review. It is
mentioned at this point for the sole purpose of preserving con-
tinuity of discourse.
^7 ucmJ, Art. 73.






It is not the purpose of this discussion to encroach into
the substantive law of insanity. Consideration will be limited
to those aspects which are related to appellate review. In mili-
tary law, insanity bears upon the mental responsibility of the
accused at the time of the offense charged against him and also
upon the mental capacity of the accused to understand the nature
of the proceedings against him and intelligently to conduct or
i6q
cooperate in his defense. y To the latter may be added an ex-
tension which bears upon the mental capacity of the accused during
the subsequent stages of appellate review. As a starting point,
170 '•'
the Manual will be consulted.
. It contains the following pro-
visions:
"After consideration of the record as a whole, if it
appears to the convening authority or higher authority that
a reasonable doubt exists as to the sanity of the accused,
he should disapprove any findings of guilty of the charges
and specifications affected by such doubt and take appropriate
action with respect to the sentence. Such authority will take
the action prescribed in 121 before taking action on the rec-
ord whenever it appears from the record of trial or otherwise
that further inquiry as to the mental condition of the accused
is warranted in the interest of justice, regardless of whether
any such question was raised at the trial or how it was deter-
mined if raised." (Emphasis added.)
^ (par. 121, MCM, 1951).±(U (par. 124, MCM, 1951).
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The foregoing provision was undoubtedly the basis for the
Rule that matters outside the record of trial will not be presented
to or argued before a board of review except with respect to mat-
ters affecting the sanity of an accused tending to show that further
inquiry as to his mental condition is warranted in the interest of
171justice. The language of these provisions is very general and
for that reason the decisions of the Court will be examined for the
interpretations which the Court has placed upon them.
Raised by Tfasworn Statement .
172
In an early case arising before the Code, but reviewed
after the effective date of the Code, it was held by the Court that
unsworn testimony of an accused, given in mitigation did not raise
an issue of sanity. The accused pleaded guilty to the charges
against him but in mitigation entered an unsworn statement to the
effect that he had been kicked in the head by a horse at the age
of Ik and that since that date had suffered periodic blackouts with
lapse of memory. The case was treated as though a not guilty plea
had been entered. In addition to proof of the offenses charged,
evidence was introduced to show the mental condition of the accused.
A board of review disapproved the findings and sentence and ordered
a rehearing on the ground that a question of sanity had been raised
and that the accused was materially prejudiced by introduction
of the health record of the accused. The Court reversed the board
i 1 Rule IXF(3}, Uniform Rules of Procedure for Proceedings in
and Before Boards of Review, Appendix IV 1955, NS, MCM, 1951.
'
172 United States v. Branstetter (No. 19), 1 USCMA 30, 1 CMR 30.
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of review, holding that the trial court's action had been proper
;
that the presumption of sanity was unassailed and, therefore, error
to introduce the health record to support the presumption; and that
no material prejudice resulted.
Error for Board Not to Consider Post Trial Matter .
One of the next cases considered by the Court was the Burns
case. ,J There the accused was tried and found guilty of assault
with intent to commit murder. The issue of insanity was raised
at the trial. The convening authority, after trial, ordered a
further mental examination by a board of officers. The board be-
lieved the accused unable to adhere to the right. The convening
authority, in spite of this finding, which was in agreement with
undisputed medical testimony at the trial, approved the finding of
guilt and reduced the sentence, later, The Surgeon General of the
Air Force reviewed the record but disagreed with the experts be-
low and concluded that the accused was sane. The board of review
approved the conviction and sentence but expressed the belief that
it would not be proper for them to consider the opinions and re-
ports submitted after the findings of the trial court. The case
was submitted to the Court on certificate. It was held by the
Court that the provisions of the Manual and Rule IX, supra
,
per-
mitted the board to look outside the record of trial. If the issue
has been fully litigated at the trial level, there is no require-
ment that the board upset the holding or launch into an independent
173 United States v. 3urns (No. 8U7), 2 USCMA. ^00, 9 CMR 30;
affirmed 5 USCMA. 707, 19 CMR 3-
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investigation. However, there was no good reason to refuse to
evaluate the evidence which had been produced. The board should
have weighed the medical reports acquired after the trial along
with the other evidence found in the record. The board of review
ordered a rehearing at which the accused was again convicted. The
Court later affirmed the conviction.
Rehearing Not Jeopardy .
Another aspect of the problem was presented by the Niolu
17k
case. The day after the accused was convicted and sentenced by
a general court-martial, an opinion was expressed to the convening
authority, by the president o: the court and others, that the ac-
cused was not mentally sound. No evidence bearing on sanity had
been introduced at the trial, and no issue there raised. The con-
vening authority disapproved the findings and sentence, directing
a rehearing. At the rehearing, evidence regarding the sanity of
the accused was presented to the court. The accused was again
convicted. The convening authority approved, as did the Army board
of review. The Court granted review as to whether the accused had
been twice placed in jeopardy. It was held that there had been no
evidence indicating insanity at the original trial and there were
no indications that the members of the trial court could have
entertained a reasonable doubt as to the sanity of the accused
prior to their findings. The trial court therefore did not find
the accused guilty in .spite of doubts as to his sanity. Any
17l+
United States v. Niolu (No. l(Ao), 2 USCMA 513, 10 CMR 11.
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information concerning the matter was received by the court mem-
bers after the' trial had been concluded. The action taken by the
convening authority was in accordance with paragraph 12^- of the
Manual, supra, and did not amount in law to an acquittal and,
therefore, no jeopardy attached.
State Judgment Not Binding on Military .
The issue of insanity arose' in United States v. Johnson . x ' '
Evidence of a Colorado lunacy proceeding was admitted in evidence
without objection. The Court found that the Colorado judgment
would not be binding upon a Colorado criminal court and that it
was not, therefore, a judgment which obligated other courts to a
' conclusive finding of insanity to accord full faith and credit
to the judgments of other courts. The Colorado proceeding deter-
mined the sanity of the accused as of the date the judgment was
rendered. The Colorado judgment did not determine the ability of
the accused to discern between right and wrong and to be able to
adhere to the right. Although the Colorado judgment was a part of
the trial record in the instant case, it is presented here as
going to the weight which might be attached to such a judgment if
first presented at the appellate level.
Examination Ordered by JAG .
' In the case of United States v. Edwards, 1 ' the accused was
•
' convicted of premeditated murder and sentenced to death. Reviewing
17? United States v. Johnson (No. 2588), 3 USCMA 725, Ik CMR lk3
.
^o United States v. Edward's" (No. ^355), h USCMA 299, 15 CMR 299..
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authorities affirmed and the case was before the Court on mandatory
review. Insanity had been considered by the trial court and under
proper instruction the court had found the accused sane. Sometime
after the trial, The Judge Advocate General of the Army requested
that the accused be given an exhaustive physical examination. The
examination resulted in finding the accused sane and that he had
been sane at the time of the offense. The reported case does not
recite whether the findings of the examination were available to
the board of review but recital of its content by the Court makes
it clear that it was available for their use. As a sidelight, this
case was retained by the board of review after affirming the find-
ing and sentence until inquiry could be made as to the mental con-
dition of a member of the trial court. Psychiatric examination
found him to have been sane at the time of the trial. The Court
affirmed the finding and death sentence in this case.
Court Bound by Board ' s Findings of Fact .
The Court had before it the celebrated case of United States v.
Dorothy K. Smith ' ' which is presently under consideration in the
United States Supreme Court. After the conviction of the accused
for the premeditated murder of her husband, resulting in a sentence
that she be imprisoned for life, the accused was observed by a
civilian psychiatrist, a civilian clinical psychologist, and three
military psychiatrists. Their findings were made available to the
board of review. The Court held that the board had weighed this
177United State s v. Smith (No. 3370), 5 USCMA 31^, 17 CMR 314.
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post trial evidence with evidence of record and found that pre-
meditation existed. Judge Latimer, writing for the Court, p. Skh,
says :
'
"Since this court lacks power to determine the weight
of the evidence, even as to the issue of sanity, we are with-
out authority to disturb the boardJs determination—regardless
of whether we might have reached an opposite conclusion."
Court Authorized Mental Examination ,
At about the same time that the Court decided the Smith case,
supra
,
it was deciding the case of United States v. Kunak. In
that case, the accused was convicted of premeditated murder and
sentenced to die. The facts were not in dispute. Briefly the ac-
cused was observed approaching the division mess tent carrying a
carbine. He approached the table where the officers and civilians
were seated, executed a right face, lifted the carbine so that the
muzzle was about four or five inches from the victim's chest, and
fired, with death resulting. After the shooting, the accused
dropped the carbine to the ground and stood at parade rest. The
defense relied solely upon insanity. When the case was being con-
sidered by the board of review, the members noted that at the
trial, all of the testimony of the expert witnesses was to the ef-
fect that the accused was sane. Against this testimony they
balanced the evidence of the accused's behavior, the presence of
mental illness in his family, his actions prior to and immediately
after the shooting. Pursuant to their Rule, they concluded to
pursue the question of insanity further and referred the case to
178 United States v. Kunak (No. 3787), 5 USCMA 2k6, 17 CMR 3^6.
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The Surgeon General of the Army. He supported the finding of sonity.
Reports were received from the Disciplinary Barracks regarding out-
breaks of the accused there which expressed doubt as to his sanity.
He was then sent to Fitzsiomons Army Hospital which reported him
sane. The board of review thereupon affirmed the conviction and
sentence. The case went to the Court of Military Appeals upon man-
datory review. By stipulation, the review was. suspended for further
examination. Civilian examiners were of the opinion that the accused
was insane. The case was returned to the board for redetermination
of the issue of sanity. The board reaffirmed the findings and sen-
tence. The Court considering che case for a second time reversed
the findings and sentence on premeditated murder for instructional
deficiency and returned the case for reconsideration. The board
could affirm a finding of unpremeditated murder and affirm an appro-
priate sentence or reverse and return the case for rehearing.
Post Trial Insanity .
The case which will next be considered is that of ffnited States
179
v. Washington . It is unique in that the members of the Court
could not reach a decision as to the action to be taken. The
Court was confronted with a problem of insanity which arose during
the appellate process. The Court did, by majority, decide that
insanity after findings and sentence does not stay the appellate
processes. The Chief Judge concluded that the matter should pro-
ceed in the ordinary course. Judge Latimer reached a contrary
result, expressing the belief that all proceedings should be stayed.
TO United States v. Washington (No. 3^51), 6 USCMA Hk, 19 CMR 2^0.
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Judge Brosman was of the -opinion that the Court had the power to
proceed with the appellate process, but he did not desire to do
so and thought it within the discretion of the Court not to do so.
Lacking a majority as to a single course of action, the case was
returned to The Judge Advocate General of the. Army without com-
pletion of appellate review.
The author Judge pointed out that the Court is not possessed
of fact-finding authority whereas boards of review are so possessed.
He pointed out further that a large amount of material had accumu-
. lated which might bear upon the mental condition of the accused
at the time of the offense and at the time of the trial which had
not been considered by a fact-finding tribunal of the judicial
->: system.. In support of this position, the author Judge quoted from
the Burns case, supra, to the effect that if the issue of insanity
• had been fully litigated there was no requirement that the board
of review upset the holding of the trial court and launch into an
independent investigation. They believed, however, that there
would be no good reason to refuse to evaluate evidence which had
been procured. Evidence acquired after the trial should be weighed
along with the other evidence found in the record.
Insanity Fully Litigated at Trial .
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United States v. Bunting was previously discussed under
the powers and limitations of boards of review and of the Court.
United States v. Bunting ' (No. 338?), 6 USCMA. 170, 19 CMR 296.
13^
It is again mentioned here only as affirming the holding in Burns
and Washington , supra , to the effect that a hoard of review need
not launch into an independent investigation if the issue of sanity-
was fully litigated at the trial level. In this case the record
contained the testimony of eleven psychiatrists and psychologists
and in the absence of some showing to the contrary, it should he
concluded that the issue had been fully developed.-
Post Trial Insanity—No Stay of Proceedings .
For the purposes of the present discussion, the case of United
181
States v. Bell presents a further extension of rules previously
announced by the Court. Judge Brosman, writing for the Court, says:
"Unlike this court, the several boards of review do
possess authority to determine issues of fact and to act on
the sentence. However, generally speaking, they are limited
to the evidence presented in the record of trial, and are
not permitted to supplement that document. Of course, there
are instances where this limitation will not apply—and thus
evidence bearing on the accused's possible lack cf mental
responsibility and capacity, or having to do with the court-
martial 1 s jurisdiction to try him may be weighed by the
board, although not offered at the trial."
This case was another in which the question of sanity arose
after the trial. The case was remanded for reoonsidazaiaon by the
board of review although Judge Latimer dissented and would have
stayed the appellate proceedings. In response to the suggestion
that counsel be appointed to carry on for the accused, he says:
"Apparently the view is taken that a lawyer is a substitute
for sanity, but I have grave doubts that that is a fair trade."
1 United States v. Bell (No. 5316), 6 USCMA. 352, 20 CMR 108.
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This case does not make clear what appellate agency would
make the determination as to the mental capacity of the accused
if the stay theory were to be adopted.
Court Returned to Board for Inquiry *
132
The case of United States v. Dunnahoe was decided after
the death of Judge Brosman and prior to the appointment of Judge
Ferguson. The accused was convicted of premeditated murder and
sentenced to death-. His victim was a thirteen-year-old German
boy. The accused struck the boy several times, then without reason
or excuse killed him by means of a pocket knife, mutilating the
body badly. The abdomen was ripped open so that the intestines
protruded . The genitals were cut off. Judge Latimer found that
it was doubtful that the testimony of record reached the minimal
limits necessary to raise an issue requiring instructions on the
-effect of a character disorder on the capacity of the accused to
premeditate .> 'The Judge had this to say:
"There is evidence of premeditation which is ample to
• support the finding, such as accused's admission that he
struck his victim several times because it would not in-
crease the punishment he could expect for the first blow,
and his statement that he had already stabbed the boy be-
fore he ' saw red* ' Accordingly, Judge Quinn would affirm
the conviction and sentence, and I would join him, if it
were not for the fact that the death penalty was imposed
.... I do not believe, however, that the issue need be re-
turned to a trial forum, as, by directing a reconsideration
by a board of review ... we are granting to the accused
all, if not more, rights than he is legally entitled to
receive. Judge Quinn is of the opinion that no issue was
raised, but he is willing to give way in order to dispose
of the case."
United States v. Dunnahoe (No. 67^0), 6 USCMA 7^5, 21 CMR 67.
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The case was referred to a board of review which could affirm
a finding of unpremeditated murder and such sentence as might be
appropriate, less than death; it might order the accused examined
as to his mental capacity to premeditate the offense, permitting
the accused to furnish evidence on that issue and then reconsider
the finding; or it might grant a rehearing. Chief Judge Quinn
expressly disagreed with Judge Latimer's position that a board of
.
review could cure an instructional error, committed at the trial
level, by taking new testimony in regard to the issue. It is sub-
mitted that the result reached in this case amounts to mitigation
.
of the death sentence or a relitigation of capacity to premeditate,
either at board level or by rehearing. It is generally conceded
.
that capacity to premeditate does not equate to insanity. It would
appear, therefore, that there would be no legal basis for going
outside the record of trial proceedings in this case.
Court Directed Further Inquiry .
The latest pronouncement within this area will be found in
the case of United States v. Schick . Judge Ferguson writes for
the majority with Judge Latimer dissenting. The accused was con-
victed and sentenced to death for the premeditated murder of an
eight-year-old girl. Evidence indicated that the accused had met
the victim and talked with her for about ten minutes. She turned
to leave whereupon the accused grabbed and choked her. He then
gagged her with her "panties" and dragged her into a ditch where
183 United State s v. Schick (No. 6388), 7 USCMA. Ul9, 22 CMR 209,
previously before the Court and reported in 6 USCMA U93, 20 CMR 209
.
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he put his foot on her head so as to hold her face under the water.
After the deed, he admitted experiencing assxual release. 'The
accused had been drinking from about noon until early evening prior
to the offense. Insanity was the only issue at the trial. Two
civilian Japanese psychiatrists had found the accused unable to
. 'distinguish right from wrong at the trial. Four Army psychiatrists
were of the opinion that the accused was suffering from a non-
psychotic behavior disorder but was able to distinguish right from
•
- wrong. and to adhere to the right at the time of the offense and was
able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and
: to cooperate, intelligently in nis defense at the time of the trial.
After the appeal. was assigned for argument before the Court,
: the defense moved to remand the case to the. board of review, or in
the alternative, for a continuance, for the purpose of obtaining
examination by civilian psychiatrists. The continuance was granted
with direction to report the findings to the Court. A team from
:
the'. Menninger- Clinic reported the accused unable to adhere to the
''*
- right at the time of the offense and considered the accused per-
manently , and. incurably ill at the time of their examination. Other
reports were also submitted indicating insanity at the time of
the offense.
By unanimous decision, the Court held that once the accused
has had a fair opportunity at the trial level to litigate the
issue of his mental responsibility for an offense and his capacity
to stand trial, those issues should on appeal be accorded the
133
same treatment as all other contested matters. The question should
not be tried de novo at every appellate level. In view of what
the Court considered to be unusual circumstances surrounding this
case, it was returned to the board of review to evaluate all of
the facts presented by the record, the report made to the Court and
such other psychiatric evidence as the board might receive by its
own investigation. The board of review again affirmed the findings
and the sentence. The Court of Military Appeals affirmed the de-
cision of the board of review.
It would appear, from the cases reviewed above, that there
has been a tendency to throw open the doors for the consideration
of new evidence, dehors the record, whenever and from wherever it
originated, upon the mere mention of insanity. The more recent
cases seem to sound some reluctance toward this approach. Why
should the question of sanity be relitigated if a full and fair
hearing has been accorded to the accused? Does lack of mental
responsibility as a defense deserve any different consideration
than such factual defenses as self-defense? The Code itself does
not indicate that Congress had any such intent. The framers of
the Manual, by paragraph 124, supra , have by the first sentence
merely stated a general principle of appellate review. It is sub-
mitted that' after a consideration of the record as a whole, any
appellate body, including the convening authority of the court,
should disapprove. any finding of guilt to which a reasonable doubt
exists regarding the sanity of the accused. This again is nothing
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more than sufficiency of the evidence. If the evidence, as a
matter of law, is insufficient to sustain the conviction, it should
be set aside. If there are lower degrees of the offense charged,
an appellate body may affirm only such degree of the offense as
may be sustained by a sufficiency of the evidence. If the finding
is set aside, then the sentence based upon that finding must also
be set aside. The sentence may be reduced if the offense is re-
duced to a lesser degree of the one charged. If only part of the
findings are set aside but others are affirmed then appropriate
action with. respect to the sentence would require that it be re-
duced in the proportion which those which were set aside might
bear to the. whole upon which the sentence had been adjudged. The
Manual provides for the observation and report of a board of one
or more medical officers with respect to the sanity of the accused
whenever it appears from the record of trial or otherwise that
further inquiry is warranted in the interests of justice whether
raised at the trial and, if raised, regardless of its determi-
nation. .The term "in the interests of justice" would appear to
be the key words of the provision. They certainly connote nothing
apart from every phase of the judicial process. It was certainly
never the intention of the framers of the Manual to relitigate
sanity every time the accused was examined. Most of the cases
contain conflicting views expressed by experts. Witnesses express
conflicting views in most criminal cases. Does the Manual express
any intention other than a guarantee that every accused shall have
1^0
a full and fair hearing in the interests of justice? It is the
"belief of this writer that the cases presented show abuses to
which the Manual provision has been subjected. In every instance,
however, the abuse, though bordering flagrancy, has been designed
to insure the most sacred rights of the accused. The Schick case,
supra, gives rather conclusive support to the proposition that
sanity, both as to responsibility for crime and capacity to stand
trial therefor, will not be relitigated at each stage of the ap-
pellate process if a full and fair hearing has once been had.
Post Trial Insanity—Stays Review .
In concluding the discussion of cases in this area, it may be
noted that Judge Ferguson has leansd away from the repeated position
of the Chief Judge regarding insanity arising after trial. The
Chief Judge has contended that the appellate process continue in
spite of post trial insanity. Judge Latimer has beea 3*uet as
firm in his position that post trial insanity should stay appellate
proceedings at whatever stage thereof the insanity may arise. In
-i Q J,
the case of United States v. Korzeniewski , Judge Ferguson inter-
preted the position of the Chief Judge in the Washington case, supra
,
as permitting appellate review to continue before the Court even
though the accused was insane because the court was limited in its
review to matters of law which could not be affected by the condition
of the accused. He interprets Judge Brosman's decision in the Eell
case, supra, as holding that a board of review may complete its
l8^ United States v. Korzeniewski
, 7 USCMA 31^, 22 CMR XOh.
review even though the accused be insane. He then joins the
position which Judge Latimer had maintained by his dissenting
opinions, believing that insanity should stay appellate proceedings.
The present case shows the Court in apparent agreement that a board
of- review, with its fact-finding powers, cannot proceed with the
''review, of .a .case after the accused has become insane. Judge Quinn
.dissented in the case because he believed the interests of justice
could be best served by a rehearing. His position has been so con-
sistent in past cases that there would be no basis to believe that
he now subscribes to the stay of proceedings belief. The case
under consideration involved a charge of desertion. The accused
had served credibly in combat during World War II, returning to
the United States after the war. He was stationed near his home.
He went home. At the time of his apprehension he had resided in
his small home town as a respected citizen for about ten years.
.
. His insanity or .breakdown came about after his trial and conviction.
This case differs very materially from the peace-time atrocities
of the sex slaying variety. The Chief Judge is not far wrong in
. his belief that the interests of justice may demand different
treatment. He has shown no compunction toward sustaining death
sentences in the former type case. His thinking is considerably
embelished with compassion for possible mental impairment in the
latter type. Judge Ferguson has not had the opportunity as yet
,to fully express his views. He has demonstrated a repugnance for
the heinous with no sign of reluctance in sustaining death penalties.
Ifc2
Judge Latimer has supported the death penalty. His approach can-
not be criticized as over-careful but may perhaps best be characterized
as somewhat skeptical and exceedingly cautious. His aversions to
the atrocious cause him to tread very lightly into those paths,
exploratory of the minds of other men when illumined only by the
faint and sometimes flickering lights of psychology and psychiatry.
His aversions are somewhat relaxed toward the less severe penalty.
The intermixture of judicial temperaments leads toward a nice balance
which is as certain to prevent unjust punishment as the capabilities
of mortal men will permit.
From a practical viewpoint, this writer favors the non-sfeay
position of the Chief Judge. If a record of trial contains insuf-
ficient evidence to sustain a conviction, as a matter of law, but
the accused becomes insane just after approval by the convening
authority, what remedy is available for his benefit? The con-
tentions on both sides of this issue are fully set forth in the
cases. No one can say only one is right and the other is wrong
either as a matter of principle or of logic. A firm position by
the court on either side of this controversy will aid the practi-
tioners in representing and processing those accused who are so





As a prelude to this chapter, as in the preceding chapter
on Insanity, no effort will be made toward an analysis of that
broad field of law encompassed within the substantive law. This
discussion will be limited to the appellate process and to what
extent consideration may there be given to matters which are not
within the record of trial. It was previously noted that the Code
makes no provision which specifically authorizes any review ex-
cept "on the basis of the entire record." The Manual did expand
the scope of review "whenever it appears from the record of trial
or otherwise that further inquiry as to the mental condition of
the accused is warranted in the interest of justice." It has pre-
viously been shown that the Manual provision provided a basis for
Rule IXF of the Uniform Rules, supra. Neither the Code nor the
Manual provide any such exception as to matters touching upon
Jurisdiction. In order to enable boards of review to reach fair
and just results, The Judge Advocates General of the Armed Forces
did see fit to include jurisdictional natters with Rule IXF of
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the Uniform Rules. The pertinent part of this Rule will again
be quoted for convenience, as follows:
' Rule IXF(2), Uniform Rules of Procedure for Proceedings
in and Before Boards of Review, Appendix IV, 1955, IIS, MCM, 1951.
lkh
"F. Matters outside record. --Matters outside the record
of trial will not be presented to or argued before a board
of review except with respect to: ...
"2. A question of jurisdiction."
TRANSCRIPT OF PRETRIAL CONFERENCE .
The first case in which the Court was squarely confronted
with a problem in this area was in the case of United States v.
186
Ferguson, supra . It will be recalled that in this case the
several accused were convicted of a mutiny at a post stockade.
While the matter was pending before the board of review, after
conviction below, a transcript of a conference attended by court
members, the staff judge advocate, and the convening authority,
the day before trial, was delivered to the board. The board con-
sidered the transcript as pertaining to jurisdiction. It was the
opinion of the board that the pretrial conference reflected com-
mand control over the court-martial members; that the exercise of
such control rendered the members incompetent to hear the case;
that the court was without jurisdiction and the proceedings there-
fore null and void. They ordered a new trial before another court.
Among other questions certified to the Court of Military Appeals
by The Judge Advocate General of the Army was an inquiry as to
whether jurisdictional error had been committed. The Court, with
all members in agreement, were of the opinion that "command con-
trol" had been exercised but that the error was not jurisdictional.
186 United States v. Ferguson (No. 3289), 5 USCMA 68, 17 CMR 68.
See fn. 146."
1^5
A rehearing was ordered. Judge Latimer, standing alone, expressed
the view that the transcript could he considered only on the question
of jurisdiction. He would, therefore, have reversed the board's
decision and returned the record to them for corrective action.
187
In reaching this conclusion, the Judge referred to the Manual,
paragraph 8, which provides:
.
. "The jurisdiction of a court-martial- -its power to try
and determine a case--and hence the validity of each of its
judgments, is conditionad upon these indispensable requi-
sites; That the court was appointed by an official empowered
to appoint it; that the msmbership of the court was in ac-
cordance with the law with respect to number and competency
to sit on the court; and that the court was invested by act
of Congress with power to try the person and the offense
charged."
He next turned to an analysis of decisions of the Federal courts,
believing that they extend jurisdiction beyond the express scope
of . the Manual provisions. After searching many of the Federal
cases, he concluded that the Supreme Court has rejected any narrow
. concept^ of jurisdiction, but will consider some infringements upon
168
.constitutional rights and privileges as being jurisdictional.
^7 (par . 6, MC1V.1951).
loo Cpinion cites: Dynes v. Hoover, 6l U.S, 65; Shaw v. United
States,' 209 F.-2d 8ll; Courts-martial not reviewable by Federal
civilian courts. Habeas corpus lies if court-martial without
jurisdiction, Snedeker, Habeas Corpus , 6 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 288
(1953); 15 ALR 2d 387; Ex parte Parrs, 93 U.S. 18; Ex parte Siebold ,
100 U.S. 371; Ex parte' Reed, 100 U.S. 13 . Denial of constitutional
rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. k^Q; Shita v. Pescor, 322 U.S.
76l; Hicks v. Hiatt, 6k F. Supp. 238; Anthony v. Hunter^ 71 F. Supp.
823; Henry v. Hodges, 76 F. Supp. 968; Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S.
695; Hiatt v. Brown, 175 F. 2d 273, and 339 U.S." 103; United States
v. Hiatt , 1^1 F.2d 66k; Burns v, Wilson, 3^6 U.S. 137«
lk6
Accepting a broader meaning of jurisdiction than is indicated by
the Manual, supra
,
the Judge was of. the opinion that the facts did
not bring the case within any of the deprivations providing a foun-
dation for habeas corpus in Federal cases. He further reasoned that
adequate appellate proceedings were available to the accused to
correct any error committed at the trial level.
'• Chief Judge Cuinn agreed that the exercise of command control
did not deprive the court-martial of jurisdiction but would not
limit consideration of the transcript to jurisdiction only. He
reasoned that the rule which prevents a consideration of matters on
appeal which were not raised at the trial level can have no appli-
cation when the reasons for the rule are not present. An exception
to the rule arises regarding "questions of a general public nature
affecting the interests of the state at large." He considered
command control to "gravely affect the military community." Al-
though the Chief Judge does not say so in so many words, he might
just as well have said that matters outside the record may be con-
sidered whenever necessary in the interests of justice. This is
not far from the authority reserved by The Judge Advocate General
to request boards of review to report on "any matter outside the
record in mitigation of the sentence or otherwise in the interest
of justice." ^ His approach is practical and quite realistic.
It is not out of keeping with the results which he reached in re-
lated cases dealing with insanity discussed above.
-L"9 Rule T$F{h), Uniform Rules of Procedure for Proceedings in
and Before Boards of Review, Appendix IV, 1955, NS, MCM, 1951.
ll*7
Judge Brosman, by separate opinion, expresses doubt that the
meaning of jurisdiction should be tested by the narrow constructions
considered in habeas corpus proceedings. He then discusses other
approaches which might reach the same result but agreed with the
Chief Judge that the board could have considered the transcript
and that once command control was shown a rehearing was required.
PRETRIAL INSTRUCTIONS .
Shortly after its decision in the Ferguson case, supra , the
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Court had before it United States v. Haimson . Among other issues
raised on appeal, it was contended that the instructions issued by
the convening authority to the trial counsel by indorsement con-
stituted an alignment with the prosecution sufficient to make the
convening authority an accuser.. In an attempt to ascertain the
extent of the convening authority's interest in the case, appel-
late government counsel took sworn statements from an assistant
staff judge advocate. Appellate defense counsel obtained cross-
interrogatories. The statement thus obtained was attached to the
Government' s brief which the board of review held might properly
be considered as relating to a jurisdictional question. The Court
found no command control of a nature to disqualify the convening
authority. By affirming the decision of the board of review, the
Court found nothing amiss in the board's consideration of the
sworn statements submitted to them. The Court very carefully re-
viewed these same statements in reaching their own opinion.
190 United States v. Haimson (No. ^9), 5 USCMA. 208, VJ CMR 208.
POST TRIAL INFORMATION—RIGHT TO REBUT ,
191
Another case is that of United States v. Long * In that
case, the accused stood convicted upon his plea of guilty. A
sentence of bad conduct discharge, forfeiture and confinement had
been imposed. Appellate review left the sentence unchanged. The
accused was. represented before the special court-martial by an
enlisted man who served as his. appointed defense counsel. It was
contended before the board of review that such appointment de-
prived the court-martial of jurisdiction. The board took cognizance
of Rule IXF2, supra. It concluded that the court-martial was not
divested of jurisdiction but then noticed a letter addressed to
The Judge Advocate General of the Navy wherein, over the reputed
signature of the accused, he stated that he had enlisted counsel
at his own request. The Court permitted the Government and defense
counsel to file affidavits bearing on this point. The Court held,
without regard to the affidavits, that the record failed to dis-
close the appointment of any qualified defense counsel and showed
no waiver of his rights to the benefits and assistance of an
officer consultant. Having been denied a substantial right, though
not jurisdictional error, the accused had just cause for complaint.
The findings and sentence were reversed, and a rehearing was
ordered. The majority opinion points out:
"... in view of our disposition of this case, we do not
enter the battle concerning these subsequent affidavits ex-
cept to point out that they would have been unnecessary had
191 United States v. Long (No. 5503), 5 USCMA 572, 18 CMR 196.
1^9
the board of review proceeded In an orderly manner. If an
appellate agency is going to use any post-trial information
as a basis for its decision, on jurisdictional matters or
in any other permissible areas, each party should be afforded
• an opportunity to present his, or its side of the dispute.
Here, before basing an affirmance on a post-trial admission
of the accused, he should have been accorded the right to
make any explanation, denial, or avoidance which was avail-
able to him.: At the least, he was entitled to be confronted
with the testimony and meet the issue it posed if the evi-
dence was to support, in whole or in part, the decision of
the board of review. Obviously this case illustrates the
• necessity for a full and fair hearing on facts which may be
used for the purpose of resolving a dispute. Presently the
•parties are attempting to litigate the controversy at this
level, and we are not inclined to become a trial forum."
Judge Cuinn dissented. He found no evidence to support the con-
clusion that the accused was prejudiced by the appointment of an
enlisted person as his counsel and would have affirmed the de-
cision of the board of review. He voices no objection to the
dicta quoted above. There can be little objection to its tenets
and, for all practical purposes, it is believed that its expression
may well be considered to be a well placed qualification to any
use of matter outside the record of trial.
In a case which has been previously discussed, United States
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v. Bell, supra , the Court considered the post trial insanity of
the accused. The Court does express the general principle that
evidence bearing on the accused 1 s possible lack of mental respon-
sibility and capacity, or having to do with the court-martial 1 s
jurisdiction to try him, may be weighed by boards of review, al-
though not offered at the trial. Unlike the Court, the boards of
192 United States v. Bell (No. 5316), 6 USCMA. 392, 20 CMR 108.
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review do possess authority to determine issues of fact and to act
on the sentence . Generally the boards are limited to the evidence
presented in the record of trial and are not permitted to supple-
ment that document. This case offers little as to jurisdictional
matters hut will be found helpful as a neat summary.
IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE .
The next case submitted for consideration is that of United
'193 '
States v. Dickenson . The accused was captured by Chinese Com-
munist forces in 1950. After the armistice, he refused to return
to the United Nations forces but later changed his mind. He
was charged with unauthorized communication, correspondence, and
holding intercourse with the enemy while a prisoner of war and with
having informed on other prisoners in order to secure favorable
treatment for himself. The conviction, with a sentence to a dis-
honorable discharge, total forfeitures, and confinement at hard
labor for ten years, was presented to the Court of Military Appeals
upon the accused' s petition for review. Although this case does
not fall specifically within that category of cases wherein matter
beyond the record was considered on appeal as going to jurisdiction,
its proximity to those cases warrants its mention here. The accused
challenged the sufficiency of evidence under the informing charge.
He argued that- the evidence would support the same charge leveled
at innumerable other persons. In support of his position, a motion
was made to the Court to consider the testimony of a certain witness
^3 United States v. Dickenson (No. 6238), 6 USCMA ^38, 20 CMR 15k.
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who testified in a wholly separate trial of another accused. The
Court was not disposed to take judicial notice of specific .testi-




"In any event the new evidence presented by the accused
can be considered only for the purpose of determining whether
justice-requires that he be granted a rehearing on the dis-
puted allegation."
The Court did in fact look at the testimony given by the witness in
the other cases. In affirming the conviction, the Court denied the
motion of the accused for consideration by the Court of the testi-
mony given in the other case in connection with its review. A
unanimous Court was actually giving effect to the same interest
of justice to which Chief Judge Quinn hitched his decision in the
Ferguson case, supra . In the Ferguson case, p. 70, Judge Latimer
said:
"Either boards of review and this court should be guided
by rules which should be observed, or the' system becomes one
of men and not one of laws. If that happens, the record on
appeal becomes as variant as the idiosyncracies of the in-
dividual judges."
In this connection, Judge Brosman, at p. 87 of the Ferguson
opinion, said:
"It has been suggested informally that this court is
one of substantial justice and not of law. I have no means
of knoxtfing whether the comment was intended as a compliment
.or the reverse. . For myself, however, I have never believed
that there exists a necessary dichotomy between law and
justice- -measured in its broadest aspect. And if there does,
then in my book so much the worse for the law. And if ad-
ministering law requires that I think after the manner of the
eighteenth century, then I am clearly administering something
else. No longer, I believe, may a misplaced comma mean on
occasion the loss of a man's life or his fortune. Here I
am sure that I am administering justice and at the same time
law—a solemn expression of legislative will."
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It will be recalled that he was there convinced that the hoard of
review could have considered the transcript of the pretrial con-
ference apart from any question of jurisdiction, however narrowly
or broadly that term might be interpreted.
DELEGATION OF POWER—VOID .
One case has arisen in this field since Judge Ferguson joined
the Court. He wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court in the case
of United States v. Roberts. The case is actually not parti-
cularly helpful. After the board of review had acted, the convening
authority submitted a letter. Affidavits containing much the same
information were attached to the pleadings. The Court considered
the material submitted and reached the conclusion therefrom that
the case had not been referred for trial by the convening authority.
The decision of the board of review was reversed and the findings
of guilty and the sentence were set aside. The record was returned
for a rehearing. The Court considered that their action eliminated
action on a petition for a new trial. If the delegation of authority
rendered the action of referral void, it was a jurisdictional de-
fect. Under such circumstances, it would appear that another
trial would have been necessary. A rehearing would limit the
maximum punishment to which the accused might be subjected whereas
there would be no such limitation attached to another trial. From
a practical standpoint, the accused in this case was probably
entitled to any benefit which might arise from this decision and
*&* United States v. Roberts (No. 7738), 7 USCMA 322, 22 CMR 112.
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it is probably not too important that the Court should choose one
course over another.
In general, the rules seem to be rather well defined in this
area. The broad considerations as to what defects are jurisdictional
will continue to be troublesome. If one were to hazard a specu-
lation as to future trends, however, it is quite possible that the
Court will consider matters outside the record of trial whenever





• ; JUDICIAL NOTICE
GENERAL .
The subject of judicial notice may not lie within the purview
of the present discussion. Matter which may be judicially noticed,
however, is rather a hybrid type of evidence. It is an intermixture
of matter, within the record, originating outside of the record and
brought into the record to make it complete. Normally judicial
notice is dealt with at the trial level as a short-cut method of
presenting proof or as a substitute for other forms of evidence.
Its application is not restricted to the trial forums; it also has
use at the appellate level. No attempt will be made herein to
treat this matter in its entirety. Only a few cases dealing with
this phase of the appellate procedure have been before the Court
of Military Appeals. This discussion will be limited to those
cases. Paragraph 1V7, Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951* provides
the foundation for this type of evidence.
RECORDS OF OTHER CASES .
195
In the rather early case of United State s v. Jackson , '
the accused was convicted of an unauthorized absence from Janu-
ary 1, 1951, to March J, 1951, while in Korea. No prior con-
victions were proved at the trial. Attached to the allied papers
was an extract copy of the accused's service record which disclosed
195 United States v. Jackson (No. lUl), 1 USCMA 190, 2 CMR 96.
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that the accused was tried and convicted by an Army summary court-
martial in Korea on January 15, 1951/ at considerable distance
from his own unit, for which he received a sentence forfeiting
$50.00 of his pay. He was tried under his correct name, service
number, and organization. The question presented was whether a
temporary exercise of jurisdiction terminated the longer absence
charged in the case under review. The Government objected to con-
sideration of the record since it was not introduced in evidence
nor adverted to at the trial. A unanimous Court noted that there
was authority both military and civilian for taking judicial notice
of the record of trial in another court-martial. The Court, without
deciding the issue, assumed that the record of the summary court-
martial was before it and determined that had the accused disclosed
his status as an absentee to military authority, his absence would
have terminated but did not do so under the circumstances. In
reaching its conclusion, the Court referred to conditions in Korea
and the practice there of establishing summary courts-martial where
there were large concentrations of troops to prosecute minor of-
fenders without returning them to their regular units for disciplinary
action. No mention is made as to the source of this information.
It appears doubtful, however, that it was any more a part of the
record of trial than was the service record extract. The Court may
have been taking judicial notice of conditions in Korea although it
would be rank speculation to make such an assertion.
156
196
The case of United States v. Dickenson y has been discussed
-• I'm ; 1 1 - i i i i
above. Here, Chief Judge Guinn, in writing for a unanimous Court,
expressed the view that the Court took judicial notice that many
prisoners were subjected to severe brutality or to tremendous
psychological pressures which made them do and say things which
they would otherwise have avoided. In this connection, the Court
also considered a publication by the British Ministry of Defence,
reporting similar treatment of British prisoners by the Chinese.
The Court was asked to take judicial notice of specific
testimony contained in the record of another separate case.
Strangely, the opinion states that the court was not disposed to
so do, yet the court did look at the specific testimony contained
in the other case to determine whether justice required a rehearing
but concluded that such action was not necessary. The motion that
such testimony be judicially noticed was denied.
197
A middle position case is that of United States v. Stringer .
In this case, four enlisted men of the Navy were charged with
conspiracy to sell military property and the larceny of military
property. They were convicted at separate trials. A timely ob-
jection in the principal case raised a question regarding the
qualification of the assistant trial counsel to serve because
of his prior participation in the matter. It was contended that
he had served as defense cotinsel for another participant who was
196 United States v. Dickenson (No. 6238), 6 USCMA. U38, 20 CMR 15^.
197 United States v. Stringer (No. 3033), U USCMA k°h, 16 CMR 68.
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granted immunity from further prosecution and who testified in the
present case. The Court granted limited review in the other three
cases. All were heard together. Here, very clearly, all four
records were before the Court. The Government contended that the
Court improperly tools judicial notice of records which were not
before it. In sustaining the convictions, the Court merely brushed
aside this issue saying that the manner in which the cases were
set for hearing together obviated extended discussion of the point.
The Government had certainly taken an anomalous position in trying
to sustain a conviction. From a practical standpoint, the Court's
solution cannot be subjected to serious criticism. The action taken
is not wholly in accord with the expressed decision in the Dickenson
case, supra . In Jackson , supra, the Court did not decide the issue
of judicial notice but indicated there was ample authority for doing
so. After looking at the other cases in all three situations pre-
sented, the Court has only indicated that the records of other cases
may not be the proper subject of judicial notice in all circumstances.
COMMON KNOWLEDGE.
There can be little doubt that the Court recognized conditions
existing in Korea and the disciplinary system which was being used
there. The Court expressly took judicial notice of the treatment




Along a similar vein is the case of United States v< Cook.
The accused stood convicted by general court-martial in Korea,
of desertion ^ith intent to avoid hazardous duty. The evidence
da sclosed that the accused was ordered to report to the machine
gun platoon of "D" Company for medical aid duty. The company was
then in reserve but some thirty-six hours later entered combat and
suffered heavy casualties. Defense urged that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to establish that the accused knew with reasonable
certainty that he would be required for such hazardous duty. The
Court took judicial notice that it was a matter of common knowledge
within the Army that medical men are always attached to units such
as -machine gun platoons when those units are going into combat.




At about this sams period, the case of United States v. Jones
"
"^
was heard. This case treated matters of common knowledge in a
different manner. In this case, the accused was charged with the
wrongful introductior of marihuana into station- Evidence referred
to the Augsburg Autobahn Snack Bar. At the outset of the trial,
the law officer had questioned the "into station" allegation but
defense counsel not only failed to demand proof of its location
but admitted its character as part of a military post in the
American zone of occupation. As to the objection on appeal that
158 United States v. Cook (No. 1121), 2 USCMA £33, 8 CMR 23.
199 United States v. Jones (No. 283), 2 USCMA 80, 6 CMR 80,
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the record contained no proof that the snack bar was a military
station, the Court held that the trial court could have taken
judicial notice of the snack bar's character but noted that there
was no notation in the record, as required by proper procedure,
that such action was taken. The Court then went ahead to note a
doctrine, analogous to judicial notice, whereby the trial court
might resort to the common fund of experience and knowledge which
men generally have obtained through data notoriously accepted by
all. Applying this doctrine to military trials, the Court said:
"It is inieed enough if it be notorious to military
men—and particularly to those in the area involved."
The Court found no error in the trial court ; s evident conclusion
"•bat the snack barwas a military station.
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Following was the case of United States v. Weiman . It pre-
sented a question regarding court-mertial jurisdiction over Polish
nationals and retainers to the camp of the United States troops
in France. The Court, citing Jones, supra, held that they would
recognize the existence of facts which did not appear in the
record of trial but which were matters of common knowledge to mili-
tary personnel at the scene of the court-martial. They recited
that official records of the Department of the Army disclosed
the recruitment of a certain Labor Service Company which was taken
to France for service with United States forces there. The Court,
although not mentioning judicial notice, recite that they had
200 Uaited States v, Weiman (No. 1^03), 3 USCMA 2l6, 11 CMR 2l6.
160
examined the treaty and agreements existing between the United
States and France respecting the presence of American forces in
that country- Since they were classified, their contents were
not set out in the opinion, nor were they a part of the record.
The Court did not elaborate on whether this was judicial notice
or the analogous doctrine mentioned in Jones , supra . There is
no indication that the trial court had followed the Manual pro-
cedure requiring a notation in the record of trial. It is possible
that the Court has tended to expand the basis of their concept
regarding judicial notice. There does not seem to be any particular
reason to distinguish matters of common knowledge. It may be just
as reasonable to recognize that the trial court has in fact taken
judicial knowledge of certain facts without announcing of record
that it had done so. The Court of Military Appeals does not seem
bound to make an announcement in every instance.
The case of United States v. Jester arose on a rehearing.
At the original trial, the prosecution depended upon one witness*
At the rehearing, the evidence which had been given by this, sole
witness at the first hearing was admitted in evidence over defense
objection. The accused later gave testimony amounting to a judicial
confession. The initial trial was held in Korea whereas the
rehearing took place in California. The Government argued that once
the residence of the witness was established in Korea, it was
presumed to continue. The Court took judicial notice, as a matter
201United States v. Jes/ter (No. 1655), k USCMA 660, 16 CMR 234.
*
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of common knowledge, that the United States Army maintained a
large scale rotation program in Korea with the average tour of
duty there varying at different periods. In reaching the con-
clusion that the former testimony was- inadmissible, the Court
held that there was little practical likelihood that the witness
had remained- in Korea indefinitely. The burden was, therefore,
upon the Government to show a proper foundation for the admission
of the prior testimony which was not done.
The Court of Military Appeals took judicial notice that at
the time of petitioner's induction, Mexico was in point of fact
in a state of war with Germany, Italy, and Japan, thereby making
the accused a citizen of a co-belligerent and not of a neutral
nation. Oh trial for desertion, the accused contended that the
court-martial lacked jurisdiction to try him-. He based his position
on the theory that he was a citizen of Mexico, a neutral foreign
• state, and therefore had never been lawfully inducted into the
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• service of the United States.
Judicial notice was taken by the Court that telephone exten-
sions were in general use in 193^ when Congress passed the Federal
Communications Act. The majority found that a person who uses the
telephone as a means of communication impliedly consents to the
receiver's use of existing extensions and that Congress did not
intend to prohibit such use. They concluded that a person who
overhears a telephone conversation by means of an extension instrument,
pop
Waited States v. Rodriguez (No. 365), 2 USCMA 101, 6 CMR 101.
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which he is authorized to use by one of the parties to a conver-
sation, may testify to its contents, even though the other com-
municant did not know of, or consent to, the listening in. Judge
20°>
Latimer dissented as to the ultimate result of the case. J
The Court recognized with approval that the trial court had
judicially noticed Army regulations requiring that each person
named in transfer orders must be provided with a copy thereof.
The regulations were
. contained in Department of the Array Technical
Manual 12-250. The Court quoted from paragraph lV?a of the Manual
• for Courts-Martial, 1951> providing that judicial notice may be
taken of the regulations and official publications of the Depart-
ment of Defense and departments thereunder. The accused was
'' charged with desertion with intent to shirk important service.
Evidence was introduced to show the issuance of orders to the
accused and judicial notice was used to show that the accused had
20*+
knowledge of the assignment.
REFUSED.
In reversing the conviction of the accused, the Court held
that it could not look to the local law of a state for matters
subject to judicial notice or the presumption of genuineness of
the signature of a state official. They reasoned that different
states have different statutes whereby different results would
obtain on similar facts when tried by courts-martial if guided by
^°;Wted States v. DeLeon (No. 523*+), 5 USCMA 7^7, 19 CMR k3.
204United States v. Taylor (No. lh^k), 2 USCMA 389, 9 CMR 19
.
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such local statutes. The case involved the larceny of a check and
the forgery of the payee's name. A photostatic copy of a check
issued by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania upon the World War II
Veteran's Compensation Fund was the foundation for the prosecution's
case. There could be little controversy over the result reached
205by the Court in this case. *
The Court also refused to take judicial notice in the case of
206
United States v. Parker. In this case, the accused stood con-
victed of two offenses of rape and one assault with intent to com-
mit rape. A death sentence had been imposed. The record of trial
indicated that the defense counsel had not been appointed more than
one day prior to trial. The Court was requested to take judicial
notice that counsel are often quite active in a case before the
appointing order is issued. This the Court refused to do because
there was no showing as to any standard practice in that regard and
the record did not indicate any extensive preparation for trial.
Chief Judge Quinn did not argue with this particular finding but,
as might well have been expected, dissented upon other grounds.
He would have denied the petition for a new trial and affirmed
the decision of the board of review. The case involved what the
opinion characterized as three heinous offenses. It is not parti-
cularly in point as to the matter under discussion, but lends
further credence to past discussion to here note that the Chief
Judge in concluding his dissent said:
2
°5 United States v. Bryson (No. 2032), 3 USCMA 330, 12 CMR 86.
2C° United States v. Parker (No. 5759), 6 USCMA 75, 19 CMR 201.
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"I have a feeling that the majority is disturbed by the
death sentence. They would like to have it reduced, but
they are unable to accomplish that purpose short of a re-
hearing. . . , I have no difficulty .
.
r . If the majority voted
to return the case to the board of review for reconsideration
of an appropriate sentence, I would join them. On the record,




In the cas3 of United States v. Williams, a question re-
garding the devolution of command with power to refer charges for
trial was presented. A majority of the Court took judicial notice
that certain officers held certain official positions within a
given theatre. Chief Judge Quinn, although concurring in the re-
sult reached by the majority, did not agree that judicial notice
could be taken of the fact that two officers of specific grade
were present in a designated area and that one was senior to the
other. He further expressed serious doubt that the Court should
take judicial notice of a Department of the Army special order as
distinguished from a general order. Them&jority had considered
a special order together with a general order and affidavits wholly
outside the record.
The case of United States v. DeMaria^ presented a matter
theoretically similar to Williams, supra . The accused was con-
victed of engaging in transactions involving an attempt to ex-
change outdated military payments for certificates of a new series.
Army regulations prohibited certain certificate transactions, also
2°T United States v. Williams (No. 6371), 6 USCMA 2^3, 19 CMR 369.
^°8 United Spates v. DeMaria (No. 6555), 6 USCMA 5^5, 20 CMR 301.
l6p
the acceptance o£ exchange of certificates after a date to he deo-
iipsa^d. "by the Secretary of the Army. Other directives and mes-
sages implemented the procedures to be followed. The court-martial
took judicial notice that the Secretary of the Army had designate!
a certain date in accordance with the prearranged plan. The de-
fense requested details of the arrangement, be also noted but nous
were offered in evidence. On appeal, the Court was urged to
judicially notice the conversion procedures prescribed by the
Secretary. The Court considered them in detail and reversed the
conviction for the reason that the accused was not charged with a
prohibited act. The Chief Judge, in writing the principal opinion,
expressed doubt that certain messages, addressed to designated com-
manders, were properly subject to judicial notice without evidence
of their further and general dissemination* Judge Brosman did not
think any such limitation existed. Judge Latimer reasoned that
the trial court had judicially noticed the only relevant items and
found that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction,
thereby dissenting from the majority, not in the application of
judicial notice, but by a different interpretation of the pro-
hibitory language of the regulations.
This case is not particularly helpful although it offers sup-
port to the proposition that the court will not be narrowly
fettered in its efforts to protect the rights of an accused to
the end that he be assured a fair trial. The last two cases
also show the Chief Judge leaning toward the common knowledge
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doctrine. General orders qualify whereas special orders or directives
of limited circulation may need a foundation before their admissi-
bility would be warranted.
Technical Manuals.
Judicial notice of Technical Manuals has been considered well
within the provisions of paragraph 1^7a, Manual for Courts-Martial,
1951. The treatment which has been given to one Technical Manual,
TM 8-2^0, Psychiatry in Military Law, however, makes it worthwhile
to give particular attention to the cases which have dealt with
this problem.
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In United States v. Smith , supra, the issue of insanity
was injected into the trial of the accused, charged with the pre-
meditated murder of her husband. TM 8-2^0 was utilized in the
cross-examination of a defense witness and in the direct exami-
nation of prosecution witnesses. The Court found that this Technical
• Manual, jointly publishedby the Army and the Air Force, clearly
fell within the Manual description of those matters which may be
judicially noticed. The Court reasoned that if this matter might
properly have been noticed judicially by the court-martial it
might just as properly be used in connection with the examination
of witnesses. It was held that the portions .used correctly stated
the law. The Court also noted that a mere doubt as to the use of
the TM expressed by defense counsel was not an objection to its use.
209
United States v. Smith (No. 3370), 5 USCMA 31^, 17 CMR 31U.
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Chief Judge Cuinn registered a strong dissent on the basis
that the prosecution's expert witnesses did not testify as to their
opinions based upon their own knowledge and medical experience but
in accordance with the structures of the Technical Manual. He ex-
presses the belief that these witnesses considered themselves bound
by the Technical Manual's terms to the exclusion of their own in-
dividual professional opinions. He incorporates by reference his
dissent in the Kunak case, infra .
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In the case of United States v. Kunak " which was decided
on the same day as the Smith case, supra , the Court had before it
a premeditated murder case defended upon insanity. A majority of
the Court thought that no error was committed in the trial court
by taking judicial notice of TM 8-2^0. The Chief Judge again dis-
sented, asserting that the apparent purpose of the Manual's
provisions, regarding judicial notice, was to obviate proof of
facts, Which, in general, are notoriously known in the military
establishment. He expresses the belief that it is a perversion
of that purpose to use it as authority for taking judicial notice
of individual beliefs and opinions. Recognized texts and treatises
may be used to test the qualifications of experts, but their con-
tent has no independent probative value. The Chief Judge was
further of the opinion that the Manual for Courts-Martial expressly
makes the doctrine of irresistible impulse a part of the military
law whereas the Technical Manual virtually eliminates it. Thus
he challenges whether TM 8-2*t0 does correctly state the law.
210 United States v. Kunak (No. 3787), 5 USCMA 3^6, 17 CMR Zk6.
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The positions of the jurists shift in the case of United States
oil
v.. Schick » .Judge Ferguson is author of the majority opinion in
which the Chief Judge concurs. This was a prosecution for the
alleged premeditated murder of an eight-year-old girl at Tokyo,
Japan <= The accused was convicted and sentenced to death. Judge
Latimer became the dissenting Judge. Without considering other
aspects of this case at this time, and looking only to the treat-
ment accorded to the Technical Manual, the author Judge is quoted:
"The accused also argues that he was prejudiced because
use of the Department of the Army Technical Manual, TM 8-2**0,
Psychiatry in Military Law, by the court-martial and board of
review^ precluded their exercise of independent judgment.
In this connection we announce that at most the 'Tech Manual 1
occupies the position of a text book or treatise on the sub-
ject of insar.ity, (See opinion of Chief Judge Quinn, United
States v, Kunak .,.), It is not competent evidence of either
the facts or opinions advanced by the authorities. It may be
used to a limited extent in connection with the -testimony of
an expert witness, but it does not have any independent pro-
bative value „ A study of the record in this case now before
us makes it abundantly clear that all the psychiatrists who
testified at the trial arrived at their respective conclusions
from an independent evaluation of many factors taken from
numerous sources and the witnesses oppeared to be completely
unfettered by the 'Tech Manual,' As a matter of fact, there
is no mention of this Manual throughout the trial. All of
the psychiatric testimony for the Government was to the
effect- -without equivocation- -that the accused knew what he
was doing at all times, could distinguish right from wrong
and adhere to the right as to the offense charged. And at
no place in the law officer's instruction did he advert to
the 'Tech Manual' or call the court's attention thereto."
The Court's finding that there was no mention of TM 8-2^0 offers
little clue as to why the defense claimed prejudice by its use at
the trial level and by the board of review. It can undoubtedly
211
United States v. Schick (No. 6388
)
; 7 USCMA klQ, 22 CMR 209.
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be concluded, however, that the opinions expressed by Chief Judge
Cuinn as dissents in the Smith and Kunak cases, supra, have found
favor with Judge Ferguson. Accordingly, judicial notice of official
publications will probably be limited to those publications con-
taining matters of common knowledge.
From the cases which have been presented, no particular pattern
or trends are discernable. From the scarcity of cases, judicial
notice does not appear to have been widely us2d in courts -martial
trials. It does provide an expeditious means of presenting facts
to the trial courts and its wider use should certainly be encouraged.
There can be little doubt that boards of review have nearly full
reign with its use as evidenced by its use before the Court. Cer-
tainly the fact-finding bodies, including the convening authority,
can always seek out truth and fact. There is considerable material
212
available in this field. Each particular use will require re-
search beyond military authority and still kept within the use
authorized oy the Manual. •
212 /For comprehensive coverage, see: Wigmore on Evidence (3d
ed. ), Vol. IX, Sects. 2565-2583; Morgan, Judicial Notice , 57 Harv.
L. Kev u 269 {l9kk); Davis, Official Notice , 62 Harv. L. Rev. 537
(19^9); Keefe. Landis, aid Shaad", Sense and Nonsense About Judicial
Noti ce, 2 Stanford L. Rev. 66*4- (l950>7~Comment- -Evidence, Judicial
Notice by Appellate Courts of Facts and Foreign Laws Hot Brought to
the Attention of the Trial Court, k2 Mich. L. Rev. 509; McCormick,
The" Need for and the Effect of Judicial Notice




SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Very little purpose can be served by attempting to recapitulate
in detail the holdings of the many cases which have previously been
discussed herein. Only a rather broad and general summary will,
therefore, be presented and that only to serve as a foundation for
certain conclusions which have been drawn. From these conclusions,
some recommendations will follow which it is hoped may serve some
useful purpose.
SUMMARY .
The Convening Authority .
It was noted that the convening authority and the supervisory
authority can be considered as nearly synonymous in so far as
their functions of reviexj are concerned.
The review of a finding of not guilty is limited to juris-
diction and sanity.
The authority to approve guilty findings and sentences is
conditioned upon the evidence of record and the law of the case,
whereas authority to disapprove is conditioned only upon dis-
cretion. The mandatory death sentence provides an exception.
The convening authority may consult "Joe" or anyone else and
may consider information from any source he chooses as a basis




The approval of a finding of guilt necessitates that the re-
view be limited to the content of the record of trial. In deter-
mining jurisdiction and the sanity of the accused, matters outside
the record may be consulted. No error is committed if jurisdiction
is substantiated or if additional proof corroborates the sanity of
the accused by this search. No additional proof of guilt will be
tolerated, however, from sources lying beyond the record.
There are further limitations placed upon approval. It must
have the support of the independent judgment of the staff judge
advocate or legal officer. Failing such support, the opinion of
The Judge Advocate General of the appropriate service must be
sought
.
Erroneous advice to the convening authority must be corrected
whether affecting the finding or the sentence.
A convening authority and his staff judge advocate or legal
officer must in fact be impartial. An accused, of course, is not
limited to the record of trial in showing the partiality of either.
A convening authority who has become an accuser, a witness against
the accused, or has any personal interest in the outcome of a trial,
is not impartial. Prior participation as trial counsel, law offi-
cer, court member or investigating officer precludes review by
that staff judge advocate or legal officer.
Only the President, the Secretary of Department, the convening
and supervisory authorities have the power to suspend sentences.
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Boards of Review .
The Code haD given the boards of review the power to deter-
mine matters of law and in addition has vested in them the power
to weigh evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and to
determine controverted questions of fact. The boards are limited
to a consideration of matters within the entire record in their
review of findings of guilt. Matters dehors the record will not
be considered even though beneficial to the accused. Exception is
made to this limitation, however, whenever jurisdiction or the
sanity of the accused is in issue. It should also be remembered
that the entire record includes all of the matters considered by
the convening authority whether arising at the trial or elsewfcse.
Wo matter outside the evidence admitted on trial may be resorted
to, however, for the purpose of sustaining a conviction.
The Court of Military Appeals has held that if all reasonable
men would conclude that a fact was established beyond a reasonable
doubt a board of review would err, as a matter of law, to conclude
otherwise. A concurrence with a view which all reasonable men
would be compelled to share leaves the board decision untouchable
upon further review. In an area between these two positions is
one where reasonable minds would differ. A board may resolve such
a conflict either way, without abuse of the discretion reposing in
it. By pluralizing the reasonable man, the Court has placed itself
in the anomalous position of saying that a given set of facts, as a
matter of law, may be sufficient to sustain a finding of guilty,
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while the same facts at the same time may be insufficient.
Any action taken by a board of review other than outright
approval of the guilty finding and sentence or the granting of a
new trial inures to the benefit of the accused., A board cannot
increase the severity of a finding or of a sentence. If granted
a rehearing, the accused cannot be tried for an offense greater
than that charged at the origiael hearing, nor can he receive a
sentence greater than that adjudged at the first trial.
Boards of review may look beyond the actual record of trial
or the entire record for matters in mitigation of a sentence.
The accused cannot complain if such consideration embraces matter
adverse to him.
Whether delineated as appropriateness of the sentence, miti-
gation, or clemency, boards of review are charged with determining
what portion of a sentence should be approved against the particular
accused in the light of the entire record and all of the surrounding
circumstances
.
The Court has determined that Congress intended to grant boards
of review the power to reduce a sentence to death to one of life
imprisonment upon the reduction of a finding of guilty of premedi-
tated murder to unpremeditated murder. Such action amounts to a
commutation of sentence, a power not otherwise available to the
boards.
The Court of Military Appeals .
The Court of Military Appeals and the boards of review are
creatures of statute, and their powers are limited to those which
Congress expressly granted or implied. The Code provides that thj
Court shall take action only with respect to matters of law. The
Court, on innumerable occasions, has consistently held that Con-
gress vested power in the boards to make factual determinations
and to consider the appropriateness of sentences whereas the Court
was not granted such powers. The author is firmly convinced that
the inherent powers vested in appellate courts generally are well
within the implied powers contemplated by the Congressional grant
' of the Code. By the test of the plural of a reasonable man, the
Court has placed unnecessary restriction upon the powers exercised
"oy it. The difficulties in drawing fine lines of distinction be-
tween matters of fact and matters of law have long plagued all
courts. The Court of Military Appeals has compounded the diffi-
culties which would confront them in any event by their own
limitations.
The Court does have the power to reverse the decision of a
beard of review whereby the board has set aside a finding of guilty
as incorrect in law. A rehearing ordered under such circumstances
does not constitute double jeopardy. The Court has not determined
the power of the Court to reverse a decision of a board whereby
the board has set aside a finding of guilty based upon an insuf-
ficiency of the facts. It is submitted that sufficiency of the
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evidence is always a matter of law. There should be no reluctance
to reverse the decision of a board of review upon such grounds.
The certification of questions to the Court, by the service
Judge Advocates General, does in effect give the Government a
right of appeal from the decisions of the intermediate appellate
body, the board of review. This right is not new to the Federal
appellate system.
The Court has considered affidavits setting forth proceedings
at the trial which had been omitted from the record on the theory
that certificates of correction do not provide the only method for
presenting the missing matter. The transcript of a pretrial con-
ference was also considered by the Court in support of alleged
command control, exercised over the trial court, which substantially
prejudiced the accused. The cases show a considerable divergence
"of opinion as to whether a motion for new trial or corrective
action of the record itself is the more appropriate procedure in
this area. From the latest expressions, it appears that the Court
will look outside the record whenever they deem it necessary to
prevent an injustice.
The power to determine the appropriateness of a sentence has
consistently been held to lie with the boards of review and not
in the Court. Certainly the Court does possess the power to
determine, as a matter of law, whether or not a board of review
has properly performed its function. There can be little objection
to this result. If the Court does actually lack the power to re-
duce a sentence when it has set aside part of the findings without
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returning the record to a board for the reassessment of a sentence,
Congress should be requested to adjust the Code. It is hardly
conceivable that Congress would intend to repose more power in an
intermediate appellate body than it saw fit to confer upon the
highest appellate agency. The dissenting opinions of Chief Judge
Quinn support the proposition that Congress has given the Court
the necessary power to adjust sentences.' The same reasoning would
permit the Court to suspend sentences for probationary periods.
* There can be little doubt but that the Court may look beyond
the record of trial in determining matters of insanity or issues
involving jurisdiction. If mental capacity and responsibility have
been fully litigated, neither a board of review nor the Court are
obliged to relitigate that issue. The Court will consider insanity
arising after the trial. This, of necessity, Requires the con-
sideration of matter which are not a part of «the record. The
Court holds that post' trial insanity shall stay the appellate
proceedings. The' Chief Judge dissents from this holding and would
complete the review. If appellate reviews were actually limited
to the record of trial in every case, there would be little reason
to support the stay theory. Certainly, no insane person will be
executed. If a' prisoner serving confinement becomes insane, he
will be given proper treatment. If an accused has been found
guilty upon insufficient evidence, thereby causing him to break
•-;.*.
'





the utmost dispatch? Such remedial action might have tremendous
therapeutic value.
CONCLUSIONS .
The scope of this treatise has been much too narrow to be con-
sidered as a review of military justice under the Uniform Code. ^
It has been broad enough, however, to prove rather conclusively
that there is very little possibility that an innocent serviceman
is at all likely to be unjustly convicted or that he will be unduly
punished.
In spite of the rather critical analysis which has been made
of certain cases decided by the Court, herein, there can be very
little argument over the outstanding work which the Court has done.
Seven volumes of published decisions are now available to the
practitioner of military law. They cover practically every phase
of criminal law: Evidence, Procedure, and Appellate Review, as
these subjects bear upon military justice. Starting as a newly
created entity in 1951> a, herculean task has been accomplished in
arriving at workable concepts of law within the framework of the
Code and the Manual. These have been tailored to accommodate the
problems peculiar to the various branches of service. The author
continually marvels at the judicial achievements of the Court.
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Rear Admiral Chester Ward, The Judge Advocate General of the
Navy, writing in 1953> gives a comprehensive evaluation of the work-
ing of the Code based upon eighteen months of observation after its
implementation. See Ward, UCMJ DOES IT WORK? 6 Vanderbilt L. Rev.
l£6 (1953). Also Fedele, Appellate Review in the Military Judicial
System
, 15 Fed. E. J. 399 U955).
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The only oath which the soldier, sailor, Marine, and airman
takes upon entry into military service is to uphold the Constitution
of the United States and to support the Government of the United
States against the enemies, both foreign and domestic. This being
the sole function of the Armed Forces, their adherence to higher
standards than those generally demanded of the civilian populace
should be required. In reaching those standards, however, the very
thing the military man protects must not be destroyed. The prin-
ciples of that Constitution which he protects must also be made to
protect him. Tne Government which he protects must insure that
his rights as an individual are also protected. By the same token,
should he transgress against his Government, he must be justly
punished* No other system of jurisprudence has ever clothed m
accused with greater protection than that provided by military
justice under the Uniform Code. It is a workable system,, All of
its problems have not been solved. It is a dynamic system. Able
lawyers and jurists devote their best efforts to the solution of
new problems as they arise. It is always possible to nit-pick
over trivialities within any system. The Uniform Code as it is
being administered provides a nice over-all balance between the
organized discipline of the military service and the rights of
an individual accused.
Leadership and training are the foundations upon which dis-
cipline is built and maintained within any organization or society.
Military law is but an adjunct to the enforcement of discipline
within the military society, but it can never successfully serve
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as a substitute for leadership and training. During the past
several years
,
practically every physically fit young man in
America has had some service in the Armed Forces of the United States.
Most of these men are very young. Many are away from their homes
for the first time. Each branch of the military services in which
these men may serve owe them something akin to a parental duty.
It is a duty to lead and to train to the end that there is a will-
ihg compliance with the rules and regulations. Enforced obedience
' fails to accomplish the same purpose. Yet during the calendar year
of 195^ Army boards of review considered 6^05 general court-martial
cases; Navy boards reviewed 1832 general court-martial records and
3^28 special court-martial plus 3^5 cases forwarded from field
activities. Air Force boards reviewed 1336 general court-martial
and 2"087 special court-martial plus 325 cases from field activities.
Of these cases, 810 Army, -2^8; Navy, 1+53 Air Force, and k Coast
Guard cases were presented to, the Court of Military Appeals on
petition by the accused. A total of 2? cases were presented to
the Court by certificate for a total of 15^2 cases reviewed by
the Court. Most of these cases involved sentences which in-
cluded some form of punitive discharge. Is discipline to be
maintained by discharging the recalcitrant? In time of war or
national emergency, many men desire to avoid the hazards of
military service. Those discharged with punitive discharges during
PlkCJ
-^ Annual Report of the United States Court of Military Appeals,
1956.
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peacetime are practically immune from future service. This leads
to a conclusion that the workability and fairness of military law
may not provide the only keys to effective discipline.
From several years of experience in law enforcement, both
civilian and military, the author has come to some rather definite
conclusions. The first of these is that the quantum of punish-
ment is the least important factor. The second is that the standard
of discipline is going to be in direct proportion to the speed
with which it is administered, providing justice is done. Applied
to the present appellate system which has been under consideration,
the third conclusion is that the transcription of the complete
record and automatic appeal which accompanies every punitive dis-
charge, whether suspended or not, is a luxury which the military
can ill afford in peacetime. There are not enough court reporters
in the United States to commence to transcribe, in full, the
judicial proceedings which take place daily in this country. With
rare exceptions,, the civilian defendant must pay for so much of
a transcript of trial proceedings as may be required should he
desire to prosecute an appeal from a lower court conviction. The
military provides an accused with a copy of the transcript and
with defense counsel at no expense to him. Of the total of 15*1-2
cases filed in the Court of Military Appeals in 1956, 1390 petitions
for grant of review were denied and only 102 were granted. The
percentage of meritorious cases would appear, therefore, to be
rather low. The cases in which petitions were sought in Court
were again a very small percentage of the total number reviewed by
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the boards of review. It is very doubtful that many of those
convicted would have desired that their cases be appealed to the
boards of review. The great bulk of court -martial cases do not
result in punitive discharges or confinement in excess of six
months. These cases, of course, do not reach the boards of review.
They are reviewed by the convening authority with the advice of
his staff judge advocate or legal officer and then reviewed again
by a supervisory authority who again has the advice of a staff
judge advocate or a law specialist. Too many trained and qualified
-'•••
• lawyers'- are awfully busy telling other people what mistakes were
• 'made in the trial of cases for which the proceedings should never
•have -been transcribed. Unless the accused himself thinks that
•''-" ' J some injustice has been done to him, why should there be any ap-
"""
:
-" peHate procedure? Most men who have done wrong, been caugnt at
it, -brought to trial, given a fair trial without delay, and given
a reasonable punishment will not complain. This must be done while
the man feels some remorse for his acts or the effect is lost. If
the accused has been dealt with justly, he is probably quite anxious
to pay his debt and is not too much concerned with the delays which
accompany the preparation of the record of trial and its review.
In addition, a great many man hours are lost while this process
is taking place. The accused is not much concerned that trial
counsel asked a leading question or that some hearsay testimony
inadvertently crept into the record. The cases which have been
presented will illustrate the point being made. The Zimmerman
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case, supra , was before boards of review three separate times
and was twice before the Court. There the accused pleaded guilty
to an unauthorized absence of ten days and missing the movement
of his ship. He was sentenced to a bad conduct discharge and con*-
finement at hard labor for three months. Although the date of the
offense is not shown, the first case before the Court was decided
on February J, 1952, having been certified to the Court on November 30,
1951 • The second Court opinion was rendered on October 6, 1952,
and had the effect of sending the case back to the board of re-
view, nearly a year after the first certification. The accused
became a victim of the automatic system of review.
RECCMMENDATIONS,
1. It is recommended that the Manual be changed to prov'.de
that courts -martial be prohibited from imposing any fixed sentence
which includes a punitive discharge or confinement in excess of
six months, but in lieu thereof impose an indeterminate sentence
providing a minimum and maximum penalty in accordance with the
gravity of the offense or offenses upon which the sentence is to
be based. A separate sentence should be assessed upon each find-
ing of guilt, thereby making it possible for appellate bodies to
sever any portion of the sentence based upon a disapproved finding.
A parol authority should be created for the purpose of determining
actual servitude and ultimate disposition depending upon the cir-
cumstances of each case.
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2. Secondly, it is recommended that boards of review be de-
prived of authority to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility
of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact in their
consideration of the record of trial and their power of review
limited to matters of law.
3. Thirdly, it is recommended that the record of trial con-
tain only the trial proceedings with the evidence adduced thereat
but include no allied papers.
k. Fourthly, it is recommended that boards of review and
the Court of Military Appeals be specifically empowered to reduce
sentences adjudged to any lesser form of punishment as might be
made necessary by a reduction of findings and that the Manual be
so modified as to clearly spell out the degrees of punishment ex-
pressly delineating which are lesser and which are greater in
relation to each other.
5. Lastly, it is most sincerely and earnestly recommended
that the present provisions of the Code and the Manual providing
for automatic review by boards of review be repealed. As a sub-
stitute, it is suggested that the present practice of reporting
or recording the proceedings and testimony of all trials by
either general or special courts-martial be continued; that the
accused, within ten days after the pronouncement of findings
against him, be permitted to request, without any specification
of reason whatever, that his case or some particular portion
thereof be reviewed in accordance with the present procedure for
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review, but without regard to the enormity of the sentence which
may have been imposed upon, him; . that then and only then shall a
transcript of the record of trial be made; and that in the absence
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- •Vei?y -little has 'actually been written concerning the appellate
: processes -of military justice. Decisions of the -Court of Military
Appeals,' -therefore,- provide the mosti authoritative source. It has
not been possible to cover the entire field of appellate review
in tiiis thesis. The author believes, however, that he has been able
to consolidate a greater amount of information regarding the back-
ground and historical development of the present system than is
presently available in any other single publication. An under-
standing of this background is essential to any comprehensive study
of the system itself,)
In general, the Court cases dealing with the authorized scope
of review and the limitations thereon have been rather exhaustively
reviewed. The purpose of this review has been to present a summary
of the system to the legal profession as a wnole. In making this
summary, an effort has been made to acquaint the reader with some
of the peculiar problems which have arisen but in such a manner as
to minimize the necessity for inuividual research by the reader.
The author has presented what he believes to be satisfactory
solutions to seme of the problems which have been encountered. It
is hoped that these suggestions may serve to interest other writers
in offering their thoughts and solutions whether in agreement or
disagreement with this writer's view. It is most sincerely believed
that the number of officers, lawyers, and reporters presently re-
quired to administer military justice is far too great to be
practical. It is believed that the conclusions and recommendations
presented are such as to provoke serious thought among students
of law relative to some means of creating a mor6 efficient appellate
system. There can be little question but that mobilization for
total war would make some change imperative.
Considerable thought was given to the possibility of sub-
stituting trials de novo in higher tribunals for the present system
of automatic reviews. It is quite possible that a better solution
may lie in this area than those which are proposed herein.
The author will be highly gratified if this work serves to
aid civilian attorneys and newly commissioned officer-lawyers in
the military in gaining an insight and understanding of the
present system without duplicating the effort and research which
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